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1 Introduction
[..] it were self-evident that hunters and gatherers had to help each other
to survive, so humans must have helping genes. (Hoffman [55], p. 1)
In our modern society, as people become more and more concerned with managing
the increasing number of tasks arising in their everyday lives, helping each other is no
longer as ’self-evident’ as it should be. Some possible reasons include the demands of
being mobile and flexible, along with the lack of home care possibilities for the elderly
and children. These constraints have resulted in, for example, a lower birth rate, which
is expected to have negative consequences for the economic and biological development
of modern society. Thus, there is a growing need for people to be supported in managing
their everyday lives.
Accordingly, by advancing research in Artificial Intelligence (AI), we can improve the
ability of artificial agents to help us solve such problems. The possibility of being con-
fronted with artificial agents increases with each passing year. They can be embedded
in multiple settings, e.g., caring and therapy, teaching, internet, and smart-phone appli-
cations. To facilitate successful communication and social interaction between artificial
agents and human partners, it is essential that aspects of human social behavior be
considered when designing human-computer interfaces. A crucial aspect is empa-
thy, often referred to as the ability to perceive and understand others’ emotional states.
Further, artificial agents are not only required to support and facilitate our everyday
lives but also present a suitable testbed to help us understand psychological phenomena
such as empathy. Hence, the goal of the present thesis is to provide a computational
model of empathy to enhance an artificial agent’s social behavior, and to provide an
experimental tool for the psychological theories shaping the model.
Parts of this thesis were already published in [11], [18], [14], [16], [17], [15], and [13].
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the following, we motivate the role of empathy in social behavior and in human-
machine interaction. Further, we emphasize the role of computational modeling in pro-
viding an experimental tool to help understanding psychological phenomena such as
empathy.
1.1.1 Empathy, social behavior, and human-machine interaction
Psychologists like Davis [34] and Hoffman [55] have emphasized the role of empathy in
cooperative and prosocial behaviors like helping, caring, and justice, as well as
in preventing antisocial behaviors like aggression. For example, students with high
empathy scores on a paper-and-pencil measure dispensed more money to a Telethon
community and volunteered more hours at shelters for homeless families than did stu-
dents with lower scores (cf. [55]). In a study by Batson & Ahmad [4], participants were
induced to feel empathy for their co-participants in a prisoner’s dilemma scenario. As
result half of the participants did not defect despite knowing that their partners had
already defected. Thus, if the participant feels empathy for the other person, then the
dilemma still exists. In a study by Mehrabian & Epstein [77], students were asked to act
as teachers and to punish a learner for each incorrect answer using varying intensities of
electric shock. As result they found that teachers with high empathy scores on a paper-
and-pencil measure were less aggressive than teachers with low empathy scores. Further,
neuropsychological evidence [35] substantiates the claim that humans empathize with
each other to different degrees depending on several factors including, among others,
their mood, personality, and social relationships.
Research in AI describes social ability as one of three important properties in an in-
telligent agent [120]. An intelligent agent is defined as: ’a computer system situated
in some environment, and capable of autonomous actions in this environment in order
to meet its design objectives.’ (Wooldridge [120], p. 15). In this regard, social abil-
ity is defined as an intelligent agent’s capacity to interact with other agents, e.g., to
cooperate and negotiate [120]. According to the role of empathy in promoting humans’
cooperative and prosocial behavior, endowing artificial agents with the ability to em-
pathize enhances their communicative and cooperative social skills, thus improving their
intelligent behavior.
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Brooks [22] claims that intelligent behavior emerges from an agent’s interaction with
its environment. Therefore, in order for an agent to exploit the actual situation and
to interact with its environment, it needs a physical body composed of sensors and
actuators that couple the agent with the environment, and thus influences the agent’s
internal processing. This is referred to as embodiment [22]. Accordingly, an artificial
agent’s embodiment is crucial to perceiving and understanding an interaction partner’s
emotional states, and to expressing and communicating empathy through, for example,
facial expressions and verbal utterances.
Research on artificial agents exhibiting empathic behavior such as virtual humans
and robots, provides valuable results for the integration of empathy in human-machine
interaction, and substantiates the role of empathy in enhancing artificial agents’ social
behavior. Virtual humans are 3D animated characters with human like appearance.
Prendinger & Ishizuka [95] found that a virtual human that provides empathic feedback
through textual expressions can reduce the stress levels of candidates during job inter-
view tasks. Brave et al. [19] found that in a game scenario of casino-style blackjack, an
artificial agent that empathizes with the player’s game situation is perceived as more
likable, trustworthy, and caring. Leite et al. [69] found that a robot’s empathic behavior
in a chess game scenario is perceived by children as more engaging and helpful. Further,
not only does an artificial agents’ ability to empathize have a positive impact on human-
machine interaction, but also their ability to evoke empathy in humans. In this regard,
Paiva et al. [91] show that empathic virtual humans can evoke empathy in children
and thus can teach them to deal with bullying situations. A virtual human’s empathic
behavior also contributes to its ability to build and sustain long-term socio-emotional
relationships with human partners as demonstrated by Bickmore & Picard [9].
However, in the context of a competitive card game scenario, Becker et al. [7] found
that a virtual human’s positive empathic emotions are significantly arousing and stress
inducing and thus inadequate. Therefore, in line with humans’ ability to empathize with
each other to different degrees, we believe that a modulation of a virtual human’s
empathic behavior through factors such as its mood, personality, and relationship to
its interaction partner, will allow for a more adequate empathic behavior in the
agent across different interaction scenarios. Although much effort has gone to providing
artificial agents with features such as mood, personality and social relationships, little
attention has been devoted to the role of such features in modulating their empathic
behavior. Altogether, endowing artificial agents with appropriate empathic behavior
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contributes in enhancing their social behavior.
1.1.2 Interdisciplinary partnership: AI and psychology
In the previous section, the role of empathy in enhancing artificial agents’ social skills
was motivated. In this regard, not only does psychological research contribute to the
computational modeling of psychological phenomena, computational modeling can also
contribute to clarifying the underlying theories. Marsella et al. [73] refer to this as an
interdisciplinary partnership. The authors argue that computational modeling can
concretize concepts dealt with in psychological theories where they are typically de-
scribed in natural language at an informal and abstract level. The process of developing
a computational model facilitates the systematic examination and deeper understanding
of the different theoretical aspects and assumptions. Furthermore, a more flexible eval-
uation of a theory can be achieved by defining different parameters and modules within
the model, thus allowing for the investigation of the effects and interactions of hidden
aspects in the theory. For example, De Vignemont & Singer [35] claim that humans
empathize with each other to different degrees depending on several factors, e.g., their
relationships with each other. However, in their theory, they do not provide concrete
values for their proposed factors, now explain how they systematically influence the de-
gree of empathy. A computational model would make it possible to test these proposed
factors and to, in turn, develop a systematic definition of how they interact to impact
the degree of empathy. In sum, computational modeling provides an experimental tool
for the underlying theories, and contributes to their verification and enhancement.
1.2 Thesis scope and objectives
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the goal of the present thesis is to provide a
computational model of empathy to enhance an artificial agent’s social behavior,
and to provide an experimental tool for the psychological theories shaping the model.
The proposed empathy model is realized for the virtual humans MAX and EMMA, and
is applied and evaluated in the context of two different interaction scenarios. The virtual
humans MAX and EMMA are developed in the AI-Group headed by Prof. Dr. Ipke
Wachsmuth at the Faculty of Technology of Bielefeld University. In the following, we
formulate the main problems and requirements to achieve our objectives. At the end of
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this section, the research context of the present thesis will be outlined.
Problems and requirements
After careful consideration of the theoretical background on empathy and of related work
on empathic artificial agents, (Chapters 2 and 3), the following problems and require-
ments emerged. In this regard, we define three requirements for building a computational
model of empathy that addresses three central processes to empathy. We refer to these
requirements as Empathy Mechanism, Empathy Modulation, and Expression of Em-
pathy. Further, we define two requirements that a proposed model of empathy should
satisfy, namely, Adequacy and Universality.
• Empathy Mechanism: empathy arises in response to others’ emotions. There-
fore, an approach to recognize others’ emotional states and to generate an empathic
emotion is required.
• Empathy Modulation: empathy emerges in different degrees depending on fac-
tors such as mood, personality, and social relationships. Therefore, to generate
different degrees of empathy, an approach to determine the values of the modu-
lation factors in question, and to modulate the empathic emotion through these
factors is required.
• Expression of Empathy: empathy is communicated by different modalities.
Therefore, in order to define an expression of empathy, a repertoire of at least
one modality that represents an adequate expression of empathy is required.
• Adequacy: the proposed empathy model should provide adequate empathic be-
havior in line with underlying theories and hypotheses.
• Universality: the empathy model should be easily applied and adapted to differ-
ent context scenarios.
Research context
This doctoral thesis is realized in an interdisciplinary research context supported by the
Collaborative Research Center 673 (CRC 673), Alignment in Communication. In
the project part A1 Modelling Partners, affective partner modeling as a function of
5
1 Introduction
internally representing others’ perceived emotional states, and emotional alignment are
addressed. In this regard, the computational model of empathy proposed here allows
a virtual human to align to interaction partners’ perceived emotional states. Further,
the empirical evaluation of the model was performed in cooperation with Prof. Dr. Pia
Knoeferle and Dr. Maria Nella Carminati as members of the psycholinguistics section of
the project.
1.3 Thesis structure
• Chapter 2: this chapter discusses the psychological and neuropsychological
background relevant to understand the theoretical concepts underlying the pro-
posed computational model of empathy. Accordingly, the chapter begins by dis-
cussing different theoretical models of empathy. Further, we focus on the implica-
tions of the theoretical models of emotion, and of theories and findings on emotion
expression and perception for the realization of several theoretical aspects of em-
pathy.
• Chapter 3: this chapter begins by giving an overview on some of the compu-
tational models of emotion, and their application and evaluation in virtual
human and robot scenarios. Subsequently, approaches to the simulation of emo-
tion expression, and methods for emotion recognition are presented. Further,
different computational models of empathy and their application and evalua-
tion in virtual human and robot scenarios are discussed. Finally, the requirements
formulated in the present chapter are concluded, and related work on empathy is
classified with respect to these requirements.
• Chapter 4: this chapter introduces a new virtual human with a female-like ap-
pearance, called EMMA. In this chapter, the different steps taken in developing
EMMA are described. A highlight is EMMA’s ability to express a wide range
of emotional states based on a large repertoire of emotional facial expressions, a
property crucial to the generation and expression of empathic emotions.
• Chapter 5: this chapter introduces our computational model of empathy real-
ized for the virtual humans MAX and EMMA. The chapter begins by presenting
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the overall structure of the model and its integration into an existing cognitive ar-
chitecture. Further, the different processing steps of the model are introduced, and
the implications of the theoretical background in shaping the model are detailed.
• Chapter 6: this chapter introduces the application and evaluation of the pro-
posed empathy model. Two application scenarios are presented for the model. This
is followed by the description of an empirical evaluation of the model, along with
its results.
• Chapter 7: this chapter summarizes and discusses the results and contribu-
tion of the thesis in light of the goals and requirements formulated in the present
chapter. The chapter ends with future directions for research.
7
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The development of a computational model of empathy is an interdisciplinary task in-
volving several psychological and neuropsychological theories, and depending signifi-
cantly on advances in these theories. Therefore, this chapter discusses the psychologi-
cal and neuropsychological background relevant to understand the theoretical concepts
underlying our computational model of empathy. Section 2.1 covers the debate on a
universal definition of empathy and describes different theoretical models of empathy.
Subsequently, Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively, elucidate the implications of theoretical
models of emotion and of theories and findings on emotion expression and perception
for the realization of several theoretical aspects of empathy.
2.1 Theoretical models of empathy
The same as other psychological phenomena such as emotion (see Section 2.2), empathy
has no universally agreed upon definition. In the following, we introduce the debate on a
universal definition of empathy, and discuss the different theoretical models of empathy.
In Section 2.1.4, our working definition of empathy is given and three central processes to
empathy are identified which are crucial to shaping the computational model of empathy
proposed in the present thesis (see Chapter 5).
2.1.1 Definitions of empathy
The origin of the term empathy can be traced back to the German term Einfühlung
which, literally translated, means ’feeling oneself into’ (Goldstein & Michaels [45],
p. 4). In the nineteenth-century, Lipps introduced the term Einfühlung in the context
of German aesthetics where he defined it as the tendency to project oneself ’into’ an
object of art during its contemplation so as to obtain a better understanding of the
observed object [45]. In the early twentieth-century, Lipps introduced Einfühlung in
a psychological context and extended its definition from understanding of art to the
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understanding of persons. In this regard, he states that the perception of another’s
emotional state leads to the imitation of the other’s emotional expression. This results
in a similar emotional reaction in the observer that allows a better understanding of the
other [45]. In 1910, Titchener introduced the English term empathy as a translation
of the German term Einfühlung [34].
A literal translation of the term Einfühlung means ’feeling oneself into’ and refers
more to an active process of projecting oneself into the other [34]. Consequently, there
was a focus on empathy as an active process. This resulted in the emergence of a further
definition of empathy as the cognitive understanding of the other by taking on the role
or the perspective of the other [34]. This deviation from the original definition lead to a
debate on a universal definition and to the emergence of different definitions. The multi-
ple definitions of empathy can be subdivided into three major categories [87]: (1)
empathy as an affective response to the other’s emotion, (2) empathy as the cognitive
understanding of the other’s emotion, and (3) empathy as the combination of the above
two definitional categories. The definitions of empathy as well as the processes under-
lying empathy are discussed next within different psychological and neuropsychological
models.
2.1.2 Psychological models of empathy
In the following, we present two psychological models of empathy offering comprehensive
and detailed models that unify different views and perspectives. Such models are crucial
to the computational modeling of empathy, and as such have major implications for our
computational model. These implications will be detailed in Chapter 5.
Hoffman’s model of empathy
In his theory of prosocial moral behavior and development, Hoffman [55] emphasizes the
important role of empathy in contributing to prosocial actions and moral principles. He
examines empathy and defines it as
[..] an affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s
own. (Hoffman [55], p. 4)
He argues that an empathic response need not to be a close match to the affect ex-
perienced by the other, but can be any emotional reaction compatible with the other’s
10
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situation. Accordingly, Hoffman follows the definition of empathy as an affective response
to the other’s emotion (cf. Section 2.1.1). However, he accords a special importance to
the cognitive processes underlying empathy, and claims that, in his perspective, empathy
is defined in terms of the processes required for an empathic response. In this regard, he
states that empathy is multidetermined, and introduces five processes by which an em-
pathic response arises. He calls these processes modes of empathic arousal. Among
these modes of empathic arousal, Hoffman distinguishes three that he defines as ’prever-
bal, automatic, and essentially involuntary’ ([55], p. 5): mimicry, classical conditioning,
and direct association. He states that these modes require lower-level cognitive pro-
cessing. Further, he distinguishes two modes that he defines as requiring higher-level
cognitive processing: mediated association and role-taking.
Mimicry Hoffman [55] defines mimicry as a process involving the imitation of another’s
facial expressions, voice, and posture that triggers an afferent feedback eliciting feelings
in the observer that are similar to those of the observed other. Thus, he identifies two
successive steps underlying the process of mimicry which he calls imitation and feed-
back. Hoffman discusses several empirical findings that provide supportive evidence for
imitation and feedback.
With regard to imitation, Meltzoff & Moore [79] found that infants between two-and
three-weeks of age can reproduce tongue protrusion, mouth opening, lip protrusion, and
a sequential finger movement demonstrated by an adult. Thus, two-to three-week old
infants are able to imitate adults’ facial and manual gestures. Meltzoff & Moore not
only provide evidence for infants’ ability to imitate, but also provide a theoretical model
explaining the mechanisms underlying infant’s facial imitation [80]. Further, Termine &
Izard [115] found that nine-month old infants reproduce their mother’s facial and vocal
expressions of joy and sadness. The same as Lipps, Bavelas et al. [6] refer to imitation
as motor mimicry. In their attempt to study motor mimicry, they found that a broad
class of incidents evoked motor mimicry in human observers, e.g., a painful situation,
laughter, smiling, affection, embarrassment, discomfort, disgust, stuttering, facing a
thrown projectile, ducking away from being hit, word-finding, reaching with effort, and
succeeding and failing at a timed task.
Regarding feedback, Hoffman discusses supportive evidence provided by evaluation
of the so called Facial Feedback Hypothesis (FFH) which refers to the assumption that
changes in facial expressions elicit emotion (see Section 2.2).
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Classical conditioning Hoffman [55] defines classical conditioning as the pairing of
others’ observed emotional cues with own simultaneous emotional experience. Thus,
the others’ observed emotional cues become conditioned and an emotional response
is evoked as an empathic response when observing these emotional cues in the other.
Hoffman [55] states that classical conditioning as an empathy arousing mode occurs
during the preverbal years of childhood, e.g., through mother-child interactions. For
example [55], when the mother’s body stiffens as an anxious reaction, this negative
feeling is transmitted to the child through body contact while holding the child. The
child’s negative feeling is paired with cues observed in the mother, which then become
conditioned stimuli. Thus, the observation of these expressive cues evokes the negative
feeling in the child, even in the absence of physical contact.
Direct association Hoffman [55] defines direct association as the process by which the
observation of another’s emotional cues, e.g., facial expressions or any other situational
cue, elicits similar past experiences that evoke an emotional response in the observer
compatible with the other’s situation. Thus, the observer directly associates the other’s
emotional cues with similar past experiences. Hoffman also argues that direct associ-
ation is a variant of classical conditioning. Compared to classical conditioning, direct
association requires the previous experience of an emotion similar to that of the other.
Mediated association Hoffman [55] also refers to mediated association as verbal me-
diation. He defines it as the process by which the processing and decoding of another’s
verbal messages elicits similar past experiences that evoke an emotional response in the
observer compatible with the other’s verbally described situation. According to Hoffman,
verbal mediation requires semantic processing and decoding of the meanings of words,
and thus require higher-level cognitive processing and more mental effort than the pre-
viously introduced empathy arousing modes. Further, he claims that verbal mediation
evoke an empathic response in the observer even in the absence of the other.
Role-taking Hoffman [55] defines role-taking as an observer’s ability to put himself
in the other’s situation, and to imagine how the other feels. According to Hoffman,
role-taking requires higher-level cognitive processing.
Stotland [113] found that participants’ negative emotional response when exposed to
a painful heat treatment procedure was higher when they imagined themselves being in
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this situation, than when they imagined how the other felt or when they simply attended
to the other’s movements. He also founds that participants in the first and second con-
dition showed a delayed physiological response after the beginning of the heat treatment
procedure than did participants in the last condition. Consequently, Hoffman states that
the delay in participants’ physiological response measured in Stotland’s experiment was
due to a higher-level of cognitive processing and the mental effort involved in role-taking.
Based on Stotland’s results, Hoffman distinguishes two types of role-taking. Self-
focused role-taking as referring to the ’imagine self’ condition in Stotland’s experiment.
Other-focused role-taking as referring to the ’imagine him’ condition in Stotland’s exper-
iment. Further, Hoffman also states that other-focused role-taking is more cognitively
demanding than self-focused role-taking as it requires taking the other’s ’inner’ states
into account.
Role-taking has also been defined by Higgins [53] as
seeing the world through another’s eyes or putting yourself in another’s
shoes. (Higgins [53], p. 119)
The same as Hoffman [55], Higgins [53] makes a distinction between two types of role-
taking, situational role-taking and individual role-taking. In situational role-taking,
an observer appraises another’s situation by using the same appraisal mechanisms as
if he were in the situation himself. In individual role-taking, an observer appraises
another’s situation by taking the other’s viewpoint and characteristics into account.
Hoffman also highlights the importance of many modes of empathic arousal.
Importance of many modes According to Hoffman [55], the many modes of empathic
arousal allow observers to empathize with others in many different situations regardless
of the emotional cues available. What determines which particular mode will operate
is the nature of the situation, e.g., the perception of expressive cues will more likely
foster mimicry. Furthermore, the different modes of empathic arousal are thought to
commonly operate in conjunction with one another. For example, the perception of
different emotional cues may activate different modes. In this case, mimicry, classical
conditioning, and direct association precede mediated association and role-taking which
involve higher-level cognitive processing. Moreover, role-taking may activate the other
modes, e.g., it may activate mimicry through the imagination of the other’s emotional
expressions. The subsequent operation of the empathy arousing modes may intensify or
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fine-tune the empathic response. The many modes also contribute to getting an accurate
empathic response, e.g., when the other’s expressive cues belie his feelings in a certain
situation, role-taking instead of mimicry will evoke a more accurate empathic response.
Hoffman also addresses the development of empathy from childhood to maturity.
Development of empathy Hoffman [55] distinguishes four stages in the development
of empathy with respect to self-other differentiation. These are egocentric empathy, quasi-
egocentric empathy, veridical empathy, and empathy beyond the situation.
In the egocentric empathy stage, children toward the end of their first year have
a confusion in their self-other differentiation. For example, a 10-month-old child who
observed a friend falling down and crying, also started to cry and then put his thumb
in his mouth and put his head in his mother’s lap. The child’s reaction was the same
as when he himself was in this situation. At this stage, children are confused about the
difference between what happens to others and what happens to themselves. Further,
their empathy is limited to the preverbal empathy arousing modes: mimicry, classical
conditioning, and direct association.
In the quasi-egocentric empathy stage, children early in their second year are aware
of ’self and others as separate physical entities’ (Hoffman [55], p. 64). For example, a
14-month-old child was comforting his crying friend by bringing him to his own mother
despite the presence of the friend’s mother. At this stage, children are confused about
the difference between their own needs and the others’ needs. Further, their empathy is
extended to an early form of the empathy arousing mode self-focused role-taking.
In the veridical empathy stage, children late in their second year are aware of
’self and others as having independent internal states’ (Hoffman [55], p. 64). Hoffman
illustrates the transition from quasi-egocentric empathy stage to the veridical empathy
stage with the following example. A two-year-old child comforted his friend by bringing
him his own teddy bear, but when his friend did not stop crying, the child looked for
his friend’s teddy bear. At this stage, children can differentiate between their own needs
and those of others, and are aware of others’ inner states as distinct from their own.
Further, they are now capable of self-focused and other-focused role-taking.
In the empathy beyond the situation stage, children become aware of ’self and
others as having their own personal histories, identities, and live beyond the immediate
situation’ (Hoffman [55], p. 64). At this stage, empathy also occurs with respect to oth-
ers’ imagined life situations. Further, Hoffman states that observers’ empathic response
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can have different degrees of intensity depending on different factors influencing their
empathy bias.
Empathy bias According to Hoffman [55], an observer’s empathic response can have
different degrees of intensity depending on the salience and intensity of the other’s
emotional cues and on the relationship between the observer and the other. The higher
the salience and intensity of the other’s emotional cues, the more intense the observer’s
empathic response. With regard to the relationship between the observer and the other,
Hoffman distinguishes in-group bias, friendship bias, similarity bias, and here-and-know
bias as factors influencing the observer’s empathy bias. That is, observers empathize
to a higher degree with family members, primary group members, friends, people with
similar concerns and needs, and with present rather than absent people. He refers to in-
group bias, friendship bias, and similarity bias as familiarity bias. Further, he discusses
empirical evidence for the proposed familiarity bias.
Costin & Jones [29] found that children watching a friend or an acquaintance in a
hypothetical dilemma reported more empathy for their friends than for the acquaintance
and were more motivated to help their friends than the acquaintance. Krebs [65] found
that participants who believed to be similar in their personality profile to the observed
person showed higher physiological response for the pleasure and pain experiences of the
other person than for those believed to be dissimilar. In his theory of prosocial moral
behavior and development, Hoffman claims that empathy plays a crucial role in the
development and motivation of prosocial moral principles.
Empathy and prosocial moral principles Hoffman [55] emphasizes the important role
of empathy in contributing to prosocial actions and moral principles. In this regard, he
focuses on caring and justice as prosocial moral behaviors. Hoffman defines caring as the
maximization of well being and happiness in others. Caring includes concern for others’
welfare and helping others in need.
Bavelas et al. [5] argue for mimicry as a communicative act mediating solidarity and
involvement with others. They state
By immediately displaying a reaction appropriate to the other’s situa-
tion (e.g., a wince for the other’s pain), the observer conveys, precisely and
eloquently, both awareness of and involvement with the other’s situation.
(Bavelas et al. [5], p. 278)
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Accordingly, Hoffman states that ’mimicry-based empathy’ (Hoffman [55], p. 45) not
only provides a motive for prosocial behavior but is also a prosocial act.
Davis’ organizational model of empathy
The same as Hoffman [55], Davis [34] attempts to unify the different perspectives on
empathy. He proposes an organizational model of empathy which is based on a definition
of empathy as
[..] a set of constructs having to do with the responses of one individual
to the experiences of another. (Davis [34], p. 12)
By means of such a broad definition, Davis’ goal is to combine the different aspects
of empathy that had been considered separately, i.e. empathy’s affective and cognitive
aspects. In this regard, Davis’ definition of empathy falls into the third category of
empathy definitions (cf. Section 2.1.1).
As compared to Hoffman, Davis not only considers different aspects of empathy but
also defines their relationship to each other. Hence, he defines four related constructs
that constitute the proposed organizational model of empathy, antecedents, processes, in-
trapersonal outcomes, and interpersonal outcomes. Figure 2.1 illustrates these constructs
and their relationship to each other.
Antecedents Davis [34] defines antecedents as the characteristics of the observer and
the situation which influence empathic processes and outcomes (see Figure 2.1). He listed
the following as relevant characteristics of the observer: biological capacities, individual
differences, and learning history. Biological capacities refer to the ability to engage in,
e.g., higher-level cognitive processes such as role-taking. In this regard, Davis refers to
Hoffman’s four stages of empathy development with respect to self-other differentiation
[55]. Individual differences refer to differences in the dispositional tendency to engage
in certain empathic processes and to experience certain empathic outcomes. Learning
history refers to acquired values and behaviors related to empathy.
With regard to the characteristics of the situation, Davis mentions strength of situation
and observer-target similarity. Strength of situation refers to the strength of perceived
emotional cues, e.g., the perception of a strong facial display of an emotion leads to a
strong affective response as an empathic outcome. Observer-target similarity refers to
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Figure 2.1: Davis’ organizational model of empathy [34], p. 13.
the degree of similarity between the observer and the other. The higher the degree of
similarity, the more intense or likely the empathic outcomes. The definition of strength of
situation is in line with Hoffman’s [55] assertion that the higher the salience and intensity
of the other’s emotional cues, the more intense the observer’s empathic response. Fur-
thermore, the definition of observer-target similarity is in line with Hoffman’s introduced
similarity bias.
Processes Davis [34] defines processes as the mechanisms by which empathic outcomes
are generated (see Figure 2.1). As processes, Davis introduces primary circular reaction,
motor mimicry, classical conditioning, direct association, language mediated association,
and role-taking as Hoffman’s modes of empathic arousal [54] [55]. Following Hoffman [54],
Davis defines primary circular reaction as the newborn’s reactive cry to another infant’s
cry. This process is not included in Hoffman’s modes of empathic arousal according to
his more recent work [55].
Further, Davis introduces labeling and elaborated cognitive networks as empathic pro-
cesses as proposed by Eisenberg et al. [37]. Accordingly, he defines labeling as making
inferences about the other’s experience based on simple cues, e.g., knowing that college
graduations are likely to produce happiness. He defines elaborated cognitive networks as
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the use of available cues to access stored knowledge and to use this knowledge to make
inferences about the other. Davis states that labeling and elaborated cognitive networks
are respectively similar to direct association and language mediated association.
Intrapersonal outcomes Davis [34] defines intrapersonal outcomes as affective and
non-affective outcomes generated by the above introduced empathic processes. These are
affected by the empathic antecedent conditions (see Figure 2.1), and are not manifested
in overt behavior toward the other.
He defines affective outcomes as an observer’s affective responses to observed experi-
ences of the other, and distinguishes parallel from reactive outcomes. Parallel outcomes
refer to affective responses that match or reproduce the affect observed in the other.
Consequently, parallel outcomes are more likely to be produced through lower-level cog-
nitive processes, e.g., motor mimicry. Furthermore, observer-target similarity increases
the likelihood of parallel outcomes. Reactive outcomes refer to affective responses that
are different from affect observed in the other. For example, witnessing someone being
unfairly treated may lead an observer to react with empathic anger, or with empathic
concern as a feeling of compassion or pity, or with personal distress as a feeling of dis-
comfort or anxiety. Consequently, experiencing an affective response different from the
affect observed in the other requires higher-level cognitive processing and interpretation
of the other’s state. Thus, reactive outcomes are more likely to be produced through
higher-level cognitive processes such as role-taking.
With regard to non-affective outcomes, Davis defines interpersonal accuracy and at-
tributional judgments as cognitive outcomes that are more likely to be produced through
higher-level cognitive processes such as role-taking. Interpersonal accuracy refers to the
adequate estimation of others’ internal states such as their feelings and thoughts. Attri-
butional judgments refer to how an observer explains what causes the other’s behavior.
Interpersonal outcomes Davis [34] defines interpersonal outcomes as overt behaviors
toward the other that mainly result from intrapersonal outcomes. Such interpersonal
outcomes are helping, aggression, and social behavior (see Figure 2.1). Davis defines
helping as
[..] actions taken by one person which, at some cost to the self, improve
the welfare of another by either reducing negative states and/or increasing
positive states for that other. (Davis [34], p. 127)
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Further, he defines aggression as antisocial behavior inhibited by empathy and nega-
tively associated with empathy. Social behavior refers to all behaviors that occur in the
context of establishing or maintaining social relationships, and that are affected by em-
pathy. Helping and aggression are also included in these behaviors. According to Davis’
mediational model [34] which addresses the role of empathy in social relationships, one’s
ability for empathy impacts one’s social behavior which is perceived by others and which
therefore influences one’s social relationships with others.
Conclusion
Both Hoffman [55] and Davis [34] offer comprehensive and detailed models of empathy
based on an elaborate discussion of empirical and theoretical work. However, they do
not provide an explanation of the exact mechanisms underlying the different aspects of
empathy considered in their models, e.g., the mechanisms required to decode and recog-
nize others’ emotional states. Further, in Davis’s model some hypothesized relationships
between the proposed empathy constructs remain difficult to understand, e.g., the rela-
tionship between the processes and the intrapersonal outcomes. In this regard, emotion
theories, and theories and findings on emotion expression and perception may allow for
a more precise explanation of the mechanisms in question (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
2.1.3 Neuropsychological models of empathy
Neuropsychological models of empathy investigate the neural mechanisms underlying
empathy and thus offer further support to psychological models. They also allow for
a more precise consideration of the processes underlying empathy. Accordingly, they
provide additional support for the computational modeling of empathy, and as such
have crucial implications for our computational model. Again, these implications will be
detailed in Chapter 5.
The shared neural network hypothesis
In the context of neurobiological research on the neural correlates of motor action execu-
tion and of motor action observation, a set of neurons that fires during execution as well
as during observation of goal-directed motor actions such as grasping, manipulating, or
holding objects was discovered and referred to as mirror neurons by Rizzolatti et al.
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[97] [96].
Subsequently, it has been suggested that the observation of an action causes the
internal automatic simulation or reproduction of the same action in the observer and
that this mechanism could be at the basis of action recognition and understanding [43]. In
line with this hypothesis, neurobiological studies show that the activation of the human
mirror neuron system is crucial for recognizing and understanding others’ actions, and
that it is also crucial to imitation and to intention understanding (see [44], [43], and [96]
for a review and discussion).
Further neurobiological studies show that another similar ’mirror’ mechanism under-
lies emotion understanding, and is thought to be fundamental to empathy [35]. That
is, observing someone’s emotional state activates brain areas involved in experiencing
that same emotional state. Wicker et al. [118] found that exposure to disgusting stimuli
(disgusting odorants) activated areas in the human brain responsible for viscero-motor
responses, and that observing facial expressions of disgust activated the same brain ar-
eas. Botvinick et al. [10] found that exposure to a painful stimuli (thermal stimulation)
engaged the human viscero-motor brain areas, as did observing faces expressing pain.
Carr et al. [24] noticed an activation of overlapping brain areas responsible for viscero-
motor responses both while imitating and while observing facial expressions of emotion
(see [44], [96], and [43] for a review and discussion of these and of further studies).
Taken together, the results of neurobiological studies investigating humans’ ’mirror
mechanisms’ suggest the existence of a shared neural network for the representation of
actions and emotions. Consequently, humans are assumed to possess a shared repre-
sentational system critical to understanding others’ actions and emotions. Accord-
ingly, Gallese [43] introduces embodied simulation as a functional mechanism at the
basis of understanding others. It consists of internal and automatic simulative processes
using a ’pre-existing body-model in the brain’ (Gallese [43], p. 42), making embodied
simulation similar to the empathy arousing mode mimicry (cf. [55]).
The empathic brain
In their attempt to narrow the definition of empathy, De Vignemont & Singer [35] state
that there is empathy if:
(i) one is in an affective state; (ii) this state is isomorphic to another
person’s affective state; (iii) this state is elicited by the observation or imag-
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ination of another person’s affective state; (iv) one knows that the other
person is the source of one’s own affective state. (De Vignemont & Singer
[35], p. 435)
Accordingly, they follow the definition of empathy as an affective response to the
other’s emotion (cf. Section 2.1.1). De Vignemont & Singer [35] claim that an empathic
response is automatically elicited by the observation or imagination of another person’s
affective state based on the activation of a shared neural network. They point out that
automatically empathizing with others when exposed to their emotions would result in
being in a ’permanent emotional turmoil’ (De Vignemont & Singer [35], p. 436). Conse-
quently, they propose several modulation factors that may influence the amplitude of
empathic brain responses. They also discuss neuropsychological evidence for the ’mod-
ulation of the empathic brain’ (De Vignemont & Singer [35], p. 437).
Saarela et al. [103] found stronger brain responses when participants empathized with
people displaying acute pain than when they empathized with people displaying chronic
pain. Singer et al. [110] showed that men but not women had significantly weaker em-
pathic brain responses when the observed person in pain was judged as unfair as when the
observed person was judged as fair and likable. Lamm et al. [66] found that participants’
empathic brain responses were reduced when they were told that painful treatment was
beneficial. Gu & Han [49] showed that participants’ empathic brain responses to pic-
tures or cartoons of hands in painful situations were stronger when they focused their
attention on the intensity of the pain than when they were asked to simply count the
number of hands in the pictures or cartoons. Cheng et al. [25] found that participants
who practice acupuncture had a reduced empathic brain response to pictures of needles
penetrating different body parts as compared to naive participants (see [35] and [52], for
a review and discussion of these and of further studies).
Based on these findings, De Vignemont & Singer [35] distinguish four main cate-
gories of modulation factors. These are features of observed emotion, relationship be-
tween empathizer and observed other, situational context, and features of the empathizer.
As features of observed emotion, they propose valence, intensity, saliency, and primary
versus secondary emotions. They state that it is may be easier to empathize with primary
emotions such as fear and happiness than with secondary emotions such as jealousy. As
relationship between empathizer and observed other they propose affective link, famil-
iarity and similarity, and communicative intentions as one’s intentions to communicate
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the desire to empathize. As situational context they propose appraisal of the situation
and display of multiple emotions. They state that it becomes difficult to concurrently
empathize with different others displaying different emotions. Finally, as features of the
empathizer they propose mood, level of arousal, personality, gender, and age, emotional
repertoire, and emotional regulation capacities.
Emotional cue Emotional Context 
Appraisal 
Processes 
Empathic  
Response 
Late appraisal model 
Emotional cue Emotional Context 
Appraisal 
Processes 
Empathic  
Response 
Early appraisal model 
Figure 2.2: Late and early appraisal models [35], p. 438.
According to De Vignemont & Singer [35], an important question is at what stage
modulation occurs during empathic processing. They propose two possible routes, and
state that current neuropsychological research cannot yet clearly distinguish between
them. First, in the late appraisal model of empathy (see Figure 2.2, left), the per-
ception of an emotional cue directly and automatically activates an empathic response.
Subsequently, the empathic response is modulated or inhibited through different mod-
ulation factors. Second, in the early appraisal model of empathy (see Figure 2.2,
right), the perception of an emotional cue does not directly and automatically activate
an empathic response. The emotional cue is first processed and evaluated in the context
of different modulation factors. Whether an empathic response arises depends on the
outcome of the evaluation.
Conclusion
Findings of neuropsychological research further substantiate and refine psychological
theories on empathy. For example, the shared neural network hypothesis is crucial for
the empathy arousing mode mimicry as defined by Hoffman [55]. Further support is
also provided for the existence of empathy bias and for empathy antecedent conditions,
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as respectively defined by Hoffman [55] and Davis [34]. These are very similar to the
empathy modulation factors defined by De Vignemont & Singer [35].
2.1.4 Conclusion and working definitions
Both Hoffman [55] and Davis [34] provide comprehensive and detailed models of empathy
where several aspects of empathy and different perspectives on empathy are unified.
As compared to Davis [34], Hoffman provides a more precise definition of empathy.
Accordingly, in the present work, we follow Hoffman’s definition of empathy as ’[..]
an affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own’. (Hoffman
[55], p. 4)
Further, after consideration of the theoretical models of empathy introduced in the
previous sections, we identify three processes that are central to human empathy and
that have been addressed in most of the presented theories. First, the Empathy Mech-
anism which we define as the process by which an empathic emotion is generated. In this
regard, Hoffman [55] proposes five empathy arousing modes, Davis [34] refers to Hoff-
man’s modes as empathic processes, and De Vignemont & Singer [35] follow the shared
neural network hypothesis. Second, the Empathy Modulation which we define as the
process by which an empathic emotion is modulated. In this regard, Hoffman [55] defines
factors influencing observers’ empathy bias, Davis [34] defines empathy antecedent con-
ditions, and De Vignemont & Singer [35] define several modulation factors. Third, the
Expression of Empathy which we define as the process by which an empathic emotion
is expressed. In this regard, Hoffman [55] and Davis [34], emphasizes that empathy man-
ifests through prosocial behaviors such as helping, caring, justice, and mimicry. Davis
[34] refers to such behaviors as interpersonal outcomes. These three identified processes
of empathy are crucial in shaping the computational model of empathy proposed in the
present thesis (see Chapter 5).
2.2 Empathy and theoretical models of emotion
In psychological research on emotion, there is no consensus on a general definition of
emotion and thus no explicit general answer to the question ’what is emotion?’. Con-
sequently, different theories analyzing and determining the nature of emotion emerged.
In this section, the implication of theoretical models of emotion in further explaining
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the processes underlying empathy is emphasized. In this regard, theoretical models of
emotion also provide further support for the computational modeling of empathy.
According to Hoffman [55], mimicry is defined as composed of two subsequent steps
which he calls imitation and feedback (cf. Section 2.1.2). Regarding the second step in
his definition of mimicry, Hoffman refers to the feedback theories and discusses support-
ive evidence provided by evaluation of the Facial Feedback Hypothesis (FFH). In the
following the feedback theories are presented.
Feedback theories
The feedback theories are based on the thesis that bodily changes, e.g., changes in the
functioning of glands and muscles, and changes in bodily expressions, follow directly
from the perception of an exciting event, and that the feeling of these changes is the felt
emotion. This thesis was introduced by James [58] who illustrated it in the following
statement:
[W]e feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we
tremble and not that we cry, strike, or tremble because we are sorry, angry,
or fearful. (James [58], p. 190)
James substantiated his thesis by drawing on Darwin’s studies [32] on emotion expres-
sion, where changes in the functioning of glands and muscles, and changes in the circu-
latory apparatus were discovered. In the 1960s, James’ theory was reconsidered in the
context of empirical studies. This resulted in the emergence of refined versions of the
theory known as the neo-Jamesian theories of emotion.
The idea that bodily expressions influence emotion can be traced beyond James to
Darwin’s older work [32]. Darwin noticed that either the expression or the repression of
the external signs of emotion, respectively, intensified or softened the intensity of that
emotion. Further, Darwin focused on a more detailed and scientific description of the
meaning of different facial expressions, as well as on the facial muscles accompanying
them. He also underlined the specific and functional role of facial actions in expressing
and communicating emotion. Inspired by Darwin’s work, most of the neo-Jamesian the-
ories attribute a primary role to facial expressions in the study of emotion, and hence
investigate the assumption that facial expressions influence emotion. This assumption
is commonly called Facial Feedback Hypothesis (FFH) [75]. In an elaborate review
24
2.2 Empathy and theoretical models of emotion
article, McIntosch [75] discusses research on the empirical evaluation of the FFH. The
results show that facial actions modulate the intensity of emotion [114] and that they
can initiate emotions [71]. These findings provide supportive evidence for the role of
bodily changes in emotion elicitation, such as the role of facial actions in initiating and
modulating emotion.
Further, McIntosch [75] refers to the possibility that representations of facial expres-
sions in the central nervous system can produce emotion without the need to perform the
related facial motion. A similar suggestion had already been made by Darwin who argued
that ’Even a simulation of an emotion tends to arouse it in our minds.’ (Darwin [32],
p. 365) This suggestion is supported by findings provided in the context of evaluations
of the shared neural network hypothesis which suggests the existence of a shared
neural network for the representation and understanding of actions and emotions (cf.
Section 2.1.3). As such it provides a refined explanation of feedback as the second step
in Hoffman’s definition of mimicry. Both mimicry as defined by Hoffman [55], and the
shared neural network hypothesis, are crucial to the generation of an empathic emotion
in our model (see Section 5.2.1).
According to Omdahl [87], while contemporary theorists such as Hoffman [55] and
Davis [34] provide comprehensive models of empathy (cf. Section 2.1), they do not
clearly explain the cognitive processing steps by which emotional states are decoded
within their models. For example, in Hoffman’s [55] empathy arousing mode role-taking,
it is not clear what exact mechanisms allow an observer to decode the emotional state
of the other. Therefore, Omdahl [87] claims that emotion theories such as cognitive
appraisal theories may provide an explanation for how the other’s emotional state is
decoded. She took Scherer’s cognitive appraisal theory of emotion [104] as an example,
and empirically examined how Scherer’s rules of cognitive appraisal of emotion explain
emotion elicitation through role-taking. Role-taking is crucial to the generation of an
empathic emotion in our computational model of empathy as based on the appraisal
component of an existing computational model of emotion [8] (see Section 5.2.2). Thus,
in the following, two example appraisal theories are presented.
Appraisal theories
Appraisal theories are based on the thesis that emotions are elicited by a continuous
subjective evaluation of perceived stimuli against a number of criteria. These are criteria
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for the satisfaction of goals, motives, likes, dislikes, norms, and values. In the following,
Scherer’s appraisal theory [104] and Ortony, Clore, and Collins’ (OCC) appraisal theory
[88] are introduced.
The component process model In hisComponent ProcessModel of emotion (CPM)
[104], Scherer defines an appraisal module as one among three functionally defined mod-
ules. Only the appraisal module is presented here (see [104] for a description of the other
modules). The appraisal module determines whether an emotion will be elicited. Scherer
defines four necessary appraisal objectives required to adaptively react to a stimulus
event. These are (1) determination of the relevance of the event; (2) determination
of the implications or consequences of the event; (3) determination of the ability to
cope with the event; (4) determination of the normative significance of the event. These
appraisal objectives are pursued based on a subjective evaluation of the event using a
number of appraisal criteria called Stimulus Evaluation Checks (SECs). They represent
a minimal set of criteria that differentiate emotions from one another.
To determine the relevance of a stimulus event, three SECs are required. A check for
novelty, a check for intrinsic pleasantness, and a check for relevance to goals and needs.
Further, to determine the implications or consequences of a stimulus event, five SECs
are needed. A check for cause, a check for probable outcomes, a check for failure to meet
expectations, a check for conduciveness to goals and needs, and a check for urgency, i.e.
how urgently is an adaptive response to the event. To determine the ability to cope with
a stimulus event, three SECs are required. A check for control as the extent to which
one can influence or has control over the event, a check for power in terms of the ability
to change the event’s outcomes in line with one’s goals and motives, and a check for
potential for adjustment in terms of one’s ability to adapt and live with the outcome of
the event. To determine the normative significance of a stimulus event, two SECs are
required. A check with external standards as the extent to which an event is compatible
with one’s values and rules as a member of a social group, and a check for internal
standards as the extent to which an event is compatible with one’s personal self-ideal
and moral code.
The cognitive structure of emotions Ortony, Clore, and Collins (OCC) [88] focus
on the analysis of the cognitive aspects underlying the appraisal function of emotion, and
propose a cognitive theory for its causal origins. In their theory, they address the question
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of what differentiates emotions from one another in terms of the cognitive structure
underlying appraisal. They call their theory The Cognitive Structure of Emotions. The
authors propose to arrange 22 emotion types into six representative groups, which in
turn are classified into three basic classes. These are emotions as valenced reaction to
consequences of events, to actions of agents, and to aspects of objects.
Regarding emotions as valenced reactions to consequences of events, OCC define,
among others, fortunes-of-other emotions as emotions that are elicited through ap-
praisal of an event as desirable or not desirable for another person. They refer to the
fortunes-of-other emotions also as empathetic emotions, and define four types: happy-
for, pity, resentment, and gloating. Happy-for or resentment are elicited when the event
is appraised as desirable for the other while gloating or pity are elicited when the event
is appraised as not desirable for the other.
OCC define three types of variables to determine the intensity of emotion types.
Central intensity variables are those that affect the intensity of all emotion types in a
basic class of emotions. Global intensity variables are those that affect the intensity of
all emotion types in all basic classes of emotions. Finally, local intensity variables are
those that affect the intensity of emotion types in particular representative groups, and
are thus specific to some emotion types but not to others. The appraisal of emotion
inducing situations is based on evaluating the three central intensity variables, namely,
desirability, praiseworthiness, and appealingness, relative to one’s goals, standards, and
attitudes.
For the fortunes-of-other emotions, OCC define three local variables that affect the
intensity of these emotions, desirability-for-other, deservingness, and liking. The local
variable desirability-for-other reflects the degree to which an event is evaluated as de-
sirable or undesirable for the other person. The local variable deservingness reflects
the degree to which one evaluates that the other person deserved or did not deserved
the event. The local variable liking reflects the degree to which one likes or dislikes the
other person. The higher the values of these variables, the higher the intensity of the
fortunes-of-other emotions.
The more one believes that the event is desirable for the other person, the higher the
intensities of the emotion types happy-for or resentment. The more one likes the other
person and believes that the other deserves the desirable event, the higher the intensity
of the emotion type happy-for. The more one dislikes the other person and believes that
the other does not deserve the desirable event, the higher the intensity of the emotion
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type resentment. The more one believes the event is undesirable for the other person,
the higher the intensities of the emotion types gloating or pity. The more one dislikes the
other person and believes that the other deserves the undesirable event, the higher the
intensity of the emotion type gloating. The more one likes the other person and believes
that the other does not deserve the undesirable event, the higher the intensity of the
emotion type pity.
Compared to existing emotion theories, OCC’s theory is the only one that provides
an explicit definition of empathic emotions and their corresponding intensity variables.
The proposed variables influencing the intensity of the fortunes-of-other emotions are
very similar to the empathy bias, to the empathy antecedent conditions, and to the
empathy modulation factors as defined respectively by Hoffman [55], Davis [34], and
De Vignemont & Singer [35]. However, OCC provide a more detailed explanation of
how their defined factors influence one’s empathy for others. Furthermore, they also
consider two types of fortunes-of-other emotions that can be referred to as ’negative
empathic emotions’, namely gloating and resentment. Further, Scherer and OCC propose
to validate their theories through their application in an Artificial Intelligence (AI)
system. Thus, appraisal theories of emotion provide a suitable and clear explanation of
the cognitive processing steps underlying role-taking.
So far, the temporal development of an empathic emotion has not been explicitly
addressed within theoretical models of empathy, e.g., the temporal decay of an empathic
emotion and the impact of several factors such as the empathizer’s changing mood over
time on modulating the empathic emotion (cf. [35], see Section 2.1.3) . Accordingly, for
the simulation of the time course of an empathic emotion, we based our model on an
existing computational model of emotion [8] (see Section 3.1.1) where emotions, mood,
and their mutual interaction over time are simulated within a dimensional emotion
model. Furthermore, primary and secondary emotions are defined and distinguished
within the model. As primary emotions, a set of emotion categories similar to Ekman’s
set of basic emotion categories [38] is defined. In the following, dimensional emotion
theories, basic emotion theories, and Damasios’ primary and secondary emotions [31]
are presented.
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Dimensional theories
Dimensional theories are based on the thesis that emotions are variations along basic
dimensions that represent fundamental elements of emotions. This thesis claims that
emotions are related to one another in a systematic manner, and that their relationships
can be represented in a dimensional model.
Scholsberg [105] proposes three basic dimensions along which emotions vary in their in-
tensity and quality. These three basic dimensions are level of activation, pleasantness-
unpleasantness, and attention-rejection. The level of activation dimension rep-
resents variations in the intensity of emotion. The pleasantness-unpleasantness, and
attention-rejection dimensions represent variations in the quality of emotion. Based on
ratings of pictures of emotional facial expressions, Scholsberg provides evidence for the
three dimensions. He found that facial expressions can be arranged around a circular
surface spanned by the pleasantness-unpleasantness and attention-rejection dimensions,
and that they can also be arranged with respect to the third dimension of level of acti-
vation, thus forming a cone-like three-dimensional emotion space.
As Scholsberg, Russell & Mehrabian [102] propose a three-dimensional emotion model.
They postulate three independent and bipolar dimensions of pleasure-displeasure,
arousal-nonarousal, and dominance-submissiveness. The pleasure-displeasure and
arousal-nonarousal dimensions are similar to the pleasantness-unpleasantness and level
of activation dimensions proposed by Scholsberg. However, Russell & Mehrabian define
arousal-nonarousal as a second dimension, and introduce a new and third dimension of
dominance-submissiveness as the degree to which one feels in control of a situation. They
argue that the emotional states of anger and anxiety have similar levels of displeasure and
arousal, and differ only in their levels of dominance [101]. To test this hypothesis, subjects
were asked to report their feelings after reading verbal descriptions of situations expected
to make them angry or anxious, and imagining themselves in these situations. The
results show a positive amount of dominance for anger, a negative amount of dominance
for anxiety, a negative amount of pleasure and a positive amount of arousal for both
anger and anxiety. Further evidence for the three dimensions was provided by Russell
& Mehrabian in the context of two other empirical studies (see [102]).
In a further investigation of a dimensional emotion model, Russell [99] argues for
the two dimensions of pleasure and arousal, and against the consideration of a third
dimension. In his exploration of a third dimension, he found dimensions that were in-
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terpreted in terms of antecedents or consequences of an emotion, and thus do not refer
to the emotion itself. Based on the results of studies of self-reports of emotion, and of
judgments of emotion words, Russell provides evidence for a two-dimensional circular
model of emotion, called the Circumplex Model of Affect, as proposed earlier by
Scholsberg. Compared to the dimensional emotion model of Scholsberg, Russell defines
activation (arousal) as a second dimension instead of attention-rejection.
The dimensional theories define basic dimensions along which emotions vary with
respect to their fundamental elements. However, there is no agreement on the number
and interpretation of these basic dimensions although there is more evidence for a first
and second dimension of pleasure and arousal, and less for a third dimension.
Basic emotion theories
Basic emotion theories are based on the thesis that there is a predefined set of emotion
categories that are basic, hard-wired in the brain, and universally recognized. This thesis
was pioneered by Darwin [32] who observed that the expressions of some emotions are
universal among cultures, and are displayed by people born blind. He concluded that the
expressions of these emotions must be innate and part of our evolutionary endowment.
Research on universals in facial expression of emotion provides supportive evidence
for a universally recognized set of emotion categories. Ekman [38] discusses the empirical
data of seven cross-cultural studies on universals in facial expression of emotion. The
results show a significant degree of agreement across different cultures in the recognition
of the six basic emotions: happy, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and surprise. As com-
pared to the dimensional theories, basic emotion theories provide only a limited set of
emotion categories.
Damasio’s primary and secondary emotions
Damasio [31] defines primary emotions as emotions that are experienced early in
life as preorganized responses to specific features of perceived stimuli, e.g., its size and
motion. He argued that these features activate the amygdala, a part of the brain crucial
to emotional processing, which, based on innate dispositional representations, triggers
bodily changes specific to the emotion, and influences cognitive processing in line with
that emotion. In the next developmental step, the connections between perceived stimuli
and emotion specific bodily changes become conscious, allowing for flexible behaviors in
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given situations. For example, knowing that a bear causes the emotion fear allows for
avoidance of this animal in a given environment. However, the mechanism for primary
emotions does not cover the full space of emotional behavior, and is thus followed by
another developmental step encompassing the mechanism of secondary emotions.
Secondary emotions are experienced by adults as responses to given situations
based on a cognitive evaluation. Damasio [31] describes the process in three steps. First,
the process begins with a cognitive evaluation of the situation through the deliberate
consideration of the situation in the form of mental images. Second, the processing of
the mental images leads to a neural response in the prefrontal cortex that arises based
on acquired dispositional representations of the connections between certain situations
and emotional responses. As described above, these dispositional representations are
acquired based on the innate dispositional representations needed for primary emotions.
Third, the neural response of the prefrontal cortex activates the amygdala, which, based
on innate dispositional representations, triggers bodily changes specific to the emotion
and influences cognitive processing in line with the emotion. Hence, secondary emotions
are expressed using the mechanism of primary emotions.
Conclusion
In sum, as elucidated by this section, theoretical models of emotion are suitable to
clarifying and explaining several processes underlying empathy, and are thus crucial
to the computational modeling of several theoretical aspects of empathy. In the next
section, we present theories and findings on emotion expression and recognition that
also have crucial implications for the realization of empathy.
2.3 Emotion expression and perception
Theories and findings on emotion expression and perception provide further support for
a deeper understanding of several processes underlying empathy, such as the generation
and expression of an empathic emotion. In this section, we present research investigating
the expression and perception of emotion.
Humans communicate their emotions through a wide range of multimodal cues. For
example, facial expressions, speech prosody and content, body postures and movements
as outward expressions, and skin conductance, muscle tension activity, and heart
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rate as inward expressions. To analyze and access the way emotions manifest through
outward and inward expressions, several methods are used and developed (see [50] for a
review). As illustrated in Section 2.2, there are different theories on emotion. Accordingly,
research on emotion expression and perception is based on these theories. Since facial
expressions are central to the present thesis, our scope will be limited to this literature.
In their research on universals in facial expressions of emotion (cf. Section 2.2), Ekman
et al. [40] introduce the FacialActionCoding System (FACS) as a comprehensive system
to describe all possible and visually distinguishable facial movements. Since every facial
movement emerges from contracting different facial muscles, Ekman et al. [40] argue that
a comprehensive expression coding system could be obtained by discovering the impact
of muscle contraction on changing the visible appearance of the face. Thus, based on an
anatomical analysis of facial muscle actions, they define Action Units (AUs) as the core
elements of FACS describing the contraction of single or multiple facial muscles as well
as eye and head movements (see Table A.1, p. 204). In order to code the time course of
facial movements, Ekman et al. [40] define a method to score the intensity of AUs using a
five point scale. Further, to code and analyze the facial expressions accompanying basic
emotions, they define rules to link AUs to the six basic emotion categories (see Table
A.2, p. 205).
According to Russell [100], facial expressions do not signal specific emotions such as
basic emotions. Instead, they manifest primary information that can be automatically,
easily, and universally understood. Russell [100] distinguishes two kinds of information,
first, quasi-physical information such as muscle contractions and visual attention, and
second, the overall level of pleasure (pleased vs. displeased) and arousal (agitated vs.
sleepy). Researchers such as Scholsberg [105] posit that facial expressions convey pri-
mary information such as pleasure and arousal (activation) (see Section 2.2). Russell
[100] argues that the combination of this primary information with a context allows for
the attribution of a specific emotion. Further, he states that dimensions are primary, el-
emental, and universal while emotion categories are complex, derived, and variable with
language and culture. Moreover, he emphasizes that spontaneous facial expressions dis-
played in daily settings are relatively mild and subtle as compared to the rather extreme
configurations introduced by Ekman et al. [40].
While most of the researchers followed a top-down approach in that they investi-
gated the emotional meaning of whole facial expressions, and then decomposing them
into components (e.g., [40]), others followed a bottom-up approach in that they in-
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vestigate the emotional meaning of individual facial actions and of their possible com-
binations (e.g., [111]). Thus, by investigating the meaning of single facial actions, it is
possible to investigate the underlying properties of a whole facial expression and of the
expressed emotion. For example, the presence of the same facial action in two differ-
ent facial expressions of emotion assigns a shared affective meaning to both expressions
(cf. [100]), e.g., raised eyebrows convey high arousal for both fear and surprise. More-
over, the intermixing of single facial actions would result in a wider range of emotional
expressions rather than being limited to predefined expressions of emotion categories.
Snodgrass [111] followed a bottom-up approach by combining FACS with the dimen-
sional emotion space of pleasure and arousal [100]. Single AUs and AUs combinations
were rated in terms of pleasure and arousal values in a first study, while in a second
study they were rated in terms of emotion categories. Some representative results of the
study by Snodgrass [111] are summarized in Figure 2.3 (left).
Figure 2.3: Left: some representative results of the study by Snodgrass [111]. Note that
the AUs were presented to participants at their maximal intensity. P andA, respectively,
denote pleasure and arousal. Right: facial expressions reconstructed in pleasure-arousal
space by Russell [100] (figure taken from [20], p. 126).
The results show significant agreement within subjects and allow the association of
emotion categories with values of pleasure and arousal. These findings support Russell’s
hypothesis [100] that the information signaled by a facial expression is present in its
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single components. Russell [100] illustrates Snodgrass’s results [111] by placing the AUs
within his dimensional emotion space of pleasure and arousal thus combining them into
eight facial expressions (see Figure 2.3, right).
The results provided by Snodgrass’s study and further discussed by Russell are valu-
able in supporting a dimensional approach to the facial expression of emotion. As com-
pared to the basic emotion approach, which limits the set of facial expression of emo-
tion, the dimensional approach allows for a wider range of expressions. Furthermore,
a bottom-up approach allows for the combination of different facial actions, and their
emotional meaning, to reconstruct new facial expressions. These findings are crucial for
the generation and expression of an empathic emotion in our computational model of
empathy (see Sections 4.3, 5.2.1, and 5.4).
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the theoretical background relevant to understand the the-
oretical concepts underlying our computational model of empathy. In Section 2.1, we
began by introducing the debate on a universal definition of empathy and the resulting
three major categories of definitions of empathy. Further, we introduced Hoffman’s
[55] and Davis’ [34] psychological models of empathy which offer comprehensive and
detailed models of empathy, and as such unify the different views and perspectives on
empathy. Within these models, different aspects of empathy are considered and dis-
cussed. For example, the mechanisms eliciting empathy as divided into lower-level
cognitive mechanisms, such as mimicry, and higher-level cognitive mechanisms, such as
role-taking, the emergence of different degrees of empathy based on several factors,
and the motivation of prosocial and moral behaviors by empathy. While such compre-
hensive and detailed models of empathy are crucial to the computational modeling of
empathy, they do not provide an explanation of the exact mechanisms underlying the
aspects of empathy in question. For example, questions remain about the mechanisms
required to decode and recognize others’ emotional states within the empathy arousing
modes as defined by Hoffman and the empathic processes as defined by Davis.
Neuropsychological models of empathy investigate the neural mechanisms underlying
empathy thus offering further support for psychological models of empathy, and allowing
for a more precise consideration of the processes underlying empathy. In this regard, we
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introduced the shared neural network hypothesis that suggests the existence of shared
neural networks for understanding actions and emotions, and which is crucial for the
empathy arousing mode mimicry as defined by Hoffman [55]. Further, we presented De
Vignemont & Singer’s [35] model of empathy as based on the shared neural network
hypothesis and which also introduces different modulation factors of empathy leading
to the emergence of different degrees of empathy. According to the discussed models of
empathy, we introduced Hoffman’s definition of empathy as our working definition
of empathy and we identified three central processes of empathy key to our model
(see Chapter 5). These processes are the Empathy Mechanism which we define as the
process by which an empathic emotion is generated, the Empathy Modulation which we
define as the process by which an empathic emotion is modulated, and the Expression
of Empathy which we define as the process by which an empathic emotion is expressed.
Further in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively, we elucidated the implications of different
theoretical models of emotion and of theories and findings on emotion expression and
perception in providing deeper explanations for several processes underlying empathy.
For example, the feedback theories provide support for Hoffman’s definition of mimicry,
while the appraisal theories provide a suitable explanation for the cognitive processing
steps underlying role-taking. Both mimicry and role-taking are crucial for the generation
of an empathic emotion in our model (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). An important aspect
that was not explicitly addressed within theoretical models of empathy is the temporal
development of an empathic emotion and its dynamic interaction with factors such
as the empathizer’s changing mood over time (cf. [35]). This issue is addressed in the
proposed computational model of empathy based on an existing computational model of
emotion [8] (see Section 3.1.1). Accordingly, we introduced the emotion theories shaping
the model and crucial to the simulation of emotion dynamics within the model, such as
dimensional emotion theories.
Findings within research on emotion expression and perception provide support for a
dimensional approach to the facial expression of emotion which allows for the expression
and perception of a wider range of emotions, as compared to the basic emotion approach.
These findings are crucial to the generation and expression of an empathic emotion within
the computational model of empathy proposed in the present thesis (see Sections 4.3,
5.2.1, and 5.4).
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As emphasized in the previous chapter, besides theoretical models of empathy, theoret-
ical models of emotion and theories and findings on emotion expression and perception
are crucial to the computational modeling of empathy. Section 3.1 gives an overview of
different approaches to the computational modeling of emotion as well as their appli-
cation and evaluation in virtual human and robot scenarios. Subsequently, in Section
3.2, we present approaches to emotion expression simulation, and methods for emotion
recognition. In Section 3.3, we introduce different computational models of empathy as
well as their application and evaluation in virtual human and robot scenarios. This sec-
tion concludes with the requirements formulated in Chapter 1 and with classifying the
introduced empathy models with respect to these requirements.
3.1 Emotion in virtual humans and robots
In this section, we give an overview on different computational models of emotion and on
their application and evaluation in virtual human and robot scenarios. In this regard, we
present the computational model of emotion, WASABI [8], as well as its application and
evaluation in scenarios involving the virtual human MAX [62]. This computational model
of emotion underlies the computational model of empathy we propose (see Chapter 5).
Furthermore, the virtual human MAX is also involved in the application and evaluation
of our empathy model (see Chapter 6). We will therefore describe WASABI and the
virtual human MAX in more details than other presented works.
3.1.1 Computational models of emotion
Marsella et al. [73] summarized the history of research on computational models of
emotion over the last 15 years, based on several example models, and their theoretical
foundations (see Figure 3.1). As depicted in Figure 3.1, appraisal theories influenced
mostly the computational modeling of emotion. As introduced in Section 2.2, appraisal
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Figure 3.1: The history of computational models of emotion. Figure adapted from [73],
p. 22. The highlighted models are presented in this Section.
theories provide explicit and clear models of the appraisal mechanisms that elicit emo-
tions (appraisal criteria) and are thus believed to be more suitable to the computational
modeling of emotion than other theories. In this regard, OCC [88] refer to their ap-
praisal theory of emotion (see Section 2.2) as a ’computationally tractable model of
emotion’ (OCC [88], p. 181). Consequently, several computational models follow OCC’s
[88] appraisal theory. One of the first computational models based on their theory is the
AffectiveReasoner (AR) [42] (see Figure 3.1). In the following, some example models are
presented to illustrate how the computational modeling of emotion is influenced by the
different emotion theories, and how these models differ from each other. For a detailed
review of existing computational models of emotion see [8].
EMA: EMotion and Adaptation
EMA (EMotion and Adaptation) [47] is a domain independent computation framework
for modeling the antecedents and consequences of emotions. EMA is based on domain
independent decision theoretic plans and a Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) approach. To
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appraise the emotional significance of ongoing events, EMA uses a set of appraisal vari-
ables such as desirability and likelihood. The values of the appraisal variables are derived
via domain independent inference rules over features of the agent’s decision theo-
retic plans, and are organized within multiple appraisal frames. Each appraisal frame
represents the appraisal of an event from the agent’s perspective or from other agents’
perspectives. This allows the agent to reason about how events or their own actions
impact other agents’ emotions. Each appraisal frame is mapped into an emotion with
a specific type and intensity using rules for emotion eliciting conditions. The use of ap-
praisal frames and the appraisal of a situation from the perspectives of other agents are
notions taken from the AR [42]. Six emotion types are considered in EMA, hope, fear, joy,
distress, anger, and guilt. Generated emotions are aggregated into a current emotional
state and an overall mood state. Given the case that different emotions with equal in-
tensities are generated (e.g., fear and hope), the overall mood state biases the intensities
of these emotions thus increasing the intensity of the mood congruent emotion.
In conclusion, EMA provides a powerful and comprehensive model of domain inde-
pendent ’plan-based appraisal’ that explains the dynamics of appraisal over time. In the
following, we present a computational model of emotion that builds upon the notions
adopted by the EMA framework (see Figure 3.1, FearNot! [36]).
A computational model for emotional characters
Dias & Paiva [36] propose a computational model of emotion where the appraisal com-
ponent comprises of a reactive layer and a deliberative layer. The appraisal component
is based on the appraisal theory of OCC [88] (see Section 2.2) and its deliberative layer
builds upon the notion of domain independent ’plan-based appraisal’ adopted in the
above presented EMA framework. The reactive layer is based on a set of domain depen-
dent emotional reaction rules. Every generated emotion has a type, an intensity value,
and a positive or negative value of valence. The intensity of an emotion is influenced
by the character’s values of arousal and mood. Mood is represented by a variable whose
value increases with the valence of positive emotions and decreases with the valence of
negative ones.
While in AR [42] and EMA [47] an agent’s personality is related to the agent’s goals,
standards, and preferences. In Dias & Paiva ’s model, further personality related
factors are included, e.g., different activation thresholds for each of the 22 emotion
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types. For example, a character who is resistant toward the emotion anger has a high
activation threshold for this emotion. Furthermore, Dias & Paiva’s model integrates a
generic computational model of empathy as will be presented in Section 3.3.1.
Breazeal’s computational model of emotion
Breazeal [20] proposes a computational model of emotion that is based on a three-
dimensional emotion space (cf. Section 2.2) of Arousal, Valence, and Stance (AVS) (see
Figure 3.1). 14 emotion categories are located within AVS space and are surrounded by
so called emotion regions. Perceived stimuli are appraised in terms of their intensity,
relevance, intrinsic affect, and goal directedness, which are mapped to AVS values. Com-
pared to the dominance dimension defined by Russell & Mehrabian [102] (see Section
2.2), the third dimension, stance, represents how approachable a percept to an agent is
and makes it to distinguish between the emotion categories anger and fear. The AVS
values are associated to emotion categories and are averaged, thus resulting in a net
AVS value for each emotion category. The position of the net AVS value within the
emotion region increases the intensity of the emotion category. The emotion category
with the highest value of intensity together with the corresponding AVS value repre-
sent the agent’s current emotional state. Based on a previous work by Velásquez [117],
primary and secondary emotions are distinguished following Damasio [31] (see Section
2.2). Primary emotions correspond to the elicitation of emotions via innate and hard-
wired releasers (emotion eliciting stimuli) while secondary emotions correspond to
the elicitation of emotions via learned releasers using emotion memories.
Compared to the previously presented models, Breazeal uses a dimensional approach
for the computational modeling of emotion that allows for smooth and continuous trajec-
tories of emotion dynamics. In the following, we present WASABI [8], a computational
model of emotion where emotions, moods, and their mutual interaction as well as pri-
mary and secondary emotions are simulated within a dimensional emotion model (see
Figure 3.1).
WASABI: Affect Simulation for Agents with Believable Interactivity
WASABI ((W) Affect Simulation for Agents with Believable Interactivity) [8] is the
computational model of emotion that underlies the computational model of empathy
developed in the present thesis (see Chapter 5).
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WASABI is composed of two interconnected modules, a cognition module and an
emotion module. The cognition module is composed of a reactive layer and a reasoning
layer where respectively primary and secondary emotions, as distinguished by Dama-
sio [31] (see Section 2.2), are triggered. Within the reactive layer, primary emotions
are triggered as hard-wired reactions to perceived stimuli while in the reasoning layer,
secondary emotions are triggered by BDI-based deliberation using memories and ex-
pectations. The appraisal processes within both layers result in negative or positive val-
ues of emotional valences, also called emotional impulses, that drive an agent’s emotion
dynamics over time.
The emotion module is comprised of two components, a dynamics/mood component
and a Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance (PAD) space. Within the dynamics/mood compo-
nent, the time course of emotions and moods and their mutual interaction are calculated
in an orthogonal space of their respective valence components (see Figure 3.2, left). The
influence of emotions on mood is modeled by interpreting the valence of emotion as a
gradient with respect to which the valence of mood increases or decreases according to
Equation 3.1.
∆y
∆x
= a · x (3.1)
The values of valences of emotions and moods decay over time based on two indepen-
dently simulated spring-mass systems for each axis, creating two reset forces Fx and
Fy that are proportional to the valences x and y. The spiral springs for each axis are
virtually anchored to the origin and attached to the point of reference (see Figure 3.2,
left). Furthermore, the concept of boredom is also considered within the dynamics/mood
component and is represented by a third orthogonal z-axis. Boredom emerges in conse-
quence to the absence of emotional stimuli. Once the point of reference lies in an epsilon
neighborhood of absolute zero (x and y), the degree of boredom starts to increase
linearly as per Equation 3.2.
z(t+ 1) = z(t)− b (3.2)
Once the point of reference is outside the epsilon region, the value of boredom is reset to
zero. The variable a in Equation 3.1, the spring constants dx and dy, the inertial mass
m of the point of reference (see Figure 3.2, left), and the parameter b can be considered
as personality related factors. Smaller values of a and greater values of the spring
constants and the inertial mass result in a more lethargic agent, while greater values
of a and smaller values of the spring constants and the inertial mass result in a more
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Dynamics / Mood PAD-Space 
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Figure 3.2: Left: the dynamics/mood space with the simulated spring-mass systems for
each axis [8], p. 90. Right: the PAD space with primary and secondary emotions [8], p.
94.
temperamental agent. Greater values of b result in an agent that becomes bored easily
in the absence of emotional stimuli.
Within PAD space (see Figure 3.2, right), primary and secondary emotions are repre-
sented and their awareness likelihood values are calculated. As primary emotions, anger,
happy, surprised, sad, and fearful as five of the six basic emotions proposed by Ekman [38]
(see Section 2.2), and the emotions bored, annoyed, and depressed as well as the neutral
emotional state concentrated are simulated. These primary emotions are located in PAD
space according to Russell & Mehrabian [102] (see Section 2.2). As secondary emotion,
relief, hope, and fears-confirmed proposed by OCC [88] as prospect-based emotions are
simulated. These secondary emotions are represented in PAD space by weighted polygon
areas as depicted in Figure 3.2 (right). For more details on the location of primary and
secondary emotions within PAD space, see [8].
For the calculation of the awareness likelihood values of primary and secondary emo-
tions, the valence of emotion x, the valence of mood y, and the degree of boredom
z provided by the dynamics/mood component over time are mapped into PAD space
according to Equation 3.3.
PAD(xt, yt, zt) = (p(xt, yt), a(xt, zt), d(t)), with
p(xt, yt) =
1
2
· (xt + yt) and a(xt, zt) = |xt|+ zt
(3.3)
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The value of dominance d(t) represents an agent’s feeling of control over a situation
and is derived from the cognition module. Only two extreme values of dominance
are considered, dominant vs. submissive. The values of dominance allow the distinction
between fear and anger as well as between sad and annoyed (cf. [102], see Section 2.2).
Each primary emotion within PAD space is surrounded by two circular regions
representing its activation and saturation thresholds. The closer the point of reference
within PAD space gets to the location of a primary emotion, the more likely an agent
becomes aware of that emotion. The awareness likelihood value of a primary emotion is
maximal within the saturation region and is equal to null outside the activation region.
The awareness likelihood values of secondary emotions are calculated based on a linear
interpolation within their polygon areas in PAD space once they are triggered by the
reasoning layer. For example, the more pleasurable and aroused an agent feels, the more
likely it is that he becomes aware of the secondary emotion relief once it is triggered by
the reasoning layer. The emotion module outputs values of pleasure, arousal, and one of
two possible values of dominance, as well as the awareness likelihood values of primary
and secondary emotions.
Discussion
Gratch & Marsella [47] and Dias & Paiva [36] focus mainly on emotional appraisal
as based on domain independent ’plan-based appraisal’ that explains the dynamics of
appraisal over time. Compared to this, Breazeal [20] and Becker-Asano [8] primarily
focus on emotion as variations along basic dimensions and on the simulation of the
time course of emotions independent of any elaborate cognitive appraisal (cf. [8]).
Furthermore, also primary and secondary emotions as defined by Damasio [31] are
distinguished in both of these models. However, compared to Breazeal’s computational
model of emotion, a more elaborate consideration of cognitive appraisal is realized
within WASABI. In this regard, similarly to Dias & Paiva’s model, a reactive and a
reasoning/deliberative layer are considered within WASABI. The same as Gratch &
Marsella’s model, WASABI’s reasoning layer is based on a BDI-approach. Furthermore,
personality factors as considered within WASABI are very similar to those proposed
by Dias & Paiva. Thus, within the WASABI computational model of emotion, several
aspects of emotion are addressed and unified (cf. Figure 3.1).
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3.1.2 Application and evaluation
There are several works on the application and evaluation of computational models
of emotion within virtual human and robot scenarios. In the following, some example
scenarios are presented just to give a small overview of how emotions are integrated into
virtual humans and robots.
The Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) system
The Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) system [59] is a virtual reality training environ-
ment to teach decision-making skills in critical situations that can face members of the
US Army. The MRE system includes virtual humans acting as friendly and hostile forces
capable of task-oriented reasoning, and of natural language and non-verbal communica-
tion with the trainees. Figure 3.3 (left) depicts a situation where the unit of a sergeant
has a collision with a civilian vehicle injuring a boy. The trainee acting as the leader
of the sergeant can communicate with his sergeant, a doctor, and the boy’s mother as
virtual humans. According to Gratch & Marsella [47], central to such training is the
recognition of subordinates’ emotions to judge their behavior accordingly and to asses
the impact of orders on them. In this regard, they propose to incorporate EMA (see
Section 3.1.1) into the MRE system to simulate the virtual humans’ emotions. Figure
3.3 (right) shows how, based on EMA, a trainee’s order impacts a sergeant’s verbal and
non-verbal behavior.
An evaluation of EMA within the MRE system demonstrated that the virtual humans’
emotional behavior has been rated as quite natural. A further evaluation of EMA by
comparing its behavior to human behavior based on an interactive questionnaire as a
standard clinical instrument to asses human emotion, showed that EMA mimics human
emotional behavior quite well [48].
The social robot Kismet
Kismet is an expressive anthropomorphic robot [20] (see Figure 3.4) that engages per-
sons in a face-to-face interaction through his expressive and emotional behavior. Kismet
perceives interacting persons through video and audio sensors, and recognizes their com-
municated affective intent such as praise, soothing, or prohibition through their tone of
voice. Based on Breazeal’s computational model of emotion (see Section 3.1.1), a per-
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son’s affective intent impacts the robot’s affective state, which triggers a corresponding
emotional expression in the robot.
An evaluation of Kismet’s affective behavior shows that subjects made use of Kismet’s
emotional expression as expressive feedback to check on the success of their communi-
cation of affective intent to Kismet. Kismet’s emotional expressions are linked to the
dimensional AVS space of his underlying emotion system, thus allowing him to reflect
the trajectories of his emotion dynamics within the dimensional emotion space (see Sec-
tion 3.2.1).
Lt: Sergeant, send two squads forward 
Sgt: (interprets utterance, exhibits brief 
fearful facial expression) 
Sgt: That is a bad idea. We shouldn’t split 
our forces 
Sgt: (gazes at Lt, exhibits brief hopeful 
expression) 
Sgt: Instead we should send one squad 
to recon forward along our route to 
Celic 
Lt: Send two squads forward! 
Sgt: (exhibits brief angry expression) 
Sgt: Against my recommendation sir 
(averts gaze and shakes head 
sideways) 
!
Figure 3.3: Left: example scenario of MRE sys-
tem [59]. Right: example emotional dialog be-
tween a trainee (Lt) and a virtual sergeant (Sgt)
[47].
Figure 3.4: The social robot
Kismet [20], p. 123.
The Multimodal Assembly eXpert (MAX)
The Multimodal Assembly eXpert (MAX) [62] is an embodied conversational agent
embedded in a 3D computer graphics environment and able to engage with human part-
ners in multimodal interaction using speech, gestures, and facial expressions. MAX was
developed in the context of the Collaborative Research Center SFB 360 ’Situated Ar-
tificial Communicators’ and is still acquiring new skills through works in the Artificial
Intelligence Group (AI-Group) at Bielefeld University. In a first scenario, MAX is visual-
ized in a CAVE-like virtual reality environment, and guides his human partner through
an interactive construction task [63]. In a further scenario, MAX acts as a guide in a
public computer museum [62] (see Figure 3.5, right) where he engages in multimodal
small talk dialogs with visitors, and provides them with information about the museum
or the exhibitions. Furthermore, MAX also engages people in a small talk dialog in the
corridor of the AI-Group at Bielefeld University.
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MAX’s behavior is controlled by a cognitive agent architecture [70] that builds
upon the classical perceive-reason-act triad (see Figure 3.5, left) where the processes in
the triad’s components run concurrently. MAX’s reactive behavior consists of an imme-
diate response to perceived events and is realized by a direct mapping from perception
to action (see Figure 3.5, left). Example reactive behaviors of MAX are gaze tracking,
focusing the interaction partner in response to prompting signals, and performing per-
manent secondary behaviors such as eye blinks and breathing in order to appear more
lifelike. MAX’s deliberative behavior consists of reasoning about which actions to per-
form in response to perceived events, and is realized by adopting a BDI-approach [70]
(see Figure 3.5, left). In order to increase the believability and likability of MAX (cf.
[8]), his cognitive architecture is extended to an emotion simulation module based
on WASABI (see Section 3.1.1); (see Figure 3.5, left). Accordingly, the primary or
secondary emotion with the highest value of awareness likelihood is expressed by one
of seven emotional facial expressions of MAX (see Section 3.2.1). The value of aware-
ness likelihood of the displayed emotion modulates the intensity of its corresponding
expression.
Figure 3.5: Left: MAX’s cognitive architecture [70]. Right: MAX acting as a museum
guide [62], p. 2.
An application of MAX’s emotion simulation module is the museum guide scenario
[8]. Within this scenario, MAX’s primary emotions are simulated. For example, the
perception of persons in MAX’s visual field triggers his emotions positively, and the
interpretation of the museum visitors’ utterances as a compliment or as politically in-
correct, respectively, triggers MAX’s emotions positively or negatively. MAX’s emotions
not only impact his facial behavior, but also further behaviors such as leaving the screen
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when in a very angry emotional state. An evaluation of MAX’s behavior within this
scenario revealed that he engages the visitors in natural communication and that they
ascribe him with a certain degree of sociality (cf. [62]).
A further application of MAX’s emotion simulation module is a non-conversational
’Skip-Bo’ card game scenario where MAX’s goal is to win the game against a human
opponent [8]. In a first version of this scenario, MAX’s primary emotions are simulated.
For example, playing a joker card triggers MAX’s emotions positively and may result in
MAX feeling happiness. An evaluation of MAX’s primary emotions within this scenario
revealed the appropriateness of his simulated emotions [7]. In another version of the
gaming scenario, MAX’s secondary emotions are simulated. For example, the expectation
that the opponent would play a joker card triggers his emotions negatively and results in
a secondary emotion of fears-confirmed when the opponent actually plays that card. An
evaluation of MAX’s secondary emotions showed, as expected, that MAX was judged to
be significantly younger when expressing only primary emotions without secondary ones
[8]. Within this scenario version, MAX also expresses empathy toward his opponent [7]
(see Section 3.3.2).
Around 10 years after the development of MAX, a new virtual human called EMMA
– Empathic MultiModal Agent – is developed in our AI-Group and is introduced in
the present thesis (see Chapter 4).
Discussion
The successful application and evaluation of the computational models of emotion within
virtual human and robot scenarios substantiates the appropriateness of the proposed
models and the role of emotions in enhancing the behavior of artificial agents. The
application and evaluation of Dias & Paiva’s model [36] is realized in the context of
empathy and is thus presented in Section 3.3.2. Compared to the application and eval-
uation scenarios presented above, WASABI is successfully applied and evaluated within
two different kinds of scenarios. A conversational agent scenario where emotions
modulate the virtual human MAX’s conversational and non-verbal behaviors, and a
gaming scenario where they only modulate MAX’s non-verbal behavior. A highlight
is the application of WASABI in a permanently running scenario setting, specif-
ically, the museum guide scenario. Thus, the successful application and evaluation of
WASABI within these different scenarios is demonstrative for the feasibility, flexibility,
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and robustness of the model.
3.1.3 Conclusion
As emphasized in this section, the WASABI computational model of emotion addresses
and unifies different aspects of emotion, and is successfully applied and evaluated within
several scenarios involving the virtual human MAX. This highlights the appropriateness
and feasibility of WASABI for the realization of several theoretical aspects of empa-
thy (cf. Chapter 2). Accordingly, the computational model of empathy proposed in the
present thesis is based on WASABI (see Chapter 5). In this regard, WASABI’s ap-
praisal component is crucial to the cognitive evaluation of others’ situation, and thus
for the generation of an empathic emotion. Furthermore, the simulation of emotion
dynamics within WASABI is crucial to the simulation of the time course of an empathic
emotion and to its modulation through factors such as the empathizer’s changing mood
over time (cf. Section 2.1).
3.2 Emotion expression and recognition
Humans’ expression of emotion is multimodal and conveys different kinds of emotional
information (cf. Section 2.3). Furthermore, humans possess elaborate and refined mech-
anisms to perceive others’ emotions. Consequently, there are several works on the simu-
lation of emotion expression and on developing methods for emotion recognition. In his
book The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals, Darwin [32] emphasized the spe-
cific and functional role of facial expressions in expressing and communicating emotion.
Ekman’s findings [38] on universals in facial expressions of emotion further substantiate
their role in expressing and communicating emotion. Accordingly, facial expressions
of emotion are central to the present thesis, and the related work presented in the next
sections is mainly on the facial expression of emotion.
3.2.1 Emotion expression
Following Grammer & Oberzaucher [46], an expression simulation system is com-
posed of two components: a control architecture for linking expressions to emotions and
an expressive output component for animating expression patterns. Works on an ex-
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pression simulation system usually considered the facial expression of emotion. In this
regard, there are two standards mainly used for an expressive output component, FACS
[40] (see Section 2.3) and the MPEG-4 standard [61] [90]. Within MPEG-4, Facial
Animation Parameters (FAPs) are specified that correspond to facial actions such as
pulling the lip corners. FAPs are defined by means of 84 specified facial feature points
that should be located on the face model in question. The MPEG-4 standard offers a
large number of complex parameters to manipulate a facial expression on the basis of
the specified facial feature points. Thus, conflicting or exaggerated facial deformations
may occur and result in unnatural expressions. In contrast, FACS [40] offers a more
controlled and elaborate method that accounts for humans’ anatomical constraints to
define facial expressions.
There are several works on an expression simulation system (see [57] for a detailed
review). In a number of works, the control architecture is primarily based on linking
emotion expressions to a set of discrete emotion categories such as Ekman’s six basic
emotion categories [38] (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3). New expressions are usually generated
on the basis of this set of discrete emotion categories by means of fading or blending.
For example, the virtual human MAX (see Section 3.1.2) can display different in-
tensities of seven emotional facial expressions [8] corresponding to his primary emotion
categories (see Figure 3.6). MAX’s face is comprised of 21 facial muscles that can be
mapped to Action Units (AUs) from the FACS [40]. MAX’s emotions also influence his
Figure 3.6: MAX’s seven facial expressions of emotion. From left to right: concentrated,
happy, surprised, annoyed/sad/depressed, angry, fearful, and bored.
speech prosody. MAX has discrete values of emotional pitch that correspond to his pri-
mary emotion categories. The frequencies of his secondary behaviors, breathing and eye
blinking, are influenced by his value of arousal. The successful evaluation of the WASABI
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emotion model [8] (see Section 3.1.1) within a non-conversational ’Skip-Bo’ card game
scenario, where MAX expresses his emotions by means of his facial expressions, suggests
the appropriate modeling of MAX’s facial expressions.
Niewiadomski et al. [84] propose an algorithm to generate so-called ’complex’ facial
expressions for their embodied conversational agent Greta. As ’complex’ facial expres-
sions they define expressions that display emotion blends (e.g., superposed expressions)
or expressions that are modified with respect to some socio-cultural rules (e.g., faked,
masked, or inhibited expressions). ’Complex’ facial expressions are computed as a com-
position of eight facial areas that can display different emotions (e.g., see Figure 3.7).
For each type of ’complex’ facial expression, a set of rules associated to Ekman’s six
basic emotion categories [38] is defined. These rules describe the facial areas of each
basic emotion that are displayed within a type of ’complex’ facial expressions as well
as the compositions of facial areas of different basic emotions. Greta’s face is animated
using MPEG-4 FAPs.
Figure 3.7: From left to right: Greta’s facial expression of anger, superposition of sadness
and anger, sadness masked by anger, and Greta’s facial expression of sadness [85].
In further works on an expression simulation system, the control architecture is based
on linking emotion expressions to a dimensional emotion model such as Russell’s Cir-
cumplex Model of Affect [99] (see Section 2.2). As compared to basic emotion models
(see Section 2.2), dimensional emotion models present dense and continuous emotion
spaces that are more inclined to characterize the continuity and subtlety of emotion
expressions, and that allow for the expression of a wide range of emotions. Furthermore,
Russell [100] argues that facial expressions do not signal specific emotions such as basic
emotions, but instead primary information such as pleasure and arousal, and that the
combination of this primary information with a context allows for the attribution of a
specific emotion (cf. Section 2.3).
In their attempt to link facial expressions to a dimensional emotion model, Albrecht et
al. [1] propose an algorithm to generate so-called ’intermediate’ facial expressions based
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on a disc-shaped evaluation-activation space. Intermediate facial expressions are gener-
ated by means of interpolation between facial expressions of Ekman’s basic emotions [38]
mapped into the disc-shaped evaluation-activation space. To animate the facial expres-
sions, they used a physics-based facial animation system modeled after human anatomy.
The same as Albrecht et al. [1], Courgeon et al. [30] propose an algorithm to generate
intermediate facial expressions by means of interpolation between expressions of eight
emotion categories (fear, admiration, anger, joy, reproach, relief, distress, satisfaction)
placed at the extreme points of PAD space. To animate the facial expressions, they used
MPEG-4 FAPs.
Breazeal [20] proposes an approach for linking emotional expressions to the three-
dimensions of AVS space. In this approach, Breazeal defines basis postures for the social
robot Kismet (see Section 3.1.2) that are associated to emotion categories lying at the
extremes of AVS space (see Figure 3.8). New expressions related to each point in AVS
space are generated by means of interpolation between the basis postures.
Altogether, these models use the dimensional emotion model to generate a wide range
of emotion expressions including shades and mixtures of emotions. However, the gen-
eration of new expressions by means of interpolation between predefined expressions
of emotion categories may generate unnatural and perceptually invalid expressions. In
order to obtain perceptually valid expressions, current research seeks to link emotion ex-
pressions to a dimensional emotion model based on the analysis of real expressions,
e.g., through image processing methods or perception studies. Within these models,
low-level expressive features such as facial muscles are directly linked to the dimensional
emotion model rather than predefined expressions. Following Russell [100], it is more
appropriate to link low-level expressive features, such as single facial actions to primary
information such as pleasure and arousal, rather than to emotion categories (cf. Section
2.3). In this regard, he postulates that the information signaled by a facial expression is
present in its single components and substantiates his assumption through Snodgrass’s
findings [111].
Stoiber et al. [112] propose an approach to generate a two-dimensional space to control
the facial expressions of a synthetic character based on analyzing physical deformations
of a human actor’s face displaying emotions. Their approach is based on detecting ge-
ometric and textural variation patterns (e.g., deformations of mouth, eyes, skin) and
their reorganization in a two-dimensional control space. While they do not rely on any
theoretical emotion space, their resulting two-dimensional control space is very similar
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to Plutchik’s emotion wheel [94] (see Figure 3.9).
Figure 3.8: Basis postures of the social robot
Kismet in AVS space [20], p. 141.
Figure 3.9: The facial expressions
generated by Stoiber et al.’s ap-
proach [112].
Zhang et al. [121] propose a method to link MPEG-4 FAPs of a synthetic character
to PAD values. Their approach is based on generating a database of synthetic facial
expressions based on a mapping from a database of human faces displaying emotion. The
database of synthetic facial expressions was annotated with PAD values using bipolar
adjective pairs from [78]. The database was used to train a model to map PAD values to
the synthetic character’s MPEG-4 FAPs. The rating of the resulting expressions in terms
of PAD values and emotion categories showed that the emotion underlying a generated
facial expression was consistent with human participants’ ratings of that expression.
Grammer & Oberzaucher [46] propose an approach to link AUs from FACS [40] to
PAD values. In the context of an empirical study, a facial expression repertoire is re-
constructed according to what they call a reverse engineering approach. In their study,
human participants rated randomly generated facial expressions displayed by a 3D face
using bipolar adjective pairs from [78]. The 3D face can express 25 AUs from FACS [40].
Based on a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and a two-dimensional regression
analysis, the meaning of each AU within PA space was extracted. Note that the dom-
inance dimension was not further considered in the regression analysis. Three example
regression planes showing the meaning of AU1, AU12, and AU5 (cf. Table A.1, p. 204)
within PA space are listed in Figure 3.10. By combining all regression planes for all AUs,
a facial expression repertoire is reconstructed.
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Figure 3.10: The regression planes representing the meaning of AU1, AU5, and AU12
in PA space [46], p. 10. The vertical axis (activation) represents the values of intensities
of the AUs.
An interesting aspect in the expression of emotion is behavior expressivity, i.e. the
velocity or abruptness of an expressive behavior. Accordingly, Chi et al. [26] propose
the EMOTE (Expressive MOTion Engine) model for defining the effort and shape
qualities of expressive movements. The effort quality of a movement can be manipulated
in terms of, e.g., weight as the impact of the movement (light vs. strong) or time as the
urgency of the movement (sustained vs. sudden). The shape quality of a movement can
be manipulated in terms of, e.g., direction of movement.
Discussion and conclusion
Ekman et al. [40] provide a set of clear and straightforward rules that define universal
facial expressions of emotion. However, the simulation of emotional facial expressions
on the basis of these rules is limited to this predefined set. In contrast, a dimensional
emotion model is believed to be more convenient to characterizing the facial expression
of emotion. However, the generation of new expressions by means of interpolation be-
tween predefined expressions located within a dimensional emotion space may produce
unnatural expressions of emotion. Further approaches propose to link low-level expres-
sive features of facial expressions to a dimensional emotion space to obtain perceptually
valid expressions.
As such, we propose an approach to link AUs to PAD emotion space based on
the work by Grammer & Oberzaucher. [46]. This approach is realized for a new virtual
human, called EMMA (see Chapter 4), where an important aspect is to provide her
with a large repertoire of facial expressions (see Section 4.3). EMMA’s facial expression
repertoire is crucial to the generation and expression of an empathic emotion in the
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proposed computational model of empathy (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.4).
3.2.2 Emotion recognition
Similar to an expression simulation system [46] (see previous section), an emotion
recognition system is composed of two components: feature recognition and mapping
to emotion. Feature recognition consists of recognizing the features that are representa-
tive for emotion from expressive and contextual cues. Mapping to emotion consists of
mapping the recognized features to emotion.
Feature recognition from expressive cues such as facial expressions, body gestures,
audio signals, and bio-potential signals is based on several methods such as image and
signal processing methods (see [51] for a review of existing methods). New approaches
to facial feature recognition attempt to recognize AUs from FACS [40] since their
detection allows for a more flexible and versatile interpretation of facial expressions as
argued by Bartlett et al. [3], Valster & Pantic [116], and El Kaliouby & Robinson [41].
While much effort is invested in developing techniques for feature recognition from
different expressive cues, several works on an emotion recognition system usually map
the wide range of recognized features to a limited set of discrete emotion categories
such as Ekman’s six basic emotion categories [38] (see [51] for a review). Therefore,
as for an expression simulation system (see Sections 3.2), dimensional emotion models
present dense and continuous emotion spaces that are more inclined to characterize
the continuity and subtlety of emotion expressions and that allow for the recognition
of a wide range of emotions. However, little attention has been devoted to emotion
recognition following a dimensional rather than a categorical approach, in particular
regarding emotion recognition from facial expressions (see [50] for a review). As such,
this field is currently in its pioneering stage.
In the works by Karpouzis et al. [60], Shin [108], Cao et al. [23], and Nicolaou et
al. [83], different approaches are proposed for mapping recognized facial features to a
dimensional emotion space. The proposed approaches are based on machine learning
and classification methods, and on facial expression data sets annotated in terms of
affective dimensions. In the works by Karpouzis et al. [60] and Nicolaou et al. [83], other
modalities are also considered such as vocal and bodily expressions.
Since facial feature recognition in terms of AUs allows for a more flexible and versa-
tile interpretation of facial expressions, Shugrina et al. [109] proposed an approach to
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recognize facial features in terms of AUs, and to map AUs to PA values based on the
empirical findings of Snodgrass [111] (see Section 2.3). Accordingly, Shugrina et al. [109]
associated each AU with a corresponding vector in PA space. The likelihood values of
each recognized AU are used to calculate a scalar weighting of the AU. These values are
used in a weighted summation of corresponding PA vectors to calculate the PA value of
a facial expression.
With regard to feature recognition from contextual cues, several works are based on
reasoning about other’s cognitive states and their link to affective states based on, e.g.,
a BDI-approach, and on the computational modeling of emotion (see Section 3.1.1).
Discussion and conclusion
As for emotion expression, dimensional emotion models are believed to be more in-
clined to characterize and thus to analyze the expression of emotion. In this regard, the
approaches proposed by Karpouzis et al. [60], Shin [108], and Cao et al. [23] rely on
machine learning and classification methods, and on facial expressions data sets anno-
tated in terms of the emotion dimensions. On the other hand, the approach proposed
by Shugrina et al. [109] is based on the interpretation of facial expressions in terms of
the PA values related to each recognized AU. Hence, emotion recognition is based on
the extracted meaning of each AU in terms of PA values, e.g., [46], thus allowing for
the interpretation of facial expressions in terms of the affective meaning of the different
facial actions. Furthermore, it also makes it possible to investigate how individual facial
actions contribute to the affective meaning of a whole expression.
As such, we propose an approach to map facial expressions displaying emotions to
PAD values based on the meaning of each AU within PAD space, as defined in the
virtual human EMMA’s facial expression repertoire (see Section 4.3). Here we assume
a system of automatic recognition of AUs as proposed by Bartlett et al. [3], Valster &
Pantic [116], and El Kaliouby & Robinson [41], and focus on mapping AUs to PAD
values. The proposed approach is crucial to the generation of an empathic emotion in
our model (see Section 5.2.1).
3.2.3 Conclusion
According to Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, dimensional emotion models are believed to be
more convenient for emotion expression and recognition. With regard to emotion ex-
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pression, proposed approaches can be classified into approaches that link whole facial
expressions to emotion dimensions and approaches that link lower-level facial features to
emotion dimensions. With regard to emotion recognition, proposed approaches can
be classified into approaches that are based on data sets of whole facial expressions an-
notated in terms of emotion dimensions or into approaches that are based on data sets of
lower-level facial features, e.g., facial actions, annotated in terms of emotion dimensions.
According to Section 2.3, approaches that consider the emotional meaning of a whole
facial expression can be referred to as top-down approaches while those that consider the
emotional meaning of single facial actions can be referred to as bottom-up approaches. In
this regard, our proposed approaches to emotion expression and to emotion recognition
from facial expression can be classified as bottom-up approaches.
3.3 Empathy in virtual humans and robots
In this section, we present and discuss different computational models of empathy, as
well as their application and evaluation in virtual human and robot scenarios.
3.3.1 Computational models of empathy
In this section, we focus on presenting works that mainly address the computational
modeling of several theoretical aspects underlying empathy (cf. Section 2.1). One of the
first models that provides a computational model of empathic emotions based on OCC’s
fortunes-of-other emotions [88] (see Section 2.2) is the Affective Reasoner (AR) [42].
CARE: Companion Assisted Reactive Empathizer
Following Davis [34] (cf. Section 2.1.2), McQuiggan et al. [76] propose an inductive
framework for modeling parallel and reactive empathy. They called their framework
CARE (CompanionAssistedReactive Empathizer) and based it on learning empirically
informed models of empathy during human-agent social interactions. In a learning phase,
users’ situation data, such as their actions and intentions, users’ affective states, bio-
potential signals, and other characteristics such as their age and gender are gathered
while they interact with virtual characters. The virtual characters respond to the user’s
situation with either parallel or reactive empathy. During interaction with the characters,
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users are able to evaluate their empathic responses using a 4 point Likert scale. Naive
Bayes classifiers, decision trees, and support vector machines are used to learn models
of empathy from ’good examples’. The induced models of empathy are used at runtime
in a test phase to drive virtual characters’ empathic responses.
A computational model of empathic emotions
Based on an empirical and theoretical approach, Ochs et al. [86] propose a computational
model of empathic emotions. In order to precisely determine the conditions of elicitation
of users’ emotions during human-machine interaction, they empirically analyzed human-
machine dialog situations to identify the characteristics of dialog situations that may
elicit users’ emotions. The results of this empirical analysis were combined with a
theoretical model of emotion to provide a model of empathic emotions. The theoretical
model of emotion is based on Scherer’s appraisal theory of emotion [104] (cf. Section 2.2)
where a description of the conditions of elicitation of emotions are defined. These are,
in turn, based on a number of appraisal variables to determine the type and intensity of
an elicited emotion. Thus, once the user’s potential emotion is determined, the agent’s
empathic emotion from the same type is triggered toward the user. The elicitation and
intensity of an empathic emotion depend on several factors. Accordingly, they define a
degree of empathy as a value that affects the base intensity of the empathic emotion
depending on the liking relationship between the user and the agent, and on the degree
to which a user deserves or not his immediate situation (cf. [88], see Section 2.2). For
their computational model of empathic emotions, they propose a formal representation
using a BDI-like approach.
A generic computational model of empathy
Rodrigues et al. [98] propose a generic computational model of empathy following neu-
ropsychological research on empathy [35] (cf. Section 2.1.3). Their model is integrated
into an existing affective agent architecture [36] (see Section 3.1.1) and is comprised of
two major components, an empathic appraisal component and an empathic response
component (see Figure 3.11).
Accordingly, a perceived event by an agent that evokes an emotional cue in another
agent is input to the empathic appraisal component together with the emotional cue.
Rodrigues et al. [98] define an emotional cue as any observable signal indicating the
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Figure 3.11: The generic computational model of empathy proposed by Rodrigues et al.
[98].
presence of an emotion, e.g., facial expressions. Within the empathic appraisal, the
emotional cue is input to an emotion recognition module, and the event is input to
a self-projection appraisal module. The emotion recognition module provides sev-
eral candidate emotions where the one with the highest potential is set as default. The
self-projection appraisal module provides an elicited emotion as follows. The empathic
agent assumes the other agent’s situation by means of self-projection and appraises this
situation using its own appraisal rules. The outputs of both modules are combined to
determine an empathic emotion as the output of the empathic appraisal. If the elicited
emotion is included in the set of candidate emotions, then it is set as the empathic
emotion. Otherwise, the default emotion included in the candidate emotions is set as
the empathic emotion. An important aspect addressed here is the modulation of the
empathic emotion by several factors following De Vignemont & Singer [35]. Accord-
ingly, the intensity of the empathic emotion is affected by the following modulation
factors: similarity, affective link, mood, and personality. Similarity is determined as the
degree of congruence of the elicited emotion with the candidate emotions. Affective link
is determined as the value of liking between the agents. The average value of both of
these factors affects the base intensity of the empathic emotion. That is, the higher the
values of similarity and affective link, the higher the value of intensity of the empathic
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emotion. Mood refers to the empathizing agent’s mood which then affects the intensity
of the empathic emotion as it affects that of other emotions [36] (see Section 3.1.1).
Personality refers to the empathizing agent’s resistance to feel particular emotions. The
more the agent is resistant to feel the empathic emotion, the less likely the emotion is
to be output by the appraisal component.
With regard to the empathic response component, the empathic emotion generated by
the empathic appraisal is added to the agent’s emotional state, and triggers a situation
appropriate action as a reactive behavior. The empathic appraisal process works concur-
rently to the reactive and the deliberative appraisal of the affective agent architecture
[36] (see Section 3.1.1).
Breazeal et al.’ s computational model of facial mimicry
According to the theoretical background on empathy introduced in Section 2.1, facial
mimicry is crucial as a mechanism by which an empathic emotion is produced. In this
section, we present Breazeal et al.’s computational model of facial mimicry for a social
robot [21]. In this regard, Breazeal et al. [21] propose a biologically inspired approach
to imitation learning based on findings by Meltzoff & Moore [80] (see Section 2.1.2).
Their approach is based on two phases, one where a human interaction partner imitates
the robot, and another where the robot imitates the human interaction partner. In the
first phase, the robot starts a motor babbling action by displaying a random facial expres-
sion. Subsequently, the human partner tries to imitate the robot’s displayed expression.
Using separate neural networks for three different facial regions (right eye, left eye, and
mouth) the robot learns a correspondence between its own facial display, and the hu-
man’s recognized facial display during imitation. The neural networks are successfully
trained with example input-output pairs. In the second phase, the robot imitates new fa-
cial expressions displayed by the human partner on the basis of the learned input-output
pairs. Further, the imitated facial expression induces the corresponding emotional state
in the robot based on the robot’s emotion model [20] (see Section 3.1.1). However, they
do not explicate how this issue is realized.
Discussion
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, one of the first models that provided a
computational model of OCC’s fortunes-of-other emotions [88] (cf. Section 2.2) is the
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Affective Reasoner (AR) [42]. Computational models of empathy that are based on
OCC’s fortunes-of-other emotions tend to be restricted to only two types of empathic
emotions, happy-for and pity. However, an empathic emotion can be any emotion that
is compatible with the other’s situation (cf. Section 2.1).
McQuiggan et al. [76] provided a model of parallel and reactive empathy following
Davis [34] (cf. Section 2.1.2). However, their approach is based on learning empirically
informed models of empathy which hence constrain the flexibility of their model, and
thus the easiness to adapt it to other contexts. Ochs et al. [86] provided a formal model
of empathic emotions that is based on an empirical analysis of human-machine dialog
situations. Similarly to McQuiggan et al.’s model [76], their model is tied to the consid-
ered context, and is also not easy to adapt to other contexts. Compared to these works,
Rodrigues et al. [98] propose a generic computational model of empathy, and focus on an
appropriate combination of different theoretical aspects of empathy within the model. In
their model, two different mechanisms are integrated to generate an empathic emotion.
Their definition of self-projection is similar to situational role-taking or self-focused role
taking as defined respectively by Higgins [53] and Hoffman [55] (cf. Section 2.1.2). Fur-
ther, their model is very similar to the early appraisal model of empathy [35] (cf. Figure
2.2, p. 22).
According to Hoffman’s definition of mimicry [55] as composed of two subsequent
steps, imitation and feedback (see Section 2.1.2), Breazeal et al. [21] focus mainly on
the realization of the imitation step in their approach to facial mimicry.
3.3.2 Application and evaluation
In this section, we present different works on the application and evaluation of compu-
tational models of empathy in virtual human and robot scenarios. Accordingly, we focus
on presenting works that mainly address the evaluation of the impact of empathy on
human-agent interaction.
The Empathic Companion
The Empathic Companion is an embodied character developed in the context of a web-
based job interview scenario to address users’ recognized emotional state [95] by pro-
viding them with empathic feedback (see Figure 3.12). The goal of developing such a
character is to investigate the effectiveness of empathic feedback to reduce users’ stress
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in frustrating situations. In this scenario, an interviewing agent interacts with a user
by asking him various questions. Bio-potential signals and context-based information
are used to recognize users’ affective states. Depending on a user’s recognized affec-
tive state, empathic feedback consists of three options. The character shows empathic
concern for a user whose recognized affective state indicates high arousal and negative
valence, or encourages a user who is not aroused, or congratulates a user whose recog-
nized emotional state indicates high arousal and positive valence. In order to evaluate
the impact of the Empathic Companion on users, bio-potential signals are also used to
measure users’ perception of the embodied character. In this regard, two versions of the
Empathic Companion were considered, a not empathic version where the character is
defined as not supportive, and an empathic version where it is defined as supportive.
The results show that the presence of the Empathic Companion significantly reduces
users’ value of arousal and stress when getting an interview question.
Empathic MAX playing Skip-Bo
Within the Skip-Bo card game scenario (cf. Section 3.1.2), the virtual human MAX pro-
vides the interaction partner with empathic feedback [7] based on the work by Prendinger
& Ishizuka [95]. MAX’s empathic feedback consists of displaying facial expressions re-
flecting the partner’s recognized emotional state, thus overriding the emotional behavior
triggered by MAX’s own emotional state (see Figure 3.13). In order to evaluate the
impact of MAX’s emotional behavior on the interaction partner, bio-potential signals
are also used to measure participants’ perception of MAX’s behavior. For this purpose,
four different conditions were considered: a non-emotional condition where MAX does
not show emotional behavior; a self-centered condition where MAX displays his own
emotions according to his own game moves; a negative empathic condition where MAX
displays self-centered emotional behavior and a non-congruent emotional state to that
of the partner, e.g., showing positive emotions in response to the partner’s negative
emotions; a positive empathic condition where MAX displays self-centered emotional
behavior and a congruent emotional state to that of the partner. The results show that
displaying positive empathic emotions in a competitive card game scenario is arous-
ing and stress inducing.
In a further work by Boukricha et al. [12], situational role-taking as defined by
Higgins [53] (see Section 2.1.2) was realized for MAX within the Skip-Bo card game
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scenario. Thus, MAX infers the partner’s emotional state by appraising the partner’s
game situation using own appraisal mechanisms. The partner’s inferred emotional state
is simulated within MAX’s emotion simulation module besides the virtual human’s own
emotional state [8]. A first evaluation of this approach was realized with respect to three
from a total of 32 game sessions recorded in the previous work by Becker et al. [7]. The
results show that the arousal course provided by situational role-taking is quite similar
to that provided by the emotion recognition system used in [7]. The proposed approach
to situational role-taking is further considered and refined in the context of the present
thesis (see Sections 5.2.2 and 6.1.2).
Figure 3.12: The empathic companion sup-
porting a human candidate in a job inter-
view task [95].
Figure 3.13: The virtual human
MAX playing Skip-Bo against a hu-
man opponent [8], p. 104.
Casino-style blackjack
In the context of a casino-style blackjack scenario, Brave et al. [19] investigated the
psychological impact of emotional and empathic agents on human users. Within this
scenario, the agent and a user are playing against a disembodied dealer. The agent was
represented by a photograph of a human face. Both interaction partners can observe
their respective performances during the game. Based on a very simple emotion model,
the agent displays positive emotions if he or the user won, and negative ones if he or
the user lost. The agent’s emotions are expressed by facial and textual expressions. The
impact of the agent’s emotional behavior on users was evaluated by asking participants
to complete a questionnaire at the end of the game. In this regard, two conditions were
considered, a self-oriented emotion and other-oriented empathic emotion. The results
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show that the agent is perceived as more likable, trustworthy, and caring in the other-
oriented empathic emotion condition than in the self-oriented emotion condition.
A virtual training environment: Crystal Island
The application and evaluation of CARE [76] (see Section 3.3.1) is realized in the context
of a virtual training environment called Crystal Island designed to teach middle school
students microbiology and genetics. Within this environment, a student is assigned a
particular task and a virtual character. Through his virtual character, the student can
interact with other characters in the world to ask questions and form hypotheses in order
to solve the assigned task. Within this scenario, data is collected for the students’ ratings
of the characters empathic behavior as defined in the CARE framework (see Section
3.3.1). The collected data was organized into training and test data. The evaluation of
the characters’ empathic behaviors according to these data sets shows that the induced
empathy models within the CARE framework produce appropriate empathic behaviors.
EDAMS: An Empathic Dialog Agent in a Mail System
The computational model of empathic emotions [86] presented in Section 3.3.1 is applied
and evaluated in the scenario of a dialog interaction in a mail system. In this scenario, a
user interacts with an empathic agent, called Empathic Dialog Agent in a Mail System
(EDAMS) to get information about his mails using predefined sentences. A 3D talking
head is used to display empathic emotions by facial expressions. In order to calculate
the intensity of an empathic emotion, some values are fixed prior to the interaction,
e.g., the agent’s degree of empathy. The empathic behavior of the agent is evaluated
by asking participants to complete a questionnaire after interaction with the EDAMS.
Three conditions are considered, similarly to those in [7]: a non-emotional condition, an
empathic condition, and a non-congruent emotional condition. The results show that
the agent is perceived more positively in the empathic condition and more negatively in
the non-congruent emotional condition.
FearNot!
FearNot! is a computer application designed to help address the problem of bullying in
schools [91]. FearNot! enables children between 8 and 12 years old to observe simulated
bullying situations from a third person perspective and to experience this situation
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through role playing. The simulated bullying situations are realized with synthetic char-
acters in a 3D virtual environment (see Figure 3.14). In an observed bullying situation,
a child interacts with the victim (the bullied character) and advises him what to do by
imagining being his friend. The child’s interaction with the victim influences the victim’s
subsequent behavior in the observed situation. In this regard, Paiva et al. [91] focus on
building characters with whom observers can feel a degree of proximity/familiarity, and
that therefore evoke empathic responses in the observer. Accordingly, certain aspects of
bullying situation were researched and taken into account in the design of such situa-
tions. The characters’ emotional behavior and expression are controlled based on the
emotion model presented in Section 3.1.1. Cartoon-like characters were chosen because
they are preferred by children. The results of an empirical evaluation of the system with
children and adults show that the system, as expected, evoked empathic responses in
children but not in adults.
The generic computational model of empathy [98] presented in Section 3.3.1 was ap-
plied and evaluated in a scenario of four characters as designed within FearNot!. The
characters were assigned different roles and values of liking relationships between each
other. An empirical study investigating the perceived values of relationship and empa-
thy between the characters is conducted with respect to two conditions, one with the
empathy model and one without. The results show that the perceived values of empathy
and relationship between empathizer and target are significantly higher in the empa-
thy condition. The results are in line with the theoretical assumptions underlying the
proposed model of empathy (see Section 3.3.1).
The relational agent Laura
Bickmore & Picard [9] introduce an approach to relational agents which they define
as computer agents able to build and sustain long-term socio-emotional relationships
with users. Their relational agent, called Laura, is a virtual agent that acts as advi-
sor in the context of a fitness program. Laura interacts with users based on designed
multimodal dialogs. In the dialogs, the agent responds multimodally using speech and
synchronized non-verbal behavior. The user interacts with Laura by choosing items from
a menu of predefined textual phrases. One important socio-emotional phenomena
that contributes to the proposed relational agent approach is empathy. In the considered
scenario, Laura’s empathic behavior is realized through scripting.
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The iCat as a chess companion
Leite et al. [69] proposed an approach to endow the iCat robot with empathic behavior
in a chess game with children to improve their chess performance (see Figure 3.15). In
their work they focus on providing the robot with a model of the children’s affective
states using a multimodal approach that combines visually recognized features such as
facial and gaze behaviors, with contextual information about the game progress. Since
prototypical facial expressions of emotion were not often observed in the children, they
decided to measure the children’s value of valence. Contextual information about the
game progress is obtained based on self-projection (cf. [98], see Section 3.3.1). Based on
this multimodal information, the probability of the children having a positive or negative
value of valence is calculated. This is based on support vector machines trained with a
data corpus containing the same kind of multimodal information obtained from recorded
videos of children playing chess with the robot.
Figure 3.14: The FearNot! syn-
thetic Characters in a 3D virtual
environment [91].
Figure 3.15: The iCat as a
Chess companion [68].
Once the children’s affective state is recognized, an adaptive empathic response
in the robot is triggered. The goal of the robot’s empathic response is to maximize the
children’s value of positive valence. By trial and error, the robot also learns to choose the
empathic response that effectively contributes to maximizing a particular child’s positive
value of valence. An empirical evaluation of the children’s perception of the robot’s
empathic behavior in the game was conducted. For this purpose, three conditions were
considered, a neutral condition where the robot does not display any empathic behavior,
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but instead a negative empathic behavior (cf. [7] and [86]); a random empathic condition
where the robot selects an empathic response randomly; an adaptive empathic condition
where the robot selects a learned empathic response. The results show that the robot
was perceived by children as significantly more engaging and helpful in the empathic
conditions, than in the neutral condition. No significant differences were found between
the two empathic conditions.
Discussion
The application and evaluation of computational models of empathy within human-agent
and agent-agent interaction scenarios provided valuable findings about the impact of em-
pathy on enhancing artificial agents’ social behavior, as well as support for the underlying
theories. For example, empathic agents appeared to reduce stress levels during job inter-
view tasks [95] and to teach children to deal with bullying situations [91]. However, the
evaluation of the impact of MAX’s empathic behavior within a competitive card game
scenario shows that displaying positive empathic emotions is significantly arousing
and stress inducing and thus inappropriate [7]. Therefore, we believe that a modula-
tion of the virtual human’s empathic emotion through factors such as mood, liking, or
deservingness (cf. Sections 2.1 and 2.2) will result in a more appropriate behavior that
further enhances an artificial agent’s social behavior. For instance, consider a teaching
scenario where an artificial agent is confronted with more than one student. Modulating
the agent’s empathic emotion through the factor deservingness, for example, would allow
the agent to empathize more with the student who does not deserved his current annoy-
ing situation, e.g., a student who is working hard but who failed the exam vs. a student
who is lazy and also failed the exam. In this regard, most of the computational models of
empathy have focused on the generation and expression of an empathic emotion, while
calculating different degrees of empathy has received little attention.
While this issue is addressed in the model by Ochs et al. [86], the perception of
the agent’s different degrees of empathy and of the different values of the modulation
factors in question were not evaluated. In contrast, Rodrigues et al. [98] evaluated the
perception of the values of relationship between empathizer and target in two considered
conditions, non-empathic condition and empathic condition with their results supporting
their model.
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3.3.3 Conclusion
According to the three central processes of empathy that we identified in Section 2.1.4,
Empathy Mechanism, Empathy Modulation, and Expression of Empathy, and to the dis-
cussion of related work on the computational modeling of empathy, the requirements
for a computational model of empathy formulated in Section 1.2 arise. Table 3.1 shows
the classification of previous work on the computational modeling of empathy discussed
in this section with respect to its contribution to these requirements.
As compared to the previous work presented in this section, within our computa-
tional model of empathy, we consider facial mimicry and situational role-taking as
mechanisms by which an empathic emotion is generated (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).
However, as compared to the model by Rodrigues et al. [98], we consider the mechanisms
separately. Further, facial mimicry as defined by Hoffman [55] has not received much
attention in the previously presented works with the exception of the work by Breazeal
et al. [21]. However, whereas in their model of facial mimicry, Breazeal et al. [21] focused
on the imitation step, in our approach, we focus on the feedback step. Further, we also
attribute high importance to the calculation of different degrees of empathy, as an
aspect that has received little attention in the computational modeling of empathy and
which is crucial in further enhancing an artificial agent’s social behavior. While in the
models by Rodrigues et al. [98] and Ochs et al. [86], only the intensity of an empathic
emotion is modulated, in our model, we also modulate its related type (emotion cate-
gory). In this regard, we follow Hoffman’s [55] emphasis that an empathic response need
not to be a close match to the affect experienced by the other, but can be any emotional
reaction compatible with the other’s situation. Furthermore, we evaluated our proposed
model based on three different conditions that distinguished different degrees of empa-
thy, thus allowing for a more fine-grained evaluation of the model and its underlying
parameters.
3.4 Summary
As emphasized in the previous chapter, theoretical models of empathy, together with
theoretical models of emotion and theories and findings on emotion expression and per-
ception, are crucial to the computational modeling of empathy. Therefore, Section 3.1
provided an overview of different approaches to the computational modeling of emotion
67
3 Related work
Related Work Empathy Mechanism 
Empathy 
Modulation 
Expression of 
Empathy Adequacy Universality 
McQuiggan et al. 
2008 Mult.EmoRec 
modulated type of 
emp.emo. Mult.EmoExp 
appropriate empathic 
reactions partly 
Ochs et al. 
2012 emotional appraisal 
modulated intensity of 
emp.emo. Mult.EmoExp 
positive impact of 
empathic agent on users partly 
Rodrigues et al. 
2009 
self-projection 
Automatic EmoRec 
modulated intensity of 
emp.emo. Mult.EmoExp 
perceived values of 
empathy and liking are 
higher in the empathic 
condition 
universal 
Breazeal 
2003 
facial mimicry 
(imitation) - facial expression 
appropriate imitation of 
perceived expressions universal 
Prendinger & 
Ishizuka 2005 Mult.EmoRec - textual expression 
empathic agent 
lowers users' stress level partly 
Becker et al. 
2005 Mult.EmoRec - facial expression 
positive empathic 
emotions in a competitive 
game are arousing and 
stress inducing 
partly 
Boukricha et al. 
2007 situational role-taking - facial expression 
arousal course similar to 
the one provided by 
EmoRec for three games 
recorded in Becker et al. 
2005 
partly 
Brave et al. 
2005 
very simple emotional 
appraisal - Mult.EmoExp 
agent more likable, 
trustworthy, and caring in 
empathic condition 
- 
Bickmore & Picard 
2005 emotional appraisal - Mult.EmoExp 
empathic behavior 
contributes to relational 
agents 
- 
Leite et al. 
2012 
self-projection 
automatic EmoRec - 
Mult.EmoExp 
adaptive behavior 
agent more engaging and 
helpful in empathic 
condition 
partly 
 
Table 3.1: Related work on the computational modeling of empathy classified with
respect to its contribution to the requirements formulated in Section 1.2. ’Mult. EmoRec’
refers to multimodal emotion recognition. ’Mult. EmoExp’ refers to multimodal emotion
expression. ’emp. emo.’ refers to empathic emotion.
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and their application and evaluation in different virtual human and robot scenarios. In
this regard, the WASABI computational model of emotion unifies several theoretical
aspects of emotion, and is successfully applied and evaluated within different scenarios
involving the virtual human MAX. This underlines the appropriateness and feasibility
of WASABI for the realization of different theoretical aspects of empathy, and as such
is at the basis of our model (see Chapter 5).
Section 3.2 presented different approaches to emotion expression simulation as well as
methods for emotion recognition. In line with findings within research on emotion ex-
pression and perception (see Section 2.3), recent works on emotion expression simulation
and on emotion recognition follow a dimensional approach. In this regard, a dimen-
sional emotion model (cf. Section 2.2) appears to better characterize the continuity
and subtlety of emotion expression, and to allow for the expression and recognition of a
wider range of emotions than other models (cf. Section 2.2). Furthermore, the discussed
works were classified into those that consider the emotional meaning of a whole facial
expression, thus relying on a top-down approach and those that consider the emotional
meaning of single facial muscles, thus relying on a bottom-up approach (cf. Section 2.3).
In this regard, a bottom-up approach allows for the combination of different facial
actions and their emotional meaning to reconstruct new facial expressions. Accordingly,
we propose an approach to link AUs from FACS [40] to PAD space [102] thus providing
a large repertoire of facial expressions of emotion (see Section 4.3). We also propose an
approach to map facial expressions displaying emotions to PAD values based on the pro-
vided meaning of each AU within PAD space. The proposed approaches are crucial for
the generation and expression of an empathic emotion within our computational model
of empathy (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.4).
Finally, Section 3.3 introduced different approaches to the computational modeling of
empathy as well as their application and evaluation within virtual human and robot sce-
narios. The models discussed were divided into those that focused mainly on addressing
the theoretical aspects of empathy, and those that focused on evaluating the impact of
empathy on human-agent interaction. With regard to the former, we identified models
that are empirically informed and thus tied to the considered context and models that
provide a more generic model of empathy. Further, the application and evaluation of
several computational models of empathy within different virtual human and robot sce-
narios provided valuable results for the role of empathy in enhancing an artificial agent’s
social behavior, and for the role of computational models as an experimental tools for
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underlying theories. However, most of the computational models of empathy have fo-
cused on the generation and expression of an empathic emotion, while the consideration
of different degrees of empathy has received little attention despite being crucial to
further enhancing an artificial agent’s social behavior.
The related works on the computational modeling of empathy presented in this section
were classified with respect to their contribution to the requirements for a computa-
tional model of empathy as formulated in Section 1.2. As compared to these works, in
our computational model of empathy, facial mimicry and situational role-taking are con-
sidered as two separate empathy mechanisms. Further, we also consider the calculation
of different degrees of empathy in our model. In line with Hoffman’s emphasis that an
empathic response need not to be a close match to the affect experienced by the other
but can be any emotional reaction compatible with the other’s situation [55], in our
model, not only the intensity of an empathic emotion is modulated, but also its related
type (emotion category). Furthermore, we evaluated our model based on three conditions
that differentiated different degrees of empathy, thus allowing for a more fine-grained
evaluation of the model and its underlying parameters.
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This chapter introduces EMMA, a new virtual human with a female-like appearance.
Besides the virtual human MAX, EMMA is developed at the Artificial Intelligence Group
(AI-Group) at Bielefeld University. Section 4.1 begins with an overview of the history
of developing a new virtual human. In Section 4.2, we present the name EMMA as
an acronym for Empathic MultiModal Agent. Section 4.3 introduces an empirically
based approach to link EMMA’s facial expressions to the dimensional emotion space of
pleasure, arousal, and dominance.
4.1 A new virtual human: The history in a nutshell
This section gives an overview of the motivation and background behind developing
EMMA as well as of the different steps taken in the design of her appearance.
4.1.1 Motivation and background
Besides the successful work on the virtual human MAX [62] (cf. Section 3.1.2), the idea
was brought up in the AI-Group at Bielefeld University to create a new virtual human.
This new virtual human is named EMMA and is the female counterpart to MAX (see
Figure 4.1).
As compared to MAX whose face is comprised of 21 facial muscles that express seven
emotion categories (cf. Section 3.2.1), an important aspect in developing EMMA is to
provide her with a large repertoire of facial expressions. Hence, EMMA’s face is modeled
in line with the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) [40] and expresses a wide range of
emotions along the Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance (PAD) dimensions [102] (see Section
4.3). Further, the creation of a new virtual human besides MAX allows for the consid-
eration of another type of interaction in addition to human-agent interaction, namely,
agent-agent interaction. For example, the conversational agent scenario realized in the
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Figure 4.1: The virtual humans MAX & EMMA in a 3D computer graphics simulation
of a biosphere.
present thesis which involves the virtual humans MAX and EMMA and a human inter-
action partner (see Section 6.1.1). Furthermore, the creation of a virtual human with a
female-like appearance allows for the computational modeling of gender differences as
well as for their analysis and evaluation. However, this aspect has not yet been consid-
ered, and could be the subject of future work. In summary, there are three important
aspects in creating EMMA:
• providing an elaborate model of facial expressions (see Section 4.3).
• allowing for the consideration of agent-agent interaction (e.g., see Section 6.1.1).
• modeling and evaluating gender differences.
4.1.2 Design and appearance
The design of EMMA’s appearance was initiated by Christian Becker-Asano and Kerstin
Hasse as former members of the AI-Group at Bielefeld University under the supervision of
Prof. Ipke Wachsmuth. The process was finalized by Andrea Hofstätter in cooperation
with the department of anthropology at the University of Vienna [56]. In the following,
we describe the different steps taken to design EMMA’s appearance.
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As mentioned before, one important aspect in creating EMMA is to provide an elab-
orate model of facial expressions. Therefore, as compared to MAX’s face, EMMA’s face
consists of a higher-resolution polygon mesh that allows for a refined modeling of Action
Units (AUs) in line with FACS [40] (see Section 4.3.1). Further, EMMA’s face mesh is
designed using front and side photographs of a real woman’s face (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: The real woman’s face underlying EMMA’s face model.
In addition to the face mesh, there are polygon mesh models for hair, ears, eyes, lacrimals,
teeth, and a palate, which together form EMMA’s entire head mesh (see Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3: The polygon mesh models forming EMMA’s head mesh [56], p. 18.
Also the texture of EMMA’s face is designed based on a photograph of a real woman’s
face (see Figure 4.4).
Further, while MAX’s body is based on a number of rigid object geometries enclosing
his limbs and connected at the level of his joints, EMMA’s body, the same as her
head, consists of a polygon mesh model. Hence, EMMA’s body allows for smoother, and
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Figure 4.4: The textures for EMMA’s face, ears, lacrimals, and palate [56], p. 19.
thus more natural body movements (see Section 4.2.2). Furthermore, the proportions
of EMMA’s body correspond to those of a real woman’s body. As emphasized in the
previous section, EMMA and MAX can appear together in the context of an agent-
agent interaction (e.g., Section 6.1.1). Accordingly, it was decided to choose textures for
EMMA’s garments that are in line with those of MAX in order to obtain a coherent
appearance for both virtual humans (see Figure 4.1).
4.2 EMMA: An Empathic MultiModal Agent
As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, EMMA’s face is modeled in line with FACS [40] and
expresses a wide range of emotions along the PAD dimensions [102] (see Section 4.3).
Hence, the idea was brought up that EMMA could be suitable to realize empathy on the
basis of the empathy mechanism facial mimicry (see Section 5.2.1). Effectively, a first
interaction scenario of EMMA is carried out in the context of empathy in this thesis (see
Section 6.1.1). To this end, the components of MAX’s cognitive architecture (see Figure
4.5) are carried over, adapted, and extended for the new virtual human EMMA. In
accordance with her capabilities within her first interaction scenario (see Section 6.1.1),
we chose the name ’EMMA’ to refer to an Empathic MultiModal Agent.
In this section, we present the cognitive architecture by emphasizing the components
that EMMA ’inherited’ from MAX and those that are specific to EMMA.
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4.2.1 The cognitive architecture
The virtual human MAX [62] has a cognitive architecture [70] that builds upon the
perceive-reason-act triad (see Figure 4.5), and that is successfully applied within several
interaction scenarios (see Section 3.1.2). Highlights include the permanently running
Figure 4.5: The cognitive architecture of the virtual human MAX carried over to the
new virtual human EMMA [70].
scenarios of MAX acting as a guide in a computer museum, and of MAX engaging peo-
ple in a small-talk dialog in the corridor of the AI-Group at Bielefeld University. The
successful application of MAX’s cognitive architecture within these and other scenarios
is demonstrative of the feasibility, flexibility, and robustness of the architecture. Accord-
ingly, MAX’s cognitive architecture is carried over to the virtual human EMMA, and is
then further adapted and extended.
The act section of the architecture triad (see Figure 4.5) includes a multimodal behav-
ior generation module, called by Kopp &Wachsmuth [64] theArticulatedCommunicator
Engine (ACE). Within this module, adaptations and extensions are performed for the
facial expression component, the speech component, and the component that generates
and controls body movements, e.g., gestures.
Further, a new architecture component, particular to EMMA and crucial to the
computational model of empathy proposed in this thesis is for facial mimicry as intro-
duced in Section 5.2.1. The adaptations and extensions carried out in the multimodal
behavior generation module of the architecture are described in the next section.
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4.2.2 The multimodal behavior
Similarly to the virtual human MAX, EMMA is capable of exhibiting multimodal behav-
ior based on facial expressions, speech, and body movements. The multimodal behavior
is triggered by the reactive and deliberative components of the architecture (see Figure
4.5) and is generated within the Articulated Communicator Engine (ACE) [64]. In the
following, we present the adaptations and extensions carried out for EMMA.
Facial expression
FACS [40] is based on an anatomical analysis of facial muscle actions, and represents a
comprehensive system to describe all possible and visually distinguishable facial move-
ments (cf. Section 2.3). Furthermore, FACS is the most widely used expression coding
system in the behavioral sciences, and has also been established as an eligible standard
for the adequate and convenient modeling of artificial facial expressions (cf. Section
3.2.1). Further, dimensional emotion models present dense and continuous emotion
spaces that are more inclined to characterize the continuity and subtlety of emotion
expressions, and that allow for the generation of a wide range of expressions. Further-
more, it seems to be more appropriate to link low-level expressive features such as single
facial actions to a dimensional emotion space rather than predefined facial expressions
(cf. Section 3.2.1). Hence, AUs are modeled for EMMA in line with FACS [40], and are
linked to the dimensional emotion space of pleasure, arousal, and dominance [102] (see
Section 4.3).
In this regard, the facial expression component is extended to the specification and
generation of facial behaviors on the basis of AUs. For example, the specification and
generation of visemes as the visual representation of speech phonemes, of key frame
animations of facial expressions, and of facial behaviors such as eye blinking as an
incessant secondary behavior and eye brow raising as a conversational behavior (cf.
[62]).
Further, the facial expression component is also extended to a facial expression
repertoire linking PAD values to AUs. Thus, to each PAD value output by the emo-
tion simulation module [8] of the cognitive architecture [70] (see Section 3.1.1), a corre-
sponding facial expression animation is generated. Furthermore, similarly to MAX (see
Section 3.2.1), the frequency of EMMA’s eye blinking, as a secondary behavior, is influ-
enced by her value of arousal. The facial behaviors generated within the facial expression
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component are synchronized with other triggered modalities such as speech and body
movements.
Speech
As for facial expressions, the parameters of EMMA’s speech prosody are also linked to
the dimensional emotion space of pleasure, arousal, and dominance [102], thus allowing
for a continuous and subtle modulation of EMMA’s emotional speech prosody. In this
regard, a new speech component based on the work by Schröder & Touvain [107] and
Schröder [106] is added. In their work, Schröder & Touvain introduce a German text-
to-speech synthesis system called MARY (Modular Architecture for Research on
speech sYnthesis) where PAD based emotional prosody rules are specified within a so
called EmoSpeak module. Since the emotional prosody generated with regard to extreme
PAD values was judged by members of our AI-Group as exaggerated, the values of some
speech prosody parameters within the specified emotional prosody rules were adapted
accordingly.
Body movements
To allow for the appropriate generation and control of EMMA’s body movements such
as her gestures, some adaptations are performed within the corresponding component.
These adaptations involved the specification of the lengths of EMMA’s limbs, number of
her joints, and the transformations within EMMA’s body-centered coordinate system.
In order to animate EMMA’s body mesh (cf. Section 4.1.2), an underlying bone struc-
ture forming EMMA’s skeleton is defined. The animation of EMMA’s skeleton – her limbs
and joints – further animates her body mesh based on a defined mesh deformation al-
gorithm. Hence, as compared to MAX whose body is based on a number of rigid object
geometries, EMMA is capable of smoother and thus more natural body movements
especially in the torso region (cf. Figure 4.1).
Similarly to MAX (see Section 3.2.1), in addition to her incessant secondary behavior
of eye blinking, EMMA has a breathing behavior defined as a body movement whose
frequency is influenced by her value of arousal. Furthermore, EMMA is also able to
synchronize speech and gestures as was previously realized for the virtual human MAX
[64].
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4.2.3 Conclusion
As emphasized in Section 4.2.2, similarly to MAX, EMMA is capable of exhibiting mul-
timodal behavior based on facial expressions, speech, and body movements. However,
EMMA can express a wider range of emotions along PAD dimensions using her face and
speech prosody, and is capable of smoother and thus more natural body movements.
Furthermore, EMMA’s large repertoire of facial expressions is crucial to the re-
alization of facial mimicry as an empathy mechanism (see Section 5.2.1), and for the
expression of empathy (see Section 5.4) as requirements for building a computational
model of empathy (cf. Section 1.2). In the following, the steps taken for the development
of EMMA’s facial expression repertoire are introduced.
4.3 EMMA’s facial expressions in
pleasure-arousal-dominance space
According to Grammer & Oberzaucher [46], an expression simulation system is composed
of two components: a control architecture for linking expressions to emotions and an
expressive output component for animating expression patterns (cf. Section 3.2.1). In this
section, we present EMMA’s facial expression simulation system. The expressive
output component is based on modeling AUs for EMMA in line with FACS [40] (see next
section). The control architecture is based on linking EMMA’s AUs to the dimensional
emotion space of pleasure, arousal, and dominance [102] using an empirically based
approach (see Sections 4.3.2 to 4.3.5).
4.3.1 Implementing the facial action coding system for EMMA
In cooperation with the department of anthropology at the University of Vienna, EMMA’s
face is modeled based on FACS [40] with the help of experienced FACS coders [56]. Over-
all 44 AUs (cf. Table A.1, p. 204) are implemented for EMMA. These include 34 AUs
for nine upper face units and 25 lower face units. The remaining AUs represent head and
eye units. Additionally, body turn left and body turn right are introduced and referred
to as ’AU90’ and ’AU91’ (see Appendix A, p. 211).
The face units are implemented at their maximal contraction directly on the head
mesh by means of so called morph targets (cf. [56]). Variations in the skin such as
78
4.3 EMMA’s facial expressions in pleasure-arousal-dominance space
permanent wrinkles are also modeled for the relevant AUs, e.g., horizontal wrinkles for
AU1 and AU2 and vertical wrinkles for AU4 (see Figure 4.6). Note that the visualization
of the wrinkles in EMMA’s current 3D computer graphics environment is still under
development.
Figure 4.6: Horizontal wrinkles for AU1 and AU2 and vertical wrinkles for AU4 [56].
Figure 4.7 shows the graphical user interface for the visualization of different values
for EMMA’s AUs. For testing purposes, different configurations of AUs can be saved and
loaded. The field ’SetPAD’ is explained later in Section 4.3.3.
Ekman and colleagues [40] define rules to link AUs to the six basic emotion categories
(see Table A.2, p. 205). Accordingly, Figure 4.8 depicts example facial expressions for
EMMA showing the six basic emotions (cf. [40]).
Further, EMMA’s visemes, as the visual representation of speech-phonemes, are spec-
ified based on her AUs following the work of Aschenberner & Weiss [2] who introduce
a German viseme set (see Table A.3, p. 212). Three example visemes of EMMA are de-
picted by Figure 4.9. For a list of figures showing the remaining visemes, see Appendix
A, p. 212. EMMA’s visemes are modeled by Andrea Hofstätter in cooperation with the
department of anthropology at the University of Vienna.
FACS allows for the modeling of a wide range of facial expressions based on a large
number of AUs. However, Ekman and colleagues [40] reduce this wide range of possibil-
ities to a limited set of discrete emotion categories (cf. Table A.2, p. 205). As mentioned
before, EMMA’s control architecture is based on linking her AUs to the dimensional
emotion space of pleasure, arousal, and dominance thus allowing for a wider range of
emotional facial expressions (cf. Section 4.2.2). EMMA’s control architecture is presented
in the following sections.
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Figure 4.7: The graphical user interface for the visualization of different values for
EMMA’s AUs.
4.3.2 Empirical study
Based on the results of an empirical study, a facial expression repertoire comprised of
facial expressions arranged in PAD space [102] is constructed for the virtual human
EMMA. The facial expression repertoire is based on linking AUs [40] to PAD space. The
empirical study was performed in cooperation with the department of anthropology at
the University of Vienna, and relies on previous work by Grammer & Oberzaucher [46]
(see Section 3.2.1). For more details on the empirical study, see [56].
The empirical study was conducted at the Biozentrum of the University of Vienna in
Austria with 353 adult participants between 18 and 65 years of age. A total number
of 3517 randomly generated facial expressions were rated by the participants. Of these,
2099 (59.7%) were rated by 211 female participants and 1418 (40.3%) were rated by 142
male participants. Each participant rated 10 randomly generated facial expressions with
a German translation of 18 bipolar adjectives from the ’Semantic Differential Measures
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Happy Surprise Anger 
Disgust Fearful Sad 
Figure 4.8: Example basic emotions modeled by EMMA’s AUs (cf. Table A.2, p. 205).
M 
AU17(0.3) AU23(0.3) 
AU24(0.4) AU26(0.1) 
O 
AU18(0.8) AU22(0.4) 
AU25(0.1) AU26(0.5) 
AU27(0.3) 
P 
AU17(0.6) AU24(0.2) 
AU34(0.2) 
Figure 4.9: Three example visemes for EMMA, M,O, and P with corresponding values
of AUs.
of Emotional State or Characteristic (Trait) Emotions’ [78] (see Table 4.1). Each facial
expression was rated with the 18 bipolar adjectives on a 1 to 7 Likert scale. Following
Osgood et al. [89], each group of six bipolar adjectives was associated with one of the
dimensions of pleasure, arousal, and dominance.
Each facial expression rated by the participants was generated by means of a facial
expression randomizer program that allows a random combination of AUs as well
as the altering of their respective intensities. Accordingly, the following rule to generate
random facial expressions on the basis of AUs was applied: among 44 AUs, choose
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randomly 10 AUs with random intensities ranging between 0% and 50% of maximal
intensity. In this way, the generation of unnaturally exaggerated facial expressions is
avoided. No facial expression was generated twice by the facial expression randomizer
program. Furthermore, a number of predefined co-occurrence rules for AUs were
applied to avoid the generation of anatomically impossible facial expressions. These rules
are introduced by Ekman & Friesen [39] to describe the appropriate combination of AUs.
A fuzzy-logical implementation of three co-occurrence rules is proposed by Wojdel et al.
[119] and was applied within the facial expression randomizer program. For more details
on the considered rules, see [56].
The randomly generated facial expressions were presented to participants in POSER
6 (Curious Labs, Santa Cruz, CA). Figure 4.10 shows the facial expression evaluation
interface. The neutral facial expression was shown to the participants as a translation
between two generated facial expressions and was also rated by five female and five male
subjects between 20 and 32 years of age.
Figure 4.10: Facial expression evaluation interface with the rating adjective ’in control-
cared for’ [56], p. 25.
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4.3.3 Methods and results
After a successful collection of data, a statistical analysis was performed (see [56] for more
details on the used statistical methods). As mentioned in the previous section, the neutral
facial expression was rated by five female and five male participants. The calculation of
the median for each of the bipolar adjectives over the 10 participants showed that the
neutral facial expression was rated as aroused, displeased, and submissive (see Table
4.1).  
 
Emo. Dim. 
 
Rating Adjectives 
 
 
Value of Median (1-7 Likert scale) 
happy-unhappy 6 
pleased-annoyed 4 
satisfied-unsatisfied 5 
contented-melancholic 5.5 
hopeful-despairing 6 
 
 
Pleasure 
relaxed-bored 5 
   
stimulated-relaxed 2 
excited-calm 2 
frenzied-sluggish 4 
jittery-dull 2 
wide-awake-asleep 2 
 
 
Arousal 
aroused-unaroused 2 
   
controlling-controlled 5 
influential-influenced 5 
in control-cared for 4.5 
important-awed 5 
dominant-submissive 5 
 
 
Dominance 
autonomous-guided 5  
Table 4.1: Values of median for the ratings of the neutral facial expression [56]. ’Emo.
Dim.’ refers to emotion dimensions.
Therefore, in order to consider the influence of the neutral facial expression on the
ratings, its evaluation was taken into account in the statistical analysis of the data.
Accordingly, for each of the bipolar adjectives, the mean value over the 10 participants
as well as the difference of this mean value to the value 4 on the 1 to 7 Likert scale
was calculated. The calculated value of difference for each of the bipolar adjectives was
subtracted from the ratings of the randomly generated facial expressions (cf. [100]).
Further, each generated facial expression consisted of 10 randomly activated AUs with
random intensities while the remaining AUs were not activated and thus had intensity
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values equal to 0. It should be noted that not only the presence of an AU in a facial
expression contributes to its meaning, but also its absence. Hence, the values of 0 intensi-
ties for the non-activated AUs were also included in the statistical analysis. As statistical
analysis, a principal component analysis and a regression analysis were carried out.
Principal component analysis
A principal component analysis with varimax-rotation was conducted on the data. For
this purpose, the data were organized as a set of data points (vectors) (N = 3482) within
an 18 dimensional space spanned by the 18 bipolar adjectives. That is, each data point
represented a vector of the rating values of each randomly generated facial expression
with the 18 bipolar adjectives. The principal component analysis yielded, as expected
(cf. Section 4.3.2), a three factor solution that accounts for most of the variance
in the data, namely, 66.7% of variance. The first factor is dominance which accounts
for 25% of variance, the second factor is pleasure and accounts for 22.5% of variance,
and the third factor is arousal and accounts for 19.2% of variance. Afterward, the data
were standardized to a mean value of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For more details
on the results of the principal component analysis for each of the three factors, see
[56]. Henceforth, only the factors pleasure, arousal, and dominance are considered in a
subsequent regression analysis.
Regression analysis
In order to examine the correlation of the intensity values of AUs with the pleasure,
arousal, and dominance factors, a two-dimensional non-linear regression of each AU
with two of the three factors was carried out using a LOESS regression method (locally
weighted regression) [27] [28]. This method uses a second-degree polynomial function and
provides a smoothed curve over the considered data points called a Loess Curve. Accord-
ingly, a two-dimensional non-linear regression of each AU with pleasure and arousal was
calculated for those facial expressions that were rated as showing positive dominance, and
those that were rated as showing negative dominance. As a result, three-dimensional
non-linear regression planes for each AU in PA spaces corresponding to two values
of dominance (positive vs. negative) were obtained. The resulting regression planes show
the meaning of each AU within PAD space. Figure 4.11 shows two example regression
planes for AU12 (Lip Corner Puller) and AU43 (Eyes Closed) in PA space of positive
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dominance. The regression plane for AU12 shows that AU12 has a maximal intensity
value with respect to positive pleasure independently of the arousal value, while the
regression plane for AU43 shows that AU43 has a maximal intensity value with respect
to negative arousal independently of the pleasure value. Thus, AU12 mainly expresses
positive pleasure while AU43 mainly expresses negative arousal.
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Figure 4.11: The non-linear regression planes corresponding to AU12 (left) and AU43
(right) in PA space of positive dominance. The vertical axis represents the AUs intensity
values.
According to the face randomizer program (see Section 4.3.2), the values of AUs
intensities range between 0% and 50% of maximal intensity. However, the regression
function generated intensity values lower than 0% and higher than 50% of maximal
intensity. Since an AU intensity value cannot be negative, except for AUs such as AU30
(Jaw Sideways) where negative values mean ’jaw moved to the left’ and positive values
mean ’jaw moved to the right’, the negative values generated by the regression method
are set to 0 and the regression planes are plotted in the range [0, 1]. The range [0, 1]
represents values between 0% and 100% of maximal intensity. The three-dimensional
regression planes for each AU in PA spaces of positive and negative dominance are
listed in Appendix A, p. 215. Note that these regression planes are provided by Andrea
Hofstätter for the purpose of the present thesis and are not presented and discussed in
[56]. Further, the regression planes for eye, head, and body units are not considered here
as we decided to first focus on the regression planes for the face units. In the following, we
report the meanings of AUs within PAD space in terms of their maximal intensity
values as shown by their corresponding regression planes.
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According to the three-dimensional regression planes for the AUs (see Appendix A, p.
215), AU10, AU12, AU14, AU18, AU26, AU27, AU30 right, AU31, AU34, and AU38,
have their maximal intensity values in PA space of positive dominance while AU1, AU2,
AU5, AU6, AU11, AU13, AU23, and AU39 have their maximal intensity values in PA
space of negative dominance. The regression planes for AU4, AU9, AU15, AU17, AU25,
AU29, AU30 left, AU33, AU35, and AU43 respectively do not show a significant dif-
ference with respect to their values of maximal intensity in PA spaces of negative vs.
positive dominance.
Regarding the PA space of positive dominance, AU12 and AU18 have their maxi-
mal intensity values with respect to positive pleasure independently of the arousal value.
AU25 and AU38 have their maximal intensity values with respect to positive pleasure
and positive arousal while AU26, AU29, and AU30 right have their maximal intensity
values with respect to positive pleasure and negative arousal. AU4 and AU17 have their
maximal intensity values with respect to negative pleasure independently of the arousal
value. AU9, AU10, AU15, AU27, AU31, and AU33 have their maximal intensity values
with respect to negative pleasure and positive arousal. AU43 has its maximal intensity
value with respect to negative arousal independently of the pleasure value.
Regarding the PA space of negative dominance, AU25 has its maximal intensity
value with respect to positive arousal and positive pleasure. AU1, AU2, AU4, AU5,
AU6, AU11, AU13, AU15, AU17, AU23, AU29, AU30 left, AU33, and AU39 have their
maximal intensity values with respect to negative pleasure and positive arousal. AU35
has its maximal intensity value with respect to negative pleasure independently of the
arousal value. AU9 has its maximal intensity value with respect to negative pleasure
and negative arousal. As in the PA space of positive dominance, AU43 has its maximal
intensity value with respect to negative arousal independently of the pleasure value.
AUs that are not mentioned here have very low intensity values that do not appear to
significantly influence the results.
By combining all regression planes obtained by the two-dimensional non-linear regres-
sion analysis, a facial expression corresponding to each point in PAD space is recomposed
and a facial expression repertoire is reconstructed. The facial expression repertoire
is comprised of facial expressions arranged in PAD space with respect to two values of
dominance (positive vs. negative); (see Figure 4.12).
The restriction of the facial expression repertoire to two values of dominance was
done in order to link the resulting facial expressions (see Section 4.3.5) to EMMA’s
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Figure 4.12: Facial expression repertoire based on the non-linear regression planes. Left:
facial expression repertoire corresponding to PA space of positive dominance. Right:
facial expression repertoire corresponding to PA space of negative dominance.
emotion simulation module [8], where only two values of dominance are considered (see
Section 3.1.1). The ’SetPAD’ field in the graphical user interface depicted by Figure 4.7
is used to visualize the resulting facial expression repertoire. By setting different values
of pleasure, arousal, and dominance, the corresponding values of AUs are visualized in
the field ’Action Units’.
4.3.4 Discussion and consequences
In this section, the results of the empirical study are discussed and the consequences
for EMMA’s facial expression repertoire are concluded. Note that the discussion of the
results of the principal component analysis and of the regression analysis as well as the
conclusion of their consequences for EMMA’s facial expression repertoire are performed
in the context of the present thesis.
Discussion
The results of evaluating EMMA’s neutral facial expression are in line with those re-
ported by Lee et al. [67] in the context of another empirical study. In the study by Lee
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et al. [67], the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST) used to measure the emotional
value of target stimuli, was performed by 21 participants. As stimuli, two juxtaposed
faces taken from pictures were presented. The juxtaposed faces showed happy-happy,
fearful-fearful, neutral-neutral, and happy-fearful expressions. The subjects were asked
to press a button labeled as positive or negative to rate the valence of the facial expres-
sions. The reaction times of the participants and their emotional evaluations had been
measured according to the EAST procedure. The idea behind this procedure is that
the reaction time is shorter when the button’s label corresponds to the presented facial
expression. As a result, they found that the neutral facial expression was similarly rated
as the fearful expression. This is in line with the evaluation of EMMA’s neutral facial
expression as aroused, displeased, and submissive (see Table 4.1), which corresponds
to the emotional state fearful (cf. [101]).
Evidence for the existence of basic dimensions of emotions is provided by several
dimensional theories (see Section 2.2). These basic dimensions are usually called pleasure-
displeasure as the first, most agreed upon dimension, arousal-nonarousal as the second
agreed upon dimension, and dominance-submissiveness as the third, less agreed upon
dimension. However, in the present study, the principal component analysis provided
a three factor solution with dominance as the first factor which accounts for 25% of
variance in the data, pleasure as the second factor which accounts for 22.5% of variance,
and arousal as the third factor which accounts for 19.2% of variance. In a previous study
by Grammer & Oberzaucher [46] (see Section 3.2.1), the principal component analysis
provided a solution with pleasure as the first factor which accounts for 27% of variance,
dominance as the second factor which accounts for 24, 5% of variance, and arousal as the
third factor which accounts for 16, 7% of variance. Compared to these findings, in the
present study, the arousal factor also represents the third and last factor provided by the
principal component analysis. This is further in line with the findings by Scholsberg [105]
that arousal represents the third and last dimension after a second attention-rejection
dimension (see Section 2.2).
Altogether, findings from the principal component analysis provide further support
for the existence of three basic dimensions of emotions, and for the reliability of
the ’Semantic Differential Measures of Emotional State or Characteristic (Trait) Emo-
tions’ [78]. Furthermore, the disagreement on the order of importance of the three basic
dimensions highlights the importance of all three dimensions.
Further, Grammer & Oberzaucher [46] published three-dimensional non-linear regres-
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sion planes for AU1, AU5, and AU12 in PA space without considering the dominance
dimension (see Section 3.2.1). According to these regression planes (see Figure 3.10,
p. 53), AU1 has its maximal intensity value with respect to positive pleasure inde-
pendently of the arousal value. AU5 has its maximal intensity value with respect to
positive pleasure and positive arousal. AU12 has its maximal intensity value with re-
spect to positive pleasure and positive arousal. Quite similarly to these findings, the
results of the present study (see Section 4.3.3 and Appendix A, p. 215) show that in
PA space of positive dominance, AU1 has its maximal intensity value with respect to
positive pleasure and positive arousal, and AU12 has its maximal intensity value with
respect to positive pleasure independently of the arousal value. However, in PA space
of negative dominance, AU1 and even AU12 have their maximal intensity values with
respect to negative pleasure. With regard to AU5, the regression plane in PA space of
positive dominance shows a maximal intensity value with respect to negative pleasure
independently of the arousal value. The regression plane in PA space of negative dom-
inance shows a maximal intensity value with respect to negative pleasure and positive
arousal. Thus, both regression planes for AU5 provided by the present study are very
different to that found by Grammer & Oberzaucher [46].
In a previous study by Snodgrass [111], AUs and AUs combinations were rated
in terms of PA values. Some representative results of the study by Snodgrass [111]
are summarized in Figure 2.3 (left, p. 33). Compared to these findings, in the present
study (see Section 4.3.3 and Appendix A, p. 215), the regression planes for AU1 show
a maximal intensity value with respect to negative pleasure although accompanied by
positive arousal in PA space of positive dominance. The regression planes of AU2 show a
maximal intensity value with respect to positive pleasure and positive arousal in PA space
of positive dominance. The regression planes for both AU4 and AU5 show a maximal
intensity value with respect to negative pleasure and positive arousal. The regression
planes for AU6 show a maximal intensity value with respect to positive pleasure and
positive arousal in the PA space of positive dominance. The regression planes for AU7,
AU9, and AU10 show a maximal intensity value with respect to negative pleasure and
positive arousal in PA space of positive dominance. Both regression planes of AU15
show a maximal intensity value with respect to negative pleasure but accompanied by
positive arousal. The regression planes for AU17 show a maximal intensity value with
respect to negative pleasure and positive arousal in PA space of negative dominance.
With regard to AUs combinations (cf. Figure 2.3, left, p. 33), the results of the present
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study show that a combination of the regression planes of AU1 and AU2 results in
a maximal intensity value of both AUs with respect to positive pleasure and positive
arousal in PA space of positive dominance. A combination of the regression planes for
AU1 and AU4, for AU1, AU2, and AU4, and for AU1, AU2, and AU5, re-
spectively, results in a maximal intensity value of the AUs with respect to negative
pleasure and positive arousal in PA space of negative dominance. A combination of the
regression planes of AU4 and AU5 results in a maximal intensity value of both AUs
with respect to negative pleasure and positive arousal in PA spaces of both positive and
negative dominance. A combination of the regression planes of AU5 and AU7 results
in a maximal intensity value of both AUs in PA spaces of both positive and negative
dominance.
In sum, the results provided by the present study replicate only partly those provided
by Snodgrass’s study [111]. A crucial reason could be the evaluation of AUs combinations
only, and the additional consideration of dominance in the present study. However, both
the present study and Snodgrass’s study [111] are very similar in their objectives which
are to investigate the meanings of AUs in PA(D) space.
The visualization of the facial expression repertoire shows quite accurate facial ex-
pressions (see Figure 4.12). With regard to pleasure and arousal, the organization of the
facial expressions in the facial expression repertoire has some similarities to that in the
facial expression repertoire reconstructed by Russell [100] (see Figure 2.3, right, p. 33).
One example is, the expression of positive pleasure and positive/neutral arousal in PA
space of positive dominance. Further, in Russell’s [100] facial expression repertoire there
is no differentiation between positive and negative dominance. Accordingly, a highlight
of the present study is that the facial expressions corresponding to negative pleasure, pos-
itive arousal, and positive dominance show more angry-like expressions while the facial
expressions corresponding to negative pleasure, positive arousal, and negative dominance
show more fearful-like expressions (see Figure 4.12). This finding further substantiates
those by Russell & Mehrabian [102] that anger and anxiety have respectively a positive
and a negative amount of dominance, while having similar amounts of negative pleasure
and positive arousal (see Section 2.2).
Although, some of the facial expressions in the repertoire are difficult to interpret in
terms of their corresponding PAD values, e.g., the facial expression of positive pleasure,
positive arousal, and negative dominance. Another example is, the facial expression
of negative pleasure, negative arousal, and negative dominance where AU12 can be
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observed. Furthermore, most of the regression planes show very low intensity values
across PA space. This results in inexpressive faces across PA space, e.g., the facial
expression of neutral pleasure, positive arousal, and positive dominance is very similar
to the neutral facial expression (see Figure 4.12). A scaling of the regression planes
with respect to the vertical axis (intensity values) does not significantly increase the
expressiveness of these expressions, and results in exaggerated expressions at the
extremes of PAD space. While the aim is to link the facial expression repertoire to
EMMA’s PAD space of her emotion simulation module [8] (see Section 3.1.1), some of
the facial expressions in the repertoire do not correspond to the primary emotion
categories located in PAD space as following Russell & Mehrabian [102]. For example,
the facial expression that is more likely to express the emotion category sad corresponds
to negative pleasure, negative arousal, and positive dominance (see Figure 4.12) while
this emotion category is located in EMMA’s PA space of negative dominance (see Figure
3.2, right, p. 42).
Further, the present study has a general caveat. By generating random facial expres-
sions, no rule was followed that defined which AUs really occur together in spontaneous
human facial expressions. This could result in the activation of AUs that show con-
tradictory effects for the observer and that thus might provide inappropriate ratings.
Furthermore, the facial expressions was presented as stills and without contextual infor-
mation possibly making the rating process difficult and conflicting.
All in all, the findings of the present study corroborate the existence of three basic
dimensions of emotions and provide further support for Russell’s [100] assumption that
facial expressions convey primary information and that the information signaled by a
facial expression is also present in its single components (cf. Section 2.3).
Consequences
As already discussed in the previous section, some of the facial expressions in the facial
expression repertoire provided by the above outlined study are either difficult to interpret
in terms of their corresponding PAD values, or are inexpressive across PAD space, or do
not correspond to the defined primary emotion categories in EMMA’s emotion simulation
module [8]. Consequently, we decided to adjust the AUs regression planes so that
they produce facial expressions that are more expressive, and that fit the PAD space of
EMMA’s emotion simulation module. To this end, two steps are carried out to amend
91
4 The virtual human EMMA
the AUs regression planes provided by the above outlined study.
First, some of the AUs are difficult to interpret in terms of PAD values, e.g., AU29
and AU30 (see Appendix A, p. 215). In their FACS manual, Ekman et al. [40] defined
a set of AUs that are linked to the six basic emotion categories (see Table A.2, p. 205).
Further, Snodgrass [111] provided a set of AUs expressing pleasure, arousal, as well as
corresponding emotion categories as arranged in Russell’s circumplex model of emotion
[100] (see Figure 2.3, p. 33). Following these studies, only AUs are considered that
clearly characterize pleasure, arousal, dominance, as well as primary emotion categories
as arranged within PAD space of EMMA’s emotion simulation module [8] (cf. Figure 3.2,
right, p. 42). Further, based on the results provided by these previous works, Table 4.2
shows the target set of AUs together with their link to EMMA’s emotion categories
and their respective PAD values.
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Table 4.2: The target set of AUs and their link to EMMA’s emotion categories as well
as their respective PAD values.
Second, the LOESS regression method [27] [28] (see Section 4.3.3) does not provide a
regression function that can be easily represented by a mathematical equation. Therefore,
the regression planes provided by this method are difficult to adapt. Consequently, a
linear regression over the non-linear regression planes of the considered AUs was
calculated by Prof. Grammer in the context of our cooperation with the department
of anthropology at the University of Vienna. As a result, mathematical equations of
the form ax+ by are obtained for each AU regression plane that allow for the intended
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adaptation of these planes. The values x and y, respectively, represent pleasure and
arousal values. Thus, the regression planes obtained by the linear regression can be
adapted by simply adjusting the a and b parameters of the equations. Note that negative
values provided by the linear regression are set to 0 (cf. Section 4.3.3); (see Figure 4.13).
For a list of the new linear regression planes, see Appendix A, p. 227.
AU12 Lip Corner Puller AU43 Eyes Closed 
A 
-100
-50
 0
 50
 100-100
-50
 0
 50
 100
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
AU12 D+
Pleasure
Arousal
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
-100
-50
 0
 50
 100-100
-50
 0
 50
 100
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
AU43 D+
Pleasure
Arousal
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
A P P 
Figure 4.13: The linear regression planes corresponding to AU12 (Left) and AU43 (right)
in PA space of positive dominance. The vertical axis represents the AUs intensity values.
According to Table 4.2, AU1 mainly expresses negative pleasure and negative domi-
nance. Thus, the regression plane for AU1 (see Appendix A, p. 227) shows a maximal
intensity value with respect to negative pleasure and negative dominance independently
of the arousal value. Further, AU2 mainly expresses positive arousal. Thus, in PA space
of negative dominance, the regression plane for AU2 shows a maximal intensity value
with respect to positive arousal independently of the pleasure value. However, this is not
replicated within PA space of positive dominance since AU2 does not occur in a facial
expression showing anger. Thus, the corresponding regression plane shows a maximal
intensity value with respect to both positive pleasure and arousal.
AU4, AU7, AU15, and AU17 mainly express negative pleasure. Thus, their re-
gression planes show a maximal intensity value with respect to negative pleasure in-
dependently of the arousal value. AU5, AU16, and AU20 mainly express negative
pleasure and positive arousal. Thus, their regression planes show a maximal intensity
value with respect to negative pleasure and positive arousal. AU6 and AU12 mainly
express positive pleasure. Thus, their corresponding regression planes show a maximal
intensity value with respect to positive pleasure independently of the arousal value.AU9,
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Figure 4.14: Facial expression repertoire based on the linear regression planes. Left: the
new facial expression repertoire corresponding to PA space of positive dominance. Right:
the new facial expression repertoire corresponding to PA space of negative dominance.
AU10, AU24, and AU38 mainly express negative pleasure, positive arousal, and pos-
itive dominance. Therefore, their regression planes show a maximal intensity value with
respect to negative pleasure, positive arousal, and positive dominance. AU25, AU27,
andAU26 mainly express positive arousal. Thus, their respective regression planes show
a maximal intensity value with respect to positive arousal independently of the pleasure
values. AU39 mainly expresses negative pleasure, positive arousal, and negative domi-
nance. Therefore, its regression plane shows a maximal intensity value with respect to
negative pleasure, positive arousal, and negative dominance. AU43 mainly expresses
negative arousal and thus both of its regression planes show a maximal intensity value
with respect to negative arousal independently of the pleasure value. Note, that the val-
ues of the maximal intensities for the AUs are fine tuned on the basis of the visualization
of the resulting facial expressions with EMMA’s face.
Again, by combining all of the regression planes, a repertoire of facial expressions
arranged within PAD space with respect to two values of dominance (positive vs. neg-
ative) is reconstructed. The resulting facial expression repertoire is depicted in Figure
4.14.
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As compared to the facial expression repertoire depicted in Figure 4.12, the new facial
expression repertoire has more similarities to that reconstructed by Russell [100] (see
Figure 2.3, right, p. 33) and has more expressive facial expressions. Some examples
are the facial expressions of positive pleasure and positive arousal, of positive pleasure
and neutral arousal, and of neutral pleasure and positive arousal. Furthermore, the
generated facial expressions correspond to the emotion categories located in PAD space
of EMMA’s emotion simulation module [8] as following Russell & Mehrabian [102] (see
Figure 3.2, right, p. 42). An evaluation of some of EMMA’s facial expressions is carried
out within an empathy context scenario and provided promising results (see Section 6.2).
While the linear regression provides a simple method to adapt the AUs regression
planes with respect to PAD values, it results in a major loss of information and in a
non-flexible way to define the meaning of AUs in PAD space. For example, according to
FACS [40], AU6 occurs in facial expressions showing happiness and sadness. Thus, as
compared to the non-linear regression planes, the linear regression planes do not allow
AU6 to have a maximal intensity value with respect to positive pleasure and positive
arousal, and also with respect to negative pleasure and negative arousal. In future work,
one could try a non-linear polynomial function to re-establish the complete meaning of
such AUs within PAD space and to get an appropriate smoother course of AUs intensity
values. A major interest of the above outlined study and of further adaptation of its
results is to explore the meaning of single AUs by trying to unify the current results
with those provided by previous works, and to propose an approach to infer PAD values
from facial expressions of emotions based on the provided AUs regression planes (see
Section 5.2.1). In the following section, the dynamic link of EMMA’s facial expression
repertoire to PAD space of her emotion simulation module [8] is presented.
4.3.5 Facial expression dynamics
As presented in Section 3.1.1, EMMA’s emotion simulation module [8] has as input,
values of emotional valences also called emotional impulses. These values are either pos-
itive or negative and are triggered by the virtual human’s, in this case EMMA, reactive
or reasoning layer of her cognition module (see Section 4.2.1). The values of emotional
impulses drive EMMA’s emotion dynamics over time. At each point in time, the emotion
module outputs values of pleasure, arousal, and one of two possible values of dominance
as well as awareness likelihood values of primary and secondary emotions. Accordingly,
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EMMA has a repertoire of facial expressions arranged in PAD space with respect to
two values of dominance (positive vs. negative); (see previous section). Therefore, each
PAD value output by EMMA’s emotion simulation module over time is expressed by its
corresponding facial expression in the facial expression repertoire. Thus, EMMA’s emo-
tion dynamics drive her facial expression dynamics over time. Figure 4.15 shows the
intensity values of EMMA’s AU12 and of MAX’s corresponding facial muscle (muscle
smile), as well as the corresponding pleasure course in PA space of positive dominance
over time. As compared to MAX, the intensity values of EMMA’s AU12 over time reflect
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Figure 4.15: Top: pleasure course over time. Left: intensity values of MAX’s smile muscle
over time. Right: intensity values of EMMA’s AU12 over time.
more the course of her values of pleasure over time. Figure 4.16 shows the intensity values
of EMMA’s AU27 and of MAX’s corresponding facial muscle (muscle mouth open), as
well as the corresponding arousal course in PA space of negative dominance over time.
Also the intensity values of EMMA’s AU27 over time better mimic the arousal course
than those of MAX’s corresponding facial muscle.
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Figure 4.16: Top: arousal course over time. Left: intensity values of MAX’s ’mouth open’
muscle over time. Right: intensity values of EMMA’s AU27 over time.
In sum, as compared to MAX, EMMA’s facial expressions reflect the trajectories
of her emotion dynamics within the PAD emotion space. Note that the space of nega-
tive arousal is not accessible to the virtual human’s emotion dynamics, except during
boredom in combination with neutral pleasure (cf. [8]). Unfortunately, EMMA’s corre-
sponding facial expressions cannot be displayed.
4.3.6 Conclusion
Based on the results of an empirical evaluation of EMMA’s facial expressions, and on
careful consideration of the results from previous research on the facial expression of
emotion, we provided an elaborate model of facial expressions for the new virtual
human EMMA. In this regard, using a bottom-up approach (cf. Section 2.3), we in-
vestigated the meaning of single AUs within the dimensional emotion space of pleasure,
arousal, and dominance, and how it contributes to the meaning of a whole facial expres-
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sion of emotion. Thus, as emphasized by Russell [100] for Snodgrass’s work [111], we
attempted to ’compile a dictionary of the meaning of elemental facial movements’
(Russell [100], p. 301). The proposed regression planes for AUs were combined to result
in a large repertoire of facial expressions which, regarding PA values, is quite similar
to that reconstructed by Russell on the basis of Snodgrass’s results (see Figure 2.3).
Furthermore, the resulting facial expressions also correspond to emotion categories as
located in PAD space following findings by Russell & Mehrabian [102] (cf. [8]) and re-
flect the trajectories of the time course of emotions within PAD space. Accordingly, the
proposed AUs regression planes in PAD space can be further used and easily adapted
for virtual humans other than EMMA whose faces, as EMMA’s, are modeled following
the FACS standard [40].
4.4 Summary
This chapter introduced the new virtual human EMMA developed at the AI-Group
at Bielefeld University as the female counterpart to the virtual human MAX [62]. In
Section 4.1, we gave an overview of the history and motivation for developing a new
virtual human and distinguished three important aspects in creating EMMA. First,
providing an elaborate model of facial expressions (see Section 4.3) based on linking AUs
from FACS [40] to the dimensional emotion space of pleasure, arousal, and dominance
[102]. Second, allowing for the consideration of another kind of interaction in addition
to human-agent interaction, namely, agent-agent interaction (e.g., see Section 6.1.1).
Third, allowing for the modeling and evaluation of gender differences. While the first
two aspects are crucial to the present thesis, the third important aspect in creating
EMMA could be the objective of future work. Further, we described the different steps
taken in the design of EMMA’s appearance, which was initialized by former members
of our group and finalized in cooperation with the department of anthropology at the
University of Vienna [56].
In Section 4.2, we introduced the name ’EMMA’ as an acronym that refers to an
Empathic MultiModal Agent in accordance with EMMA’s capabilities within her first
interaction scenario (see Section 6.1.1). In this regard, EMMA’s model of facial expres-
sions (see Section 4.3) is crucial for the realization of the empathy mechanism facial
mimicry (see Section 5.2.1) and for the expression of empathy (see Section 5.4). To this
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end, the virtual human MAX’s cognitive architecture [70] was carried over, adapted, and
extended for the new virtual human EMMA. Adaptations and extensions were carried
out for the facial expression component, for the speech component, and for the compo-
nent that generates and controls body movements. Based on FACS [40] as an eligible
standard for the adequate modeling of facial expressions (cf. Section 3.2.1), the facial ex-
pression component was extended to the specification and generation of facial behaviors
on the basis of AUs. Since dimensional emotion models are considered as more inclined
to characterize the continuity and subtlety of emotion expression than other emotions
models (cf. Section 3.2.1), the facial expression component was also extended to a fa-
cial expression repertoire linking AUs to the dimensional emotion space of pleasure,
arousal, and dominance [102]. Also the speech component was extended to the simulation
of emotional speech prosody on the basis of PAD values (cf. [107] [106]). The component
to generate body movements was adapted to the specification of the lengths of EMMA’s
limbs, of the number of her joints, and of the transformations within EMMA’s body-
centered coordinate system. Thus, similar to the virtual human MAX, EMMA is capable
of exhibiting multimodal behavior based on facial expressions, speech, and body move-
ments. However, the new virtual human can express a wider range of emotions along the
PAD dimensions using her face and speech prosody.
In Section 4.3, we introduced the steps taken for the development of EMMA’s facial
expression repertoire. In cooperation with the department of anthropology at the
University of Vienna, EMMA’s AUs were modeled with the help of experienced FACS
coders [56] and EMMA’s visemes were specified based on AUs. A total of 44 AUs were
implemented for EMMA. Based on the results of an empirical study, a facial expression
repertoire was provided by linking AUs to PAD values. The empirical evaluation was
performed in cooperation with the department of anthropology at the University of Vi-
enna [56]. In this study, human subjects rated randomly generated facial expressions of
EMMA in terms of PAD values. As a result, three-dimensional non-linear regression
planes were provided for each AU showing its meaning in PAD space. A facial expression
repertoire was reconstructed by combining all regression planes for all AUs, and includes
quite accurate facial expressions. As such, the results provide further support for Rus-
sell’s [100] assumption that facial expressions convey primary information and that the
information signaled by a facial expression is also present in its single components (cf.
Section 2.3).
However, some of the facial expressions provided by the empirical study are either
99
4 The virtual human EMMA
difficult to interpret in terms of PAD values, or are inexpressive, or do not correspond
to EMMA’s emotion categories as arranged within her PAD emotion space following
[102] (cf. [8]). Accordingly, we decided to adapt the AUs regression planes by unifying
the results provided by the present study, and those of previous work on the facial
expression of emotion. For this purpose, linear regression planes for the AUs were
used for an easy adaptation of the planes by simply adjusting the plane coefficients. By
combining the new regression planes, a new facial expression repertoire was reconstructed
comprised of facial expressions that are more expressive, and quite similar to those
defined in Russell’s proposed repertoire [100] (see Figure 2.3, p. 33). Furthermore, the
resulting facial expressions also correspond to emotion categories as located in PAD
space following Russell & Mehrabian [102] (cf. [8]), and reflect the trajectories of the time
course of emotions within PAD space. Accordingly, the proposed AUs regression planes
in PAD space can be used and easily adapted for virtual humans other than EMMA
whose faces, like EMMA’s, are modeled following the FACS standard [40]. However, the
linear model results in a major loss of information and in a non-flexible way to define
the meaning of AUs within PAD space. All in all, based on the results of an empirical
evaluation of EMMA’s facial expressions and on careful consideration of the results of
previous works on the facial expression of emotion, we provided an elaborate model of
facial expressions for the new virtual human EMMA. This model of facial expressions
is crucial to the realization of facial mimicry as an empathy mechanism (see Section
5.2.1) and for the expression of empathy (see Section 5.4) as requirements for building
a computational model of empathy (cf. Section 1.2).
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This chapter introduces a computational model of empathy realized for the virtual hu-
mans MAX and EMMA. Section 5.1 gives an overview of the structure of the proposed
model and its integration into an existing cognitive architecture. Subsequently, Section
5.2 introduces two separate empathy mechanisms by which an empathic emotion is pro-
duced. In Section 5.3, an approach to modulate the empathic emotion produced by the
empathy mechanisms is proposed. Further, Section 5.4 presents, the different modalities
by which empathy is expressed.
5.1 Model overview
In this section, we give an overview of the structure of the proposed computational model
of empathy as well as of its integration into an existing cognitive architecture.
5.1.1 Model structure
According to the requirements Empathy Mechanism, Empathy Modulation, and
Expression of Empathy, formulated in Section 1.2 and further discussed in Section
3.3.3, the computational model of empathy proposed here is based on three processing
steps:
1. The empathy mechanism as the process by which an empathic emotion is gen-
erated. Two separate mechanisms are considered, facial mimicry and situational
role-taking.
2. The empathy modulation as the process by which the empathic emotion produced
in step 1 is modulated and a degree of empathy is calculated.
3. The expression of empathy as the process by which the empathic emotion modu-
lated in step 2 is expressed.
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Furthermore, our model of empathy follows the late appraisal model of empathy
[35] (cf. Section 2.1) in that the empathic emotion is produced first and than modu-
lated. Therefore, in our model, the empathy mechanism takes place before the empathy
modulation. Figure 5.1 depicts the structure of the computational model of empathy in
terms of its three processing steps.
Empathy Modulation 
Expression of Empathy 
Empathic  
Emotion 
Empathy Mechanism 
Facial  
Mimicry 
Situational 
Role-Taking 
or 
Figure 5.1: The structure of the proposed computational model of empathy in terms of
its three processing steps.
The three processing steps underlying our model are introduced respectively in Sec-
tions 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. In the following, we discuss the integration of the proposed model
into an existing cognitive architecture.
5.1.2 Integration into a cognitive architecture
According to Section 3.1, WASABI [8] (see Section 3.1.1) presents a suitable computa-
tional model of emotion for the realization of several theoretical aspects of empathy (cf.
Chapter 2). In this regard, WASABI’s appraisal component is crucial to the cognitive
evaluation of others’ situations and thus for the generation of an empathic emotion.
Furthermore, the simulation of emotion dynamics within WASABI is crucial to the sim-
ulation of the time course of an empathic emotion, and to its modulation through the
empathizer’s changing mood over time [35] (cf. Section 2.1.3). Therefore, we integrated
our model intoWASABI which represents the emotion simulation module of the virtual
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humans MAX’s and EMMA’s cognitive architecture [70] (see Sections 3.1.2 and 4.2.1).
Figure 5.2 depicts the cognitive architecture of MAX and EMMA with the empathy
model as integrated into the emotion simulation module of the architecture.
Figure 5.2: The cognitive architecture [70] of the virtual humans MAX and EMMA with
the proposed computational model of empathy integrated into the emotion simulation
module [8].
In the following sections, the three processing steps underlying our model are intro-
duced.
5.2 Empathy mechanisms
According to the theoretical background on empathy introduced in Section 2.1, there
are several mechanisms by which an empathic emotion is produced. As already em-
phasized in Section 3.2, facial expressions are crucial to expressing and communicating
emotions [32] [38] and are thus central to the present thesis. Therefore, in our model,
one considered empathy mechanism is facial mimicry. While expressive cues such as
facial expressions may present a valid source of information about others’ emotional
states, contextual cues are another possible source of information based on the appraisal
of others’ situations (cf. Section 3.2.2). In this regard, in our model, we also consider
103
5 A computational model of empathy
the empathy mechanism situational role-taking. Facial mimicry and situational role-
taking are considered separately and are applied to two different interaction scenarios
(see Section 6.1).
5.2.1 Facial mimicry
In their theoretical models of empathy (see Section 2.1.2), both Hoffman [55] and Davis
[34] introduce mimicry as an empathy mechanism. Hoffman defines mimicry as a process
involving the imitation of another’s facial expressions, voice, and posture that triggers
an afferent feedback, eliciting feelings in the observer that are similar to those of the ob-
served other. Thus, he identifies two successive steps underlying the process of mimicry
which he calls imitation and feedback. Accordingly, facial mimicry is defined by Hoff-
man as the process involving the imitation of another’s facial expressions that triggers
an afferent feedback, eliciting the same feeling in oneself as that of the observed other.
Following Hoffman, in our model, facial mimicry consists of an internal imitation of
perceived emotional facial expressions, which results in an emotional feedback that
represents the perceived emotional state.
Further, according to the shared neural network hypothesis (cf. Section 2.1.3), the ob-
servation of another’s emotional state activates brain areas involved in experiencing that
same state. This suggests the existence of a shared representational system involved in
understanding others’ emotions. Following this hypothesis, in our model, facial mimicry
is based on the use of a shared representational system. That is, the same facial
expression repertoire is used to express one’s own emotions as well as to understand
emotions from others’ perceived facial expressions.
Damasio [31] distinguishes between primary and secondary emotions (see Section 2.2).
While primary emotions are experienced early in life as preorganized reactive responses
to specific features of perceived stimuli, secondary emotions are experienced by adults
as responses to given situations based on a cognitive evaluation. Following Hoffman [55]
(see Section 2.1.2), facial mimicry or mimicry in general is preverbal, automatic, and
essentially involuntary. Thus, the emotion produced by this mechanism – the empathic
emotion – corresponds to a primary emotion. Accordingly, in our model, facial mimicry
generates a primary emotion as defined by the underlying emotion simulation module
[8] where primary and secondary emotions are distinguished (see Section 3.1.1). The em-
pathic emotion is thus produced within the reactive layer of the cognitive architecture
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[70] (see Section 5.1.2).
As mentioned above, in our model, facial mimicry is based on the use of a shared
representational system. Accordingly, using her own Action Units (AUs) and their in-
tensity functions (regression planes) within Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance (PAD) space
(cf. Section 4.3), facial mimicry is realized for EMMA as follows:
1. Internal imitation: EMMA internally imitates a perceived facial expression by
mapping perceived facial features to her own AUs.
2. Emotional feedback: the AUs resulting from internal imitation step are mapped
to a PAD value representing the perceived emotional state.
Figure 5.3 depicts our proposed approach to facial mimicry as based on internal imi-
tation and emotional feedback, and on using a shared representational system.
Other‘s Facial Expressions 
Internal Imitation 
Emotional Feedback 
AUs 
Facial Mimicry 
Shared 
Representational 
System 
Own AUs 
Face Repertoire 
PAD 
Own Emotion Module 
Empathy Mechanism 
Figure 5.3: The empathy mechanism facial mimicry as based on internal imitation
and emotional feedback, and on using a shared representational system.
In our realization of facial mimicry, we mainly focus on emotional feedback. In this
regard, for internal imitation, we assume having a system of automatic AU recognition
as those presented in Section 3.2.2. Accordingly, in order to determine a PAD value
from AUs intensity values representing a perceived facial expression, the following two
equations are used:
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n∑
i=1
AUi(p, a, d) · wi(t) = AU∑(p, a, d, t)
(p, a, d)t,hint = AUmax(t)
(5.1)
n∑
i=1
|AUi(p, a, d)− wi(t)| = AU∑(p, a, d, t)
(p, a, d)t,final = AUmin(t)
(5.2)
First, in Equation 5.1, the AUs intensity functions corresponding to each input AU
are weighted with the corresponding input intensity values. The weights wi(t) represent
the AUs input intensity values at each point in time t. Subsequently, a sum of the
weighted AUs intensity functions is calculated. The PAD value corresponding to the
maximum of the weighted summation is returned and is called (p, a, d)t,hint. Since most
of the AUs intensity functions have their maximum values at the boundaries of PAD
space (see Appendix A, p. 227), the resulting PAD value is thus likely to lie at the
boundaries of the space. This PAD value is further used to determine in which quadrant
of PAD space the sought PAD value could lie. Finally, the domain of each considered
AU intensity function is restricted to that quadrant of PAD space. The idea behind this
method is to determine where the considered AUs have a common meaning within
PAD space.
For example, consider a perceived facial expression composed of AU12 and AU43
with respective intensity values equal to 0.4 and 0.2 at time-stamp t. Now, consider the
respective intensity functions for AU12 and AU43 in PA space of positive dominance
(see Figure 5.4). According to these intensity functions, AU12 has a maximal intensity
value with respect to positive pleasure independently of the arousal value while AU43
has a maximal intensity value with respect to negative arousal independently of the
pleasure value. Thus, both AUs are expected to have a common meaning with respect to
positive pleasure and negative arousal. By applying Equation 5.1, the intensity functions
for AU12 and AU43 are respectively weighted with the values 0.4 and 0.2 and a sum of
the weighted functions is calculated. As a result, (p, a, d)t,hint is equal to (100,−100, 100)
(see Figure 5.5).
Second, in Equation 5.2, the AUs intensity functions with restricted domain are
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Figure 5.4: The linear regression planes corresponding to AU12 (Left) and AU43 (right)
in PA space of positive dominance. The vertical axis represents the AUs intensity values.
translated with respect to the input intensity values – wi(t) – of their corresponding AUs.
Subsequently, a sum of their absolute values is calculated. The PAD value corresponding
to theminimum of the calculated sum denoted by (p, a, d)t,final is returned as the sought
PAD value at time-stamp t.
Again, as an example, consider a perceived facial expression composed of AU12 and
AU43 with respective intensity values equal to 0.4 and 0.2 at time-stamp t. The domains
of the intensity functions for AU12 and AU43 are restricted to [0, 100] for the pleasure
dimension, and to [−100, 0] for the arousal dimension. By applying Equation 5.2, the
intensity functions for AU12 and AU43 are respectively translated to −0.4 and −0.2 and
a sum of their respective absolute values is calculated. As a result, (p, a, d)t,final is equal
to (40,−77, 100); (see Figure 5.6). Increasing the input intensity value of AU12 would
increase the value of positive pleasure while increasing the input intensity value of AU43
would increase the value of negative arousal. That is, smiling (AU12) with eyes closed
(AU43) is interpreted as expressing positive pleasure and negative arousal.
Note that the calculation of (p, a, d)t,hint may provide more than one solution. Ac-
cordingly, the AUs in question have a common meaning in more than one quadrant of
PAD space. Thus, the domain of each considered AUs intensity function is restricted to
those quadrants of PAD space. It is also possible that the calculation of (p, a, d)t,final
provides more than one solution. In this case, a possible way to get an explicit value
of (p, a, d)t,final is to calculate a mean value of all possible solutions.
For example, consider only one AU, e.g., AU12 with an input intensity value of 0.4.
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Figure 5.5: Top: the intensity functions of AU12 and AU43, respectively, weighted with
the values 0.4 and 0.2. Bottom: the sum of the weighted intensity functions of AU12 and
AU43 showing the value of (p, a, d)t,hint.
The calculation of (p, a, d)t,final provides one solution for pleasure, many solutions for
arousal, and two solutions for dominance (positive vs. negative) (see Appendix A, p.
227). By calculating the mean value of all possible solutions, a PAD value is provided
that is equal to (40, 0, 0) where the values 0 can be interpreted as: ’AU12 alone neither
expresses positive nor negative arousal and dominance’.
However, this approach becomes less appropriate when, e.g., considering a facial ex-
pression with AUs displaying similar amounts of negative and positive pleasure, arousal,
and dominance. Such facial expression is then interpreted as displaying neutral plea-
sure, neutral arousal, and neutral dominance. This result could also be provided by the
approach proposed by Shugrina et al. [109] regarding pleasure and arousal (see Section
3.2.2). In this case, further involvement of context related information, e.g., through
situational role-taking or self projection as realized in the model by Rodrigues et al. [98]
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Figure 5.6: Top: the absolute values of the intensity functions of AU12 and AU43,
respectively, translated to the values −0.4 and −0.2. Bottom: the sum of the above
functions showing (p, a, d)t,final. ’abs’ refers to the absolute value.
(see Section 3.3.1), may provide a more appropriate solution. Accordingly, in our ap-
proach, context related information is considered to get an explicit value of dominance
(see Sections 5.2.2 and 6.1.1). Regarding pleasure and arousal, we rely on the calcula-
tion of the mean value of all possible solutions while the consideration of context related
information to get an explicit solution should be considered in future work.
Further, as mentioned in Section 4.3.3, not only does the presence of an AU in a
facial expression contribute to the meaning of that expression but also its absence.
Hence, the AUs that are not activated in a perceived facial expression are considered in
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 as having intensity values equal to 0. In order to easily explain
these equations, non-activated AUs were not included in the above given examples.
The appropriateness of this approach was tested by applying it to the facial expres-
sion repertoire reconstructed on the basis of the linear AUs intensity functions and by
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using these functions. Further, it was also tested by applying it to the facial expression
repertoire reconstructed on the basis of the non-linear AUs intensity functions and by
using these functions (see Appendix A, p. 215). In both cases, the determined PAD
values are exactly the same as those related to the input facial expressions.
Once a PAD value is determined by this approach, it is represented within PAD
space of EMMA’s emotion simulation module [8] (see Figure 5.3). The determined PAD
value represents a hypothesis about the emotional state related to a perceived facial
expression.
First results of this approach are investigated using the virtual human MAX’s facial
expressions of emotion. As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the virtual human MAX has 21
facial muscles and can express different intensities of seven facial expressions of emotion.
By applying facial mimicry, EMMA first internally imitates MAX’s facial expression by
getting the values of his facial muscles at each point in time and by mapping them to her
own AUs with corresponding intensity values. Figure 5.7 depicts the mapping of MAX’s
facial muscles involved in his facial expressions of emotion to EMMA’s AUs.
Figure 5.7: Top: MAX’s facial expressions for happy, surprised, annoyed/sad, angry, and
fearful. Bottom: EMMA’s facial expressions resulting from internal imitation of those of
MAX.
Subsequently, a PAD value is determined from the values of AUs provided by internal
imitation of MAX’s facial expression. The PAD values determined from MAX’s facial
expressions of emotion at their maximal intensity values are summarized in Table 5.1.
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Note that MAX’s facial expression corresponding to the neutral emotional state concen-
trated has some slightly activated facial muscles. As mentioned above, MAX’s inactive
facial muscles in a facial expression are considered in Equations 5.1 and 5.2 as having
intensity values equal to 0.
 
 
MAX’s Emo. in PAD space 
 
 
(p, a, d)t,final 
Happy: (80, 80, +/-100), (50, 0, +/-100) 
 
(96, -5, +/-100) 
 
Surprised: (10, 80, +/-100)  (21, 66, +/-100) 
 
Annoyed: (50, 0, 100) 
 
(-96, -44, +/-100) 
 
Sad: (50, 0, -100) 
 
(-96, -44, +/-100) 
 
Angry: (-80, 80, 100) 
 
(-77, 8, 100) 
Fearful: (-80, 80, -100) 
 
(-75, 98, -100) 
Concentrated: (0, 0, +/-100) (-14, 7, +/-100) 
   
Table 5.1: MAX’s expressed emotions in PAD space and the determined values of
(p, a, d)t,final.
According to Table 5.1, the PAD values determined by the proposed approach are
quite accurate as compared to those of MAX’s expressed emotion categories. For each
of the facial expressions corresponding to the emotion categories happy, surprised, an-
noyed/sad, and concentrated, two possible values of (p, a, d)t,final are determined that
differ in their values of dominance. In this regard, context related information is needed
to decide for an explicit value of dominance (e.g., see Section 6.1.1). Except for the facial
expressions corresponding to angry and fearful where respectively one explicit PAD value
is determined. As compared to MAX, EMMA can express positive pleasure with different
values of arousal (see Figure 4.14, p. 94). Accordingly, MAX’s facial expression of hap-
piness is interpreted as expressing near neutral value of arousal. Further, MAX’s facial
expression of annoyed/sad is interpreted as expressing negative arousal while MAX’s
expression of angry is interpreted as expressing near neutral arousal. While the arousal
values determined for these facial expressions are not similar to those of their corre-
sponding emotion categories, the difference in arousal between the determined arousal
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values for these facial expressions is similar to the difference between those of their
corresponding emotion categories.
Figure 5.8 (Top) depicts the determined PA time course from MAX’s expression of
happiness during activation of the emotion category happy after receiving a sequence of
positive emotional impulses. The figure shows that the determined PA course is similar to
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Figure 5.8: Top: PA time course determined by our proposed approach. Bottom: intensity
values of MAX’s smile muscle over time.
the course of the intensity values of MAX’s smile muscle during activation of the emotion
category happy (see Figure 5.8, bottom). Thus, the determined PA course reflects the
changes in MAX’s smile muscle during activation of his emotional state of happiness
over time.
In sum, a first investigation of our approach to determine PAD values by combining
the meaning of different AUs within PAD space shows promising and interesting re-
sults. However, this approach should be further investigated on the basis of human data
provided by an automatic AU recognition system, or by a database of facial expressions
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annotated with AUs and their intensity values. This field is in its pioneering stage and
thus currently, such human data are not easy to obtain.
5.2.2 Situational role-taking
Hoffman [55] and Davis [34] introduce role-taking as an empathy mechanism (see Section
2.1.2). Hoffman defines role-taking as an observer’s ability to put himself in the other’s
situation and to imagine how the other feels. He distinguishes two types of role-taking,
self-focused role-taking and other-focused role-taking. Self-focused role-taking refers to
the ability to imagine oneself being in the other’s situation while other-focused role-
taking refers to the ability to imagine how the other feels in a considered situation.
Similar to Hoffman, Higgins [53] also defines role-taking as seeing the world through the
other’s eyes or putting oneself in the other’s shoes (cf. Section 2.1.2). He also distinguishes
two types of role-taking that are similar to those introduced by Hoffman, situational role-
taking and individual role-taking. In situational role-taking, an observer appraises the
other’s situation by using the same appraisal mechanisms as if he were in the same
situation himself, whereas in individual role-taking, the additional implication of the
other’s viewpoint and characteristics are taken into account.
Accordingly, in our model, situational role-taking refers to the ability to generate
a hypothesis about the other’s emotional state by appraising the other’s situation using
one’s own appraisal mechanisms.
Following Hoffman (cf. Section 2.1.2), role-taking, as compared to, e.g., mimicry,
requires a higher-level cognitive processing. In this regard, individual role-taking is con-
sidered as being more cognitively demanding than situational role-taking, since it re-
quires the additional consideration of the other’s viewpoint and characteristics. Further,
Damasio [31] defines secondary emotions as emotions that are experienced by adults in
response to given situations based on a cognitive evaluation (cf. Section 2.2). Accord-
ing to Damasio, the process of secondary emotions starts with a cognitive evaluation
of the situation through a deliberate consideration of the situation in the form of men-
tal images. Similarly, role-taking is also a process that can be defined as starting with
a cognitive evaluation of the other’s situation through a deliberate consideration of
the other’s situation. This may further trigger reactive processes that generate the em-
pathic emotion or it may generate an empathic emotion by mere cognitive evaluation.
Thus, as empathic emotions, primary and secondary emotions can be generated through
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role-taking.
However, in our model, only the generation of primary emotions by means of sit-
uational role-taking is considered. Therefore, in our model, the empathy mechanism
situational role-taking is triggered within the deliberative layer of the cognitive architec-
ture [70] (see Section 5.1.2) and generates the empathic emotion on the basis of reactive
processes within the reactive layer of the architecture.
Omdahl [87] underlines that contemporary theorists such as Hoffman and Davis pro-
vide comprehensive models of empathy where they discuss different empathy arousing
modes but do not clearly explain the cognitive processing steps by which emotional
states, such as happy, sad, or angry are decoded within these modes (cf. Section 2.2).
Omdahl mainly considers the empathy mechanism role-taking and claims that cognitive
appraisal theories (see Section 2.2) may provide an explanation for how the other’s
emotional state is decoded by role-taking.
Accordingly, as in our previous work [12] (see Section 3.3.1), situational role-taking
is realized based on WASABI’s appraisal component [8] (see Section 3.1.1). Within
WASABI, primary emotions are triggered as hard-wired reactions to perceived stimuli
in the reactive layer of the cognitive architecture [70] (see Section 5.1.2). Secondary
emotions are triggered by BDI-based deliberation within the deliberative layer of the
architecture. The appraisal processes within both layers result in negative or positive
values of emotional impulses and in one of two possible values of dominance that drive an
agent’s emotion dynamics over time. As mentioned earlier in this section, only primary
emotions are generated by situational role-taking as realized in our model. Accordingly,
by means of a BDI-based deliberation, a cognitive evaluation of the other’s perceived
situation is realized based on one’s own appraisal mechanisms as defined within
the deliberative layer. These appraisal mechanisms trigger further appraisal mechanisms
defined within the reactive layer, which result in negative or positive emotional impulses
and in one of two possible values of dominance (see Figure 5.9). The emotional impulses
and a determined value of dominance are input to the virtual human’s own emotion
simulation module [8] (see Section 5.2.3) and represent a hypothesis about the other’s
emotional state.
The realization of situational role-taking requires a context scenario. While facial
mimicry is realized for the virtual human EMMA, situational role-taking is realized
for the virtual human MAX in cooperation with the doctoral thesis project of Nhung
Nguyen [81]. A more detailed description of the realization of this empathy mechanism
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Figure 5.9: The empathy mechanism situational role-taking based on own internally
represented appraisal mechanisms. ’EI’ refers to an emotional impulse, ’Dom’ refers to
a value of dominance.
and of the underlying appraisal mechanisms are presented in Section 6.1.2.
5.2.3 The empathic emotion
According to OCC’s emotion theory [88], fortunes-of-other emotions, also called empa-
thetic emotions, are elicited through appraisal of an event as desirable or not desirable
for another person (cf. Section 2.2). As such, in our model, an empathic emotion is
defined as an emotion that is elicited with respect to the other’s perceived emotional
state. That is, an empathic emotion is elicited after detecting a rapid and, at the same
time, salient change in the other’s perceived emotional state, or if the other’s emotional
state is perceived as salient.
At each point in time, the emotional values resulting from facial mimicry (cf. Sec-
tion 5.2.1) or from situational role-taking (cf. Sections 5.2.2) are input to the virtual
human’s emotion simulation module (cf. Section 3.1.1). These values drive the simu-
lated dynamics of the other’s perceived emotional state over time. Thus, the time
course of the perceived emotional state is represented and simulated within the virtual
human’s emotion simulation module. Accordingly, a related primary emotion as well as
a corresponding value of awareness likelihood are inferred.
The other’s perceived emotional state is represented by an additional reference point
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within the virtual human’s emotion simulation module. Thus, the virtual human always
distinguishes between his own and others’ perceived emotional states. Further, the em-
pathy mechanisms facial mimicry and situational role-taking, as defined in our model,
are respectively based on one’s own facial expression repertoire and on ones’ own ap-
praisal mechanisms to generate a hypothesis about the other’s emotional state. Thus, in
line with Hoffman’s [55] defined four stages in the development of empathy with respect
to self-other differentiation (see Section 2.1.2), our model allows for quasi-egocentric
empathy. That is, while the virtual human always distinguishes between his own and
others’ perceived emotional states, he evaluates others’ situations from his own perspec-
tive.
The simulation of the dynamics of further emotional states in addition to the virtual
human’s emotional state has been realized in the context of our previous work on situa-
tional role-taking [12]. The dynamics of these emotional states are simulated in exactly
the same way as the dynamics of the virtual human’s emotional state (cf. Section 3.1.1).
Note that negative values of arousal resulting from facial mimicry are mapped to neu-
tral values of arousal since the negative arousal space is not accessible to the emotion
dynamics as defined in [8] except during boredom (see Section 3.1.1).
Once the perception of the other’s emotional state is interrupted, the perceived emo-
tional state simulated within the virtual human’s emotion simulation module decays
over time, and reaches the state of boredom. Thus, the virtual human assumes that the
other is no longer receiving emotional stimuli and that, as for himself, the other becomes
bored in consequence to the absence of emotional stimuli. This can be interpreted as the
virtual human’s assumed default state for the other as long as no perceived emotional
state of the other is available. Further, the perceived emotional state is also asserted as
belief about the other’s emotional state within the BDI-based deliberative layer of the
cognitive architecture (see Section 5.1.2).
Once the other’s perceived emotional state is represented within the virtual human’s
emotion simulation module, a defined condition of elicitation of an empathic emo-
tion is checked. This condition of elicitation is checked with respect to the PAD values
of the perceived emotional state over time. That is, with respect to a predefined short
time interval T , the difference between perceived PAD values corresponding to the time-
stamps tk−1 and tk, with tk − tk−1 <= T , is calculated as ‖PADtk − PADtk−1‖. If the
difference in PAD values exceeds a predefined saliency threshold TH1, or if ‖PADtk‖
exceeds a predefined saliency threshold TH2, then the emotional state PADtk and its
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related primary emotion represent the empathic emotion (see Figure 5.10). The prede-
fined thresholds can be interpreted as representing the virtual human’s responsiveness
to the others’ perceived emotional states.
PAD Primary Emotion 
Own Emotion Module 
Empathy Mechanism 
PAD >= TH PAD < TH 
No  
Empathy 
Empathic Emotion 
PAD 
Facial  
Mimicry 
Situational 
Role-Taking or 
Figure 5.10: The empathic emotion as output by the empathy mechanism. PAD
refers to ‖PADtk − PADtk−1‖ and ‖PADtk‖. TH refers to TH1 and TH2.
By calculating the difference ‖PADtk − PADtk−1‖, empathy is elicited with respect
to the dynamic change in the perceived emotional state. In this regard, a rapid and
salient negative change from positive emotional state toward a neutral emotional state,
and a rapid and salient positive change from a negative emotional state toward a neu-
tral emotional state elicit an empathic emotion. Thus, an empathic emotion is elicited
in response to a neutral emotional state resulting from a rapid and salient change in
emotional state. Accordingly, a perceived neutral facial expression that comes shortly
after a negative or positive facial expression of emotion elicits empathy. In contrast, in
previous work by Rodrigues et al. [98], an empathic emotion is produced in response to
an emotional cue, e.g., facial expressions, which is defined as any signal indicating the
arousal of an emotion.
Once an empathic emotion is elicited, the next processing step in our model is trig-
gered, namely, empathy modulation.
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5.3 Empathy modulation
Hoffman [55], Davis [34], OCC [88], and De Vignemont & Singer [35] (see Sections 2.1 and
2.2), introduce several factors that modulate an observer’s empathic response. Following
De Vignemont & Singer (cf. Section2.1.3), we group these factors into four categories:
(a) features of observed emotion, (b) relationship between empathizer and the observed
other, (c) situational context, and (d) features of the empathizer (see Table 5.2).
 
 
 
Authors 
 
 
Features of observed 
emotion 
 
Relationship between 
empathizer and the 
observed other 
 
 
 
Situational context 
 
 
Features of the 
empathizer 
 
Hoffman 
(2000) 
salience and intensity of 
observed emotion 
familiarity bias: 
in-group bias 
friendship bias 
similarity bias 
here-and-know bias - 
Davis 
(1994) strength of situation 
observer-target 
similarity - 
biological capacities 
individual differences 
learning history 
OCC 
(1988) desirability-for-other liking deservingness desirability-for-self 
De Vignemont & Singer 
(2006) 
valence, intensity, 
saliency, primary vs. 
secondary emotions 
affective link 
familiarity and similarity 
communicative 
intentions 
appraisal of the situation 
display of multiple 
emotions 
mood 
arousal 
personality, gender and 
age 
emotional repertoire 
emotional regulation 
capacities 
 
Table 5.2: Factors modulating an observer’s empathic response classified into four cat-
egories following De Vignemont & Singer [35].
Davis distinguishes between factors that directly modulate the empathic outcomes and
those that influence the empathic processes thus modulating their empathic outcomes
(cf. Section 2.1.2). Such factors are, e.g., biological capacities, individual differences, and
learning history. For example, in our model, the empathy mechanism facial mimicry
is based on using one’s own facial expression repertoire. Thus, facial mimicry may, for
example, produce an empathic emotion from type annoyed in response to the other’s
emotional state of anger (cf. Section 5.2.1). This can be explained as due to the factor
individual differences since one’s own facial expression repertoire may be different from
the other’s. While such factors modulate the empathic emotion, they do not influence an
observer’s felt degree of empathy. That is, an observer may experience a maximum
degree of empathy even if the generated empathic emotion does not match the other’s
emotion in consequence to such factors. Therefore, in our model, we consider empathy
118
5.3 Empathy modulation
modulation as the process by which an empathic emotion is modulated by factors
that affect the felt degree of empathy. Accordingly, we define the degree of empathy as
the degree of similarity between the empathic emotion as generated by the empathy
mechanism and the empathic emotion after the process of empathy modulation. That
is, the more similar one’s empathic emotion to the other’s perceived emotion, the higher
the degree of empathy.
In the following, the modulation process and the calculation of a degree of empathy
are introduced.
5.3.1 Modulation process
In our model, the modulation process is realized within PAD space of the virtual
human’s emotion simulation module [8] (see Section 3.1.1). Accordingly, at each point
in time when an empathic emotion is elicited, the following equation is applied:
empEmot,mod = ownEmot+
(empEmot − ownEmot) · (
n∑
i=1
pi,t · wi)/(
n∑
i=1
wi)
(5.3)
The value empEmot,mod represents the modulated empathic emotion. Further, the
value ownEmot represents the virtual human’s own emotional state as the modula-
tion factor mood. The value empEmot represents the non-modulated empathic emotion
resulting from the previous processing step, the empathy mechanism. The values pi,t
represent modulation factors in addition to the factor mood. The values wi represent
assigned values of weights for the modulation factors pi,t.
The values pi,t represent arbitrary predefined modulation factors that can have values
ranging in [0, 1]. Such modulation factors are for example, liking and familiarity (see
Table 5.2). As proposed by OCC [88], liking can be represented by values ranging in
[−1, 1] from maximum dislike to maximum like where the value 0 represents neither like
nor dislike. Following this, familiarity can be represented by values ranging in [0, 1] from
non-familiar to most-familiar. Only the impact of positive values of pi,t is considered in
the present approach for empathy modulation. The values of pi,t are determined with
respect to the social context and are asserted as beliefs within the BDI-module (see
Section 6.1). The values wi allow for the assignment of different values of weights to the
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modulation factors pi,t. For example, liking may be assigned a higher value of weight
than familiarity thus having a stronger effect on the modulation of the empathic emotion
than familiarity.
By applying Equation 5.3, the modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod lies on
the straight line spanned by the virtual human’s own emotional state ownEmot and the
non-modulated empathic emotion empEmot (see Figure 5.11, left).
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Figure 5.11: The PA space of positive dominance of the emotion simulation module [8].
Left: empEmot,mod as lying on the straight line spanned by ownEmot and empEmot.
Right: the empathy facilitation region defined for the primary emotion category angry.
As mentioned in the previous section, we define the degree of empathy as the degree
of similarity between the modulated empathic emotion and the non-modulated one.
Thus, the degree of empathy is represented by the distance between empEmot,mod and
empEmot within PAD space. That is, the closer empEmot,mod to empEmot, the higher
the degree of empathy. The less close empEmot,mod to empEmot, the lower the degree
of empathy. At each point in time t, the degree of empathy is impacted by the values
of the modulation factors. The impact of the modulation factors pi,t is calculated as a
weighted mean of their current values at each point in time t.
In previous work by Rodrigues et al. [98], the impact of the modulation factor mood
is defined as follows. A negative mood increases the potential of a negative empathic
emotion and decreases the potential of a positive one while a positive mood increases
the potential of a positive empathic emotion and decreases the potential of a negative
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one. Accordingly, in our model, the virtual human is more sensitive to the empathic
emotion when his emotional state is more similar to the empathic emotion. The virtual
human is more resistant to the empathic emotion when his emotional state is less
similar to the empathic emotion. That is, the closer the virtual human’s own emotional
state ownEmot to the empathic emotion empEmot the higher the degree of empathy
and the less the modulation factors pi,t can impact the degree of empathy. The less close
the virtual human’s own emotional state ownEmot to the empathic emotion empEmot
the lower the degree of empathy and the more the modulation factors pi,t can impact
the degree of empathy.
With regard to the impact of the modulation factors pi,t, the higher their value of
weighted mean, the closer the modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod to the non-
modulated empathic emotion empEmot and the higher the degree of empathy. The
lower their value of weighted mean, the less close the modulated empathic emotion
empEmot,mod to the non-modulated empathic emotion empEmot and the lower the
degree of empathy.
As compared to previous work, e.g., Rodrigues et al. [98] (see Section 3.3.1), our
approach to empathy modulation allows for a maximal degree of empathy even if
the virtual human’s own emotional state ownEmot is maximally different to the non-
modulated empathic emotion empEmot. This occurs by maximal values of pi,t. For
example, consider the modulation factors liking and familiarity. The virtual human
would experience a maximal degree of empathy with a maximally liked and familiar other
independently of his own emotional state. The idea is that one’s emotional state has less
influence on his degree of empathy with strongly liked and familiar others. Further, the
proposed approach also allows for higher degrees of empathy even if the values of pi,t are
very low. This occurs when the virtual human’s own emotional state ownEmot is very
similar to the non-modulated empathic emotion empEmot. For example, consider again
the modulation factors liking and familiarity. The virtual human would experience a
maximal degree of empathy with neither liked nor disliked, and with non-familiar
other in situations where he experiences a similar emotional state to that of the other.
The idea is that one is very sensitive to the other’s emotion when he is experiencing
a similar emotion, and that he can thus also fully empathize with neutrally liked or
unfamiliar others.
According to our working definition of empathy, an empathic response to the other’s
emotion should be more appropriate to the other’s situation than to one’s own [55] (see
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Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.4). Hoffman [55] emphasizes that an empathic response need not
to be a close match to the affect experienced by the other, but can be any emotional
reaction compatible with the other’s situation. Further, according to the thesis of the di-
mensional theories (see Section 2.2), emotions are related to one another in a systematic
manner and their relationships can be represented in a dimensional model. Accordingly,
the modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod is facilitated only if it lies in an imme-
diate neighborhood to the non-modulated empathic emotion empEmot. Otherwise,
empEmot,mod is inhibited and the next processing step in our model is not triggered (see
Figure 5.12).
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Figure 5.12: Empathy modulation as the second processing step in our computational
model of empathy.
Hence, for each primary emotion category located within PAD space of the emotion
simulation module [8] (see Section 3.1.1), we defined a so called empathy facilitation
region as a box surrounding the emotion category. For example, Figure 5.11 (right)
shows the PA space of positive dominance of the emotion simulation module [8] (see
Section 3.1.1) with the defined empathy facilitation region for the emotion category an-
gry. As depicted in Figure 5.11 (right), the modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod
has as related emotion category concentrated and the non-modulated empathic emotion
empEmot has as related emotion category angry. Accordingly, once the modulated em-
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pathic emotion empEmot,mod enters the empathy facilitation region defined for angry,
it is facilitated or otherwise it is inhibited. Within the empathy facilitation region for
each emotion category, the modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod represents an
empathic response that is compatible with the other’s situation (cf. [55], see above).
Thus, the virtual human is allowed to react with an emotion from a different type
(emotion category) although compatible with the empathic emotion.
Table 5.3 shows the PAD coordinates of the corner points defined for each empathy
facilitation region. The choice of these values for the empathy facilitation regions is a
matter of design and evaluation. 
 
Emotion category in PAD space 
 
 
Emp. Facil. Reg. PAD coordinates 
Happy: (80, 80, +/-100), (50, 0, +/-100) (100, 0, +/-100), (100, 100, +/-100),  
(-25, 0, +/-100), (-25, 100, +/-100) 
 
Surprised: (10, 80, +/-100) (30, 0, +/-100), (30, 100, +/-100),  
(-30, 0, +/-100), (-30, 100, +/-100) 
 
Annoyed: (-50, 0, 100) 
 
(25, 0, +/-100), (25, 100, +/-100),  
(-100, 0, +/-100), (-100, 100, +/-100) 
 
Sad: (-50, 0, -100) 
 
(25, 0, +/-100), (25, 100, +/-100),  
(-100, 0, +/-100), (-100, 100, +/-100) 
 
Angry: (-80, 80, 100) 
 
(25, 0, +/-100), (25, 100, +/-100),  
(-100, 0, +/-100), (-100, 100, +/-100) 
 
Fearful: (-80, 80, -100) (25, 0, +/-100), (25, 100, +/-100),  
(-100, 0, +/-100), (-100, 100, +/-100) 
 
Concentrated: (0, 0, +/-100) (30, 0, +/-100), (30, 100, +/-100),  
(-30, 0, +/-100), (-30, 100, +/-100) 
  
Table 5.3: The PAD coordinates of the defined empathy facilitation region (Emp. Facil.
Reg) for each emotion category within PAD space.
According to Table 5.3, the empathy facilitation region for the emotion category happy
covers the entire space of positive pleasure with slightly negative pleasure. The empathy
facilitation regions for annoyed, angry, fearful, and sad cover the entire space of negative
pleasure with slightly positive pleasure. Further, a modulated empathic emotion with a
related emotion category concentrated or surprised is defined as a compatible empathic
response to a non-modulated empathic emotion with any other related emotion category
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defined in PAD space. However, when the non-modulated empathic emotion has as
related emotion category concentrated or surprised, only a modulated empathic emotion
with a related emotion category concentrated or surprised is defined as a compatible
empathic response. In order to enlarge the empathy facilitation regions of both surprised
and concentrated, the negative or positive change in pleasure that elicited the empathic
emotion (cf. Section 5.2.3) has to be considered. Thus, the space of positive pleasure
could be included when the empathic emotion is elicited as a result of a positive change
in pleasure, while the negative space of pleasure could be included when the empathic
emotion is elicited as a result of a negative change in pleasure.
Once the modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod is facilitated, the next process-
ing step in our model, namely, expression of empathy, is triggered (see Section 5.4).
Otherwise, the virtual human continues expressing his own emotional state ownEmot.
Since in our approach, we consider the modulation factor mood, one would ask why
the empathy modulation is not realized within the dynamics/mood space of the
virtual human’s emotion simulation module (cf. Section 3.1.1) instead of PAD space. In
this regard, a modulated empathic emotion could be generated by modulating, with the
values pi,t, the emotional impulse which allows for a change from the virtual human’s own
emotional state toward the non-modulated empathic emotion. In this case, a problem
is, that some PAD values cannot be reached by means of emotional impulses and thus
a change toward an empathic emotion with such PAD values cannot be achieved.
In the following section, we introduce our approach to calculate the degree of empathy
once the modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod is facilitated.
5.3.2 Degree of empathy
As mentioned in the previous section, the degree of empathy is represented by the
distance between empEmot,mod and empEmot within PAD space. Hence, once the
modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod enters the empathy facilitation region, the
degree of empathy is calculated and increases toward the non-modulated empathic emo-
tion empEmot. Outside the empathy facilitation region, the degree of empathy is equal
to 0. Within the empathy facilitation region, the degree of empathy is calculated by the
following equation at each point in time t a modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod
is facilitated:
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degEmpt = (1− ‖empEmot,mod − empEmot
maxDistBox
‖)2 (5.4)
The value degEmpt represents the calculated degree of empathy and ranges within
[0, 1]. The value empEmot,mod represents the modulated empathic emotion. The value
empEmot represents the non-modulated empathic emotion (cf. previous section). The
value maxDistBox represents the possible maximum distance between empEmot,mod
and empEmot within the empathy facilitation region (see Figure 5.13). Note that the
distances ‖empEmot,mod − empEmot‖ and maxDistBox are weighted distances in
PAD space. That is, we defined values of weights for each dimension within PAD space.
A polynomial function is chosen in order to get smooth values of the calculated degree
of empathy.
HAPPY 
HAPPY 
CONCENTRATED 
SURPRISED 
BORED 
ANNOYED 
ANGRY 
empEmot 
X 
ownEmot 
X 
X 
empEmot,mod 
Arousal 
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Figure 5.13: The degree of empathy within PA space of positive dominance of the
emotion simulation module [8]. Outside the empathy facilitation region, the degree of
empathy is equal to 0. Inside the empathy facilitation region, the degree of empathy
increases toward the non-modulated empathic emotion empEmot. maxDistBox repre-
sents the possible maximum distance between empEmot,mod and empEmot within the
empathy facilitation region.
According to the dimensional theories (see Section 2.2), the pleasure dimension is
the first, most agreed upon dimension, the arousal dimension is the second agreed upon
dimension and the dominance dimension is the third, less agreed upon dimension. Thus,
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regarding the defined weight values for each dimension within PAD space, we assigned
a higher weight value to the pleasure dimension, a lower value to the arousal dimen-
sion, and a very low value to the dominance dimension. Hence, a modulated empathic
emotion that differs only in its arousal value to the non-modulated empathic emotion
reflects a higher degree of empathy than one that differs only in its pleasure value. For
example, annoyed reflects a higher degree of empathy with respect to angry than sur-
prised. Further, a modulated empathic emotion that differs only in its dominance value
to a non-modulated empathic emotion reflects a high degree of empathy. For example,
fearful reflects a high degree of empathy with respect to angry and vice versa.
Now, consider the following example. The virtual human’s emotional state ownEmot
has as its related emotion category angry. The modulated empathic emotion empEmot,mod
also has angry as its related emotion category, and the non-modulated empathic emotion
empEmot has as related emotion category annoyed. In this case, the calculated degree of
empathy has a lower value than when empEmot,mod has annoyed as its related emotion
category. Thus, the virtual human has a higher degree of empathy when his empathic
response is more appropriate to the other’s situation than to his own (cf. [55], see Section
2.1.2).
As long as no further empathic emotion is elicited (cf. Section 5.2.3), the modulated
empathic emotion decays over time (cf. [8], see Section 3.1.1). The decay function
of the modulated empathic emotion is affected by the degree of empathy, that is, the
higher the calculated value of the degree of empathy, the slower the decay. The lower
the value the faster the modulated empathic emotion decays. This is realized by respec-
tively, increasing and decreasing the values of the spring mass constants (cf. [8], see
Section 3.1.1) of the modulated empathic emotion. Also the degree of empathy decays
with respect to the decaying values of pleasure and arousal of the modulated empathic
emotion. Once the modulated empathic emotion’s values of pleasure and arousal are
equal to 0, the virtual human returns to expressing his emotional state. Accordingly, as
long as the PA values of the modulated empathic emotion do not equal 0, the virtual hu-
man continues expressing the modulated empathic emotion. However, this may produce
inappropriate behavior. For example, consider the virtual human showing a positive em-
pathic emotion that starts to decay after a while. During this time, the virtual human’s
own emotional state is triggered positively. Thus, the virtual human cannot express his
emotional state since he is still expressing the decaying empathic emotion. This issue
should be considered in more details in future work.
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5.4 Expression of empathy
Hoffman [55] and Davis [34] (see Section 2.1.2) emphasize the role of empathy as mo-
tivating prosocial and cooperative behaviors such as caring, helping, and justice.
They define caring and helping as actions that increase the well-being and the positive
emotions of others. Further, Bavelas et al. (cf. Section 2.1.2) state that mimicry con-
veys involvement and solidarity with the other’s situation. Accordingly, in our model,
we consider the expression of empathy as the process by which actions are triggered
to increase the other’s well-being and to convey involvement with the other’s situation.
The expression of empathy consists of triggering the virtual human’smultiple modal-
ities by the modulated empathic emotion (see Figure 5.14).
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Figure 5.14: The computational model of empathy with the third processing step ex-
pression of empathy.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the proposed computational model
of empathy is realized for the virtual humans MAX and EMMA. Thus, for EMMA, a
facial expression from her facial expression repertoire (cf. Section 4.3) is triggered by the
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PAD value of the modulated empathic emotion. Using EmoSpeak (see Section 4.2.2),
EMMA’s speech prosody is modulated by the PAD value of the modulated empathic
emotion. For MAX, a facial expression is triggered with respect to the value of awareness
likelihood of the primary emotion category related to the modulated empathic emotion.
Regarding his speech prosody, MAX’s value of emotional pitch is triggered with respect
to the primary emotion category related to the modulated empathic emotion.
For both MAX and EMMA, the frequencies of their eye blinking and breathing be-
haviors are also influenced by the value of arousal of the modulated empathic emotion.
Triggering further modalities, such as verbal utterances or spatial helping actions, de-
pends on the scenario’s context (see Section 6.1).
5.5 Summary and conclusion
This chapter introduced a computational model of empathy realized for the virtual
humans MAX and EMMA. In Section 5.1, we gave an overview on the structure of the
model and its integration within the emotion simulation module of an existing cognitive
architecture. In light of the requirements for building a computational model of empathy
as formulated in Section 1.2 and discussed in Section 3.3.3, the proposed model is based
on three processing steps, empathy mechanism, empathy modulation, and expression
of empathy. Supported by the theoretical background introduced in chapter 2, in Sections
5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 respectively, we discussed working definitions for the three processing
steps underlying our empathy model, and we introduced the approaches to realize them.
In Section 5.2, we introduced our approach to realize facial mimicry based on
EMMA’s facial expression repertoire where PAD values are linked to AUs. Hence, by
combining the meanings of AUs within PAD space as represented by their corresponding
intensity functions, PAD values corresponding to perceived facial expressions of emotions
are determined. Accordingly, the proposed approach is in line with the emphasis that
dimensional emotion models present dense and continuous emotion spaces that are more
inclined to characterize the continuity and subtlety of emotion expressions, and that
allow for the recognition of a wide range of emotions. A first evaluation of the pro-
posed approach shows that the PAD values determined from MAX’s facial expressions
of emotion are quite accurate, thus providing promising results. However, this ap-
proach should be further investigated with human data provided by an automatic AU
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recognition system, or by a database of facial expressions annotated with AUs and their
intensity values. This field is in its pioneering stage and thus currently, such human data
are not easy to get. The proposed approach can be easily adapted for use by virtual
humans other than EMMA that have a similar facial expression repertoire, and can also
be easily carried over in different interaction scenarios. Hence, in light of the requirement
Universality that a computational model of empathy should fulfill (cf. Section 1.2), our
realization of facial mimicry contributes to the universality of our empathy model.
Further in Section 5.2, an approach to realize the empathy mechanism situational
role-taking was introduced. As compared to the empathy mechanism facial mimicry,
situational role-taking allows for the consideration of contextual cues which are also
another possible source of information based on the appraisal of others’ situations. How-
ever, our approach to realize situational role-taking requires a context scenario and is
thus domain dependent. Furthermore, by means of our defined condition of elicitation
of an empathic emotion, empathy is not only elicited in response to the saliency of a
perceived emotional state but is also elicited with regard to the dynamic change in
the perceived emotional state. Moreover, different values for the elicitation thresholds
can be defined which allow for the modeling of a virtual human’s responsiveness to
the other’s perceived emotional state.
In Section 5.3, we introduced an approach to modulate an empathic emotion and to
calculate a degree of empathy. The proposed approach allows for the modulation of an
empathic emotion through the factor empathizer’s mood as well as through other arbi-
trary predefined modulation factors that can have values ranging in [0, 1], e.g., liking or
familiarity. Furthermore, it also allows for the assignment of different values of weights
to the latter mentioned factors, to define which modulation factors have a more signif-
icant impact on the modulation of an empathic emotion and on the degree of empathy
than others. In line with Hoffman’s emphasis [55] that an empathic response need not to
be a close match to the affect experienced by the other, but can be any emotional reac-
tion compatible with the other’s situation (cf. Section 2.1.2), not only we modulate the
intensity of an empathic emotion but also its related type (emotion category). Hence,
we defined regions of immediate neighborhood for each emotion category within PAD
space where a modulated empathic emotion from different type (emotion category) to
the non-modulated one represents a compatible empathic response. Further, a degree
of empathy is calculated as the degree of similarity between the modulated and the
non-modulated empathic emotion. In this regard, we rely on the thesis of the dimen-
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sional theories (see Section 2.2) that emotions are related to one another in a systematic
manner, and that their relationships can be represented in a dimensional model. Hence,
in our approach, we exploited the assumed relationships between emotions in PAD space.
Once the modulation factors are defined, our proposed approach for the modulation of
an empathic emotion and for the calculation of a degree of empathy can be easily car-
ried over in different context scenarios as realized in the present thesis (see Section 6.1).
Thus, in light of the requirementUniversality, the proposed approach, as our approach
to realize facial mimicry, further contributes to the universality of our empathy model.
In Section 5.4, the expression of empathy as triggered by the modulated empathic
emotion was introduced. In this regard, facial expressions, speech prosody, and eye blink-
ing and breathing behaviors can be classified as context independent modalities while
other modalities such as verbal utterances and spatial helping actions can be classified
as context dependent. Thus, in light of the requirement Universality, context inde-
pendent expressions of empathy further contribute to the universality of our empathy
model.
In sum, the proposed computational model of empathy allows a virtual human to
empathize with his interaction partner to different degrees, and to express his degree
of empathy through different modalities. Thus, our model enhances a virtual human’s
social behavior as one of our main objectives (cf. Chapter 1). Furthermore, within
our model, different parameters are defined that allow for the investigation of several
theoretical aspects of empathy that are not explicitly defined within theoretical models
of empathy. Thus, our model also provides an experimental tool for its underlying
theories, which is another main objective of this thesis (cf. Chapter 1). While at this
point, we might seem to have achieved our thesis objectives, this issue should be further
verified by the application and evaluation of our model within a context scenario which
is subject to the next chapter.
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This chapter introduces the application and evaluation of the computational model of
empathy presented in the previous chapter. The application of the proposed model is
carried out in the context of two interaction scenarios presented in Section 6.1, a conver-
sational agent scenario and a spatial interaction task scenario. Subsequently, in Section
6.2, an empirical evaluation of our model in the context of the conversational agent
scenario is introduced.
6.1 Application scenarios
In this section, the application of our computational model of empathy in the context
of two interaction scenarios is introduced. First, in Section 6.1.1, we present a con-
versational agent scenario involving the virtual humans MAX [62] (see Section 3.1.2)
and EMMA (see Chapter 4) and a human interaction partner. Then, in Section 6.1.2,
we present a spatial interaction task scenario involving the virtual human MAX and a
human interaction partner.
6.1.1 A conversational agent scenario
As emphasized in Section 4.1.1, one important aspect in creating the virtual human
EMMA besides the virtual human MAX, is to allow for the consideration of agent-
agent interaction in addition to human-agent interaction. Hence, the conversational
agent scenario presented here involves both virtual humans MAX and EMMA and a
human interaction partner. This scenario is an extension of a previous scenario where
the virtual human MAX acts as a guide in a public computer museum [62] (see Section
3.1.2). Within this scenario, MAX engages in natural face-to-face conversation with
visitors and provides them with information about the museum or the exhibitions. In
this regard, MAX conducts multimodal small talk dialogs using speech, gestures, and
facial behaviors. During his interaction with human partners, MAX’s emotions can be
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triggered positively or negatively. For example, the perception of persons in MAX’s visual
field or the interpretation of a human partner’s verbal utterance as a compliment trigger
MAX’s emotions positively. The interpretation of a human partner’s verbal utterance as
obscene or politically incorrect trigger MAX’s emotions negatively. In this scenario, we
integrate EMMA as a third interaction partner. As with MAX, human interaction
partners can also engage in a small talk dialog with EMMA, and her emotions can be
triggered in the same way as those of MAX. Figure 6.1 depicts the scenario setting.
Both virtual humans reside in a 3D computer graphics simulation of a biosphere (see
also Figure 4.1, p. 72). The virtual humans are displayed in their real sizes on two
separate panels. Human partners interact with MAX and EMMA using a keyboard as
input device to communicate.
Figure 6.1: The virtual humans MAX and EMMA displayed in their real sizes on two
separate panels in the conversational agent scenario. The human partner interacts with
the virtual humans using a keyboard.
Within this scenario, EMMA empathizes with MAX’s emotions based on the compu-
tational model of empathy proposed in Chapter 5. During small talk between a human
partner and MAX, EMMA follows the conversation by directing her visual attention
toward the speaking agent. When attending to MAX, EMMA’s empathy process is trig-
gered. As mentioned in Section 4.2, this scenario is the first interaction scenario
for EMMA. Again, in accordance with EMMA’s empathic capabilities within her first
interaction scenario, we chose the name ’EMMA’ to refer to an Empathic MultiModal
Agent (cf. Section 4.2). In the following, we illustrate EMMA’s empathic behavior in
this scenario.
When EMMA’s visual attention is directed toward MAX, the empathy mechanism
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facial mimicry introduced in Section 5.2.1 is triggered. Accordingly, EMMA internally
imitates MAX’s emotional facial expression by getting the values of his facial muscles
at each point in time and by mapping them to her Action Units (AUs). Subsequently,
a Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance (PAD) value is determined from the values of AUs pro-
vided by internal imitation of MAX’s facial expression (cf. Section 5.2.1). As discussed in
Section 5.2.1, it is possible that different PAD values result from Equations 5.1 and 5.2.
In this case, a mean value of all possible solutions regarding pleasure and arousal is cal-
culated. Regarding dominance, context related information is considered as a means
to an explicit solution. Since EMMA’s value of dominance is always positive within this
scenario (cf. [62]), she assumes the same value for MAX. This can be considered as a
very simple form of situational role-taking where only the value of dominance is inferred
(see Section 5.2.2). The determined PAD value represents a hypothesis about MAX’s
emotional state, and is input to EMMA’s emotion simulation module [8], thus driving
the simulated dynamics of the perceived emotional state over time (cf. Section 5.2.3).
The perceived emotional state is represented by a second reference point within
EMMA’s emotion simulation module, thus allowing her to distinguish between her own
and MAX’s emotional state (see Figure 6.2, left). The perceived emotional state is as-
serted as belief about MAX’s emotional state within EMMA’s BDI-module [70]. Once
MAX’s perceived emotional state exceeds a predefined saliency threshold, or a salient
change in MAX’s perceived emotional state is detected (cf. Section 5.2.3), an empathic
emotion is elicited (see Figure 6.2, middle) and the next processing step, empathy mod-
ulation, is triggered.
Per empathy modulation, as introduced in Section 5.3, the elicited empathic emotion
is modulated by means of three factors. First, EMMA’s changing mood over time. Sec-
ond, liking as the degree to which EMMA likes MAX. And third, familiarity as the
degree to which EMMA is familiar with MAX. OCC [88] distinguish between momentary
and dispositional liking. Momentary liking refers to the value of liking in a defined mo-
ment while dispositional liking refers to the basic value of liking. For example, one may
momentarily feels less liking for an otherwise dispositionally liked person. The values
of momentary and dispositional liking influence each other. With regard to familiarity,
its value could increase or decrease during the interaction, thus affecting its basic or
its dispositional value. In this scenario, we consider the values of liking and familiarity
as dispositional values. Thus, their values are predefined and do not change during the
interaction. Changing values of liking during the interaction are taken into account in
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Figure 6.2: The PAD space of EMMA’s emotion simulation module [8]. PER de-
notes the perceived emotional state, EMP denotes the elicited empathic emotion, and
MODEMP denotes the modulated empathic emotion.
the scenario presented in Section 6.1.2. Depending on the values and weights of dispo-
sitional liking and familiarity, different profiles of EMMA’s modulated empathy with
MAX can be defined and considered. That is, the higher the values of liking and famil-
iarity, the higher EMMA’s degree of empathy with MAX. Regarding the modulation
factor mood, the more similar EMMA’s emotional state to MAX’s perceived emotional
state, the higher EMMA’s degree of empathy with MAX. For example, when EMMA’s
emotions are triggered negatively by the human partner, EMMA’s degree of empathy
with MAX’s positive emotions is rather low or equals 0, except when she has a high
value of relationship (liking and familiarity) to MAX. Once the modulated empathic
emotion (see Figure 6.2, right) is facilitated, a degree of empathy is calculated and the
next processing step, expression of empathy, is triggered.
Based on the processing step expression of empathy, EMMA’s context independent,
as well as context dependent, modalities are triggered (see Section 5.4). In this scenario,
EMMA’s context dependent modality consists of a verbal utterance triggered when,
in turn, the human partner’s verbal utterance triggers MAX’s emotions. The human
partner’s input utterance is evaluated with the recognized change in MAX’s perceived
value of pleasure. The changes in MAX’s perceived value of pleasure are detected by
EMMA based on calculating the difference of the pleasure values, Ptk − Ptk−1 , at time-
stamps tk−1 and tk. Accordingly, a positive change in MAX’s perceived value of pleasure
triggers utterances from EMMA that encourage the human partner to continue being
134
6.1 Application scenarios
kind to MAX. A positive change that results in a positive value of pleasure triggers
utterances such as That’s great! You are so kind to MAX!. A positive change in the
space of negative pleasure triggers utterances such as This is not enough! try to be
kinder to MAX!. A negative change in pleasure triggers utterances from EMMA that
advises the human partner not to be unfriendly to MAX. A negative change in the space
of positive pleasure triggers utterances such as Why are you saying that to MAX! This
is nasty!. A negative change that results in a negative pleasure value triggers utterances
such as Better think about what you are saying! This is really nasty!.
As long as no further empathic emotion is elicited, EMMA’s modulated empathic
emotion decays over time (cf. Section 5.3.2). Accordingly, the higher EMMA’s degree
of empathy with MAX, the slower her modulated empathic emotion decays, and vice
versa. Once the PA values of the modulated empathic emotion equal the value 0, EMMA
returns to her own emotional state.
In this scenario, we illustrated how by means of our model, EMMA empathizes with
MAX’s emotions to different degrees depending on her mood and on her defined values
of relationship (liking and familiarity) to MAX. An example dialog situation within this
scenario is presented in Section 6.2.2. In the following, another application scenario of
our model is presented.
6.1.2 A spatial interaction task scenario
A cooperation between the present thesis project and the thesis project of Nhung Nguyen
[81] was realized under the supervision of Prof. Ipke Wachsmuth [13]. In this context, our
proposed model (see Chapter 5) is applied within the spatial interaction task scenario
realized in the work by Nguyen & Wachsmuth [82].
Nguyen & Wachsmuth [82] propose a computational model for structuring and con-
trolling a virtual human’s spatial behavior in task execution at close distances. In
this regard, the space surrounding the virtual human, which they define as peripersonal
space, and the space in interpersonal interaction, which they define as interaction space,
are modeled. The peripersonal space is subdivided into touch space and lean-forward
space (see Figure 6.3).
The boundary of touch space corresponds to the lengths of the virtual human’s arms.
The boundary of lean-forward space corresponds to the maximal reach of the virtual
human when bending forward from the waist. The virtual human assumes that another
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Figure 6.3: Subspaces surrounding a virtual human [82]. Left: the peripersonal space
as subdivided into touch space and lean-forward space. The lean-forward space is an
extension of touch space. Right: interaction space as the intersection of two partners’
peripersonal spaces.
agent entering his proximity is surrounded by the same peripersonal space as his own.
Thus, the interaction space is modeled as the intersection of the peripersonal spaces of
the virtual human and the other agent. The computational model proposed by Nguyen
& Wachsmuth [82] is realized for the virtual human MAX in a spatial interaction task
scenario with a human interaction partner.
The spatial interaction task scenario consists of a cooperative tower building task.
In a virtual reality CAVE-like environment, MAX and the human partner are standing
face-to-face at a table. Their overlapping peripersonal spaces form their interaction space.
The goal is to cooperatively solve a tower building task with virtual toy blocks by
alternatively putting one toy block upon the other. The toy blocks are labeled with
different numbers and have different sizes. The numbers descend with lower sizes. At the
beginning of the task, the largest toy block is placed by default in the center of interaction
space where MAX and the human partner have to place the remaining blocks. In order
for a human interaction partner to select and place the virtual toy blocks, a Wiimote
controller is used. Figure 6.4 shows an example interaction where the human partner
selected block number nine and placed it upon the largest toy block labeled T.
The blocks are placed randomly at free locations within MAX’s and the human part-
ner’s peripersonal spaces. Each partner is assigned a number of blocks with respect to
a defined minimum. The following two rules are defined to build a tower. First, the
blocks can be ordered by their numbers, e.g., block number three can be placed on top
of block number four. When all blocks are ordered with respect to their numbers, the
highest tower, which we call ideal tower is built. Second, the blocks can be ordered by
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Figure 6.4: The virtual human MAX and a human interaction partner in the spatial
interaction task scenario. From left to right, the human partner starting the task by
selecting block number nine and by placing it upon the largest block labeled T. The red
and green semi circles, respectively, represent the peripersonal spaces of MAX and the
human partner. The bright arcs represent the lean-forward spaces while the dark semi
circles represent the touch spaces. The intersection of both peripersonal spaces represents
the interaction space (cf. Figure 6.3). The game situation as perceived by MAX is shown
by his thought bubble.
their sizes, e.g., block number three can be placed on top of block number five omitting
block number four. In this case, a tower that is smaller than the ideal tower is built.
Accordingly, the most appropriate block is defined as the block that best fits both of
these rules. To successfully achieve the tower building task, each partner should place
the most appropriate block located in his peripersonal space. Once the smallest block
with number one is placed on the top of the tower, the tower building task is completed.
As mentioned above, the goal of the spatial interaction task is to cooperatively solve
the tower building task. For this purpose, a cooperative spatial action, called help-
ing action, is defined as relocating objects into positions reachable by the partner. For
example, it is possible that the most appropriate block needed by one of the partners
is not reachable. In this case, the helping action consists of relocating the most appro-
priate block into a position reachable by the partner. Based on the size and layout of
interaction space [82], the virtual human MAX can relocate objects to any free positions
reachable by his partner. In this regard, the following question arises: Which position
within interaction space is chosen by MAX to help the human partner?
According to Hoffman [55] and Davis [34], empathy plays a major role as a motiva-
tional basis of cooperative prosocial behavior such as helping and caring (cf. Section
2.1.2). Hence, based on the computational model of empathy proposed in this thesis
(see Chapter 5), MAX’s helping action is triggered and is modulated by his degree of
137
6 Application and evaluation
empathy with his interaction partner. In the following, we illustrate MAX’s empathic
behavior within this scenario.
During the partner’s game turn, MAX’s attention focus is on the human partner
and the empathy mechanism situational role-taking introduced in Section 5.2.2 is
triggered. As mentioned in Section 5.2.2, the realization of situational role-taking requires
a context scenario and is introduced in more details in this section. As defined in Section
5.2.2, situational role-taking refers to the ability to generate a hypothesis about the
other’s emotional state by appraising the other’s situation using one’s own appraisal
mechanisms. Hence, in the spatial interaction task scenario, MAX generates a hypothesis
about his human partner’s emotional state by appraising his partner’s game situation
using his own appraisal mechanisms.
During his game turn, MAX appraises his situation based on a sequence of plans
defined in his BDI-module [70]. MAX’s BDI-plan to achieve the goal of placing a block
on top of the tower is depicted by Algorithm 1. Accordingly, once MAX has the turn, this
BDI-plan is triggered (line 2). In the Skip-Bo card game scenario [8] (see Section 3.1.2),
MAX’s value of dominance is set to positive during his turn and to negative during
his partner’s turn. Similarly, MAX’s value of dominance during his game turn in the
present scenario is set to 100, while during his partner’s game turn it is set to the value
−100 (lines 4 and 24). For a successful completion of the tower building task, MAX first
searches for the most appropriate block to place on top of the tower (line 6). Depending
on the block’s position, a corresponding value of emotional valence, also called emotional
impulse [8] (cf. Section 3.1.1), is triggered according to a defined cost function (lines
7 to 11 and 14 to 16). This cost function associates the physical effort of motor actions
with emotional valences. The physical effort of motor actions is represented by object
positions within peripersonal space. That is, with increasing arm-reach distances for
objects, more physical effort is needed for humans to reach for them (cf. [72]). This cost
function is depicted by Figure 6.5.
According to this cost function, blocks located in MAX’s touch space are reachable
with less physical effort and are thus associated with lower costs represented by positive
values of emotional valences ranging in [0, 100]. The value 100 corresponds to the center of
MAX’s touch space. Blocks located in MAX’s lean forward space are reachable with more
physical effort and are thus associated with higher costs represented by negative values
of emotional valences ranging in [−100, 0]. The value 0 corresponds to the boundary of
touch space. Blocks located in extrapersonal space are not reachable and are associated
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Algorithm 1 MAX places block on top of the tower.
1: Goal: ACHIEVE place-block-on-top-of-tower
2: Precondition maxHasTurn
3: Body
4: setDominance positive
5: playedMove = false
6: while block ← getNextMostAppropriate(freeBlocks) and !playedMove do
7: blockPosition← getPosition(block)
8: if blockPosition in reach-space then
9: grasp block
10: emotionalV alence← costFunction(blockPosition)
11: send emotionalV alence
12: placeOnTopOfTower( block)
13: playedMove = true
14: else
15: emotionalV alence← costFunction(blockPosition)
16: send emotionalV alence
17: numNotReachBlocks += 1
18: end if
19: if numNotReachBlocks = numAllApproprBlocks then
20: fail
21: end if
22: end while
23: setGameTurn partner
24: setDominance negative
25: Effects send emotionalV alencePositive
26: Failure send emotionalV alenceNegative
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Figure 6.5: The defined cost function associating the physical effort of motor actions
with emotional valences.
with a maximal negative value of emotional valence equal to −100. Further, given the
case that the most appropriate block needed by MAX is not reachable, MAX searches
for the next most appropriate and reachable one. Once such a block is located by MAX,
he places it on top of the tower (line 12). This action is interpreted as goal success and
is rewarded with a positive value of emotional valence equal to 40 (line 25). In case no
appropriate and reachable block is available (lines 19 to 21), MAX skipped a turn. This
is interpreted as goal failure and triggers a negative value of emotional valence equal
to −40 (line 26).
As mentioned earlier, during the partner’s game turn, MAX’s attention focus is on
the partner, and the empathy mechanism situational role-taking (cf. Section 5.2.2) is
triggered. Thus, MAX appraises the partner’s situation using his own appraisal mech-
anisms based on a sequence of plans defined in his BDI-module. MAX’s BDI-plan to
appraise the partner’s achievement of the goal of placing a block on top of the tower is
depicted by Algorithm 2. This BDI-plan is triggered once the partner has the turn (line
2). As for himself, MAX assumes the partner’s value of dominance is equal to 100 (line
4). Furthermore, MAX searches for the most appropriate block needed by the partner
to put on top of the tower (line 5). Once such a block is located, MAX infers the block’s
position in the partner’s peripersonal space (line 6). Note that MAX assumes that his
partner is surrounded by a peripersonal space which is the same as his own. Thus, MAX
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Algorithm 2 Partner places block on top of the tower.
1: Goal: ACHIEVE place-block-on-top-of-tower partner
2: Precondition partnerHasTurn
3: Body
4: setDominance positive
5: block ← getMostAppropriate(freeBlocks)
6: blockPosition← getPosition(block)
7: emotionalV alence← costFunction(blockPosition)
8: send emotionalV alence
9: numNotReachBlocks← getNumNotReachBlocks(freeBlocks)
10: if numNotReachBlocks = numAllApproprBlocks then
11: fail
12: end if
13: block ← getGraspBlock(freeBlocks)
14: blockPosition← getPosition(block)
15: emotionalV alence← costFunction(blockPosition)
16: send emotionalV alence
17: if placeOnTopOfTower(block) then
18: success
19: end if
20: setGameTurn self
21: setDominance negative
22: Effects send emotionalV alencePositive
23: Failure send emotionalV alenceNegative
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creates a model of his partner’s peripersonal space by projecting his own peripersonal
space to the partner. Using one’s own body model to simulate someone else’s perspective
is known as embodied simulation [82] (cf. [43], see Section 2.1.3). A corresponding
value of emotional valence is triggered for the partner according to the cost function
depicted by Figure 6.5 (lines 7 and 8). Accordingly, embodied simulation, followed by
the generation of a value of emotional valence, are triggered as lower-level cognitive pro-
cesses defined within the reactive layer of the virtual human’s cognitive architecture [70]
(see Section 5.1.2).
The partner’s assumed value of dominance together with the triggered value of emo-
tional valence for the partner are input to MAX’s emotion simulation module [8] and
drive the simulated dynamics of the partner’s perceived emotional state over time (cf.
Section 5.2.3). The perceived emotional state is represented by a second reference point
within MAX’s emotion simulation module, thus allowing him to distinguish between his
own and the partner’s emotional state (cf. Figure 6.2, left). The perceived emotional state
is asserted as belief about the partner’s emotional state within MAX’s BDI-module.
Once the partner’s perceived emotional state exceeds a predefined saliency threshold, or
a salient change in the partner’s perceived emotional state is detected (cf. Section 5.2.3),
an empathic emotion is elicited (cf. Figure 6.2, middle) and the next processing step,
empathy modulation, is triggered.
Per empathy modulation (see Section 5.3.1), the elicited empathic emotion is modu-
lated by means of three factors. First, MAX’s mood during the game. Second, liking as
the degree to which MAX likes the human partner during the game. Third, deserving-
ness as the degree to which the partner deserves his current game situation. The values
of liking and deservingness range in [0, 1] from neither liked nor disliked to most liked,
and from neither deserved nor not deserved to most deserved. Note that positive values
of deservingness represent deserved positive events and not deserved negative ones. The
values of liking and deservingness change during the interaction and are asserted as
beliefs in MAX’s BDI-module. Thus, we consider the values of liking as momentary (cf.
OCC [88]); (see Section 6.1.1). In the following, the calculation of the values of liking
and deservingness is introduced.
Liking is calculated as the partner’s assumed degree of empathy with MAX. The
partner’s degree of empathy with MAX is calculated based on the partner’s investment
in helping actions. That is, the more the partner helps MAX, the higher his assumed
degree of empathy, the higher MAX likes his partner. In this regard, we follow Davis’
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emphasis that one’s ability for empathy impacts one’s social behavior which is perceived
by others and which thus influences one’s social relationships with others [34] (cf. Section
2.1.2). The relationship between helping actions and degree of empathy is introduced
later in this section.
Deservingness is calculated as the number of reachable appropriate blocks in MAX’s
touch space divided by the number of all current appropriate blocks. That is, the more
reachable appropriate blocks are in MAX’s touch space, the higher the value of deserv-
ingness and vice versa.
The higher the values of liking and deservingness, the higher MAX’s degree of empathy
with the human partner. The more similar MAX’s emotional state to the partner’s
perceived emotional state, the higher MAX’s degree of empathy with the human partner.
Once the modulated empathic emotion (cf. Figure 6.2, right) is facilitated, the next
processing step, expression of empathy, is triggered.
Based on the processing step expression of empathy, MAX’s context independent as
well as context dependent modalities are triggered (see Section 5.4). In this scenario,
MAX’s context dependent modality consists of a helping action, defined earlier in
this section, as relocating the most appropriate block toward positions reachable by his
partner. MAX’s helping action is triggered only if the partner’s pleasure value becomes
negative, and if the most appropriate block is reachable for MAX. By calculating the
difference in the partner’s perceived pleasure value as Ptk − Ptk−1 , at time-stamps tk−1
and tk, a helping action is triggered when Ptk − Ptk−1 <= 0 and Ptk <= 0. Accordingly,
MAX do not always help as soon as the most appropriate block is in the partner’s lean
forward space, thus leaving some room for the partner to perform the task by himself.
Further, MAX’s helping action is modulated by his degree of empathy with his partner.
MAX’s degree of empathy is calculated as introduced in Section 5.3.2.
MAX’s helping action consists of placing the most appropriate block into a position
within interaction space that is reachable by the partner. The boundary of interaction
space corresponds to two circular arcs spanned by the lean forward spaces of MAX and
his partner (see Figure 6.6, gray area). These circular arcs are denoted respectively as
leanArcMAX and leanArcpartner. The closest position to the partner, where MAX can
place a block is denoted as Pm (see Figure 6.6). Pm is defined as the intersection of
leanArcMAX and the line segment spanned by MAX’s center of peripersonal space and
the partner’s center of peripersonal space. The corresponding position vector is denoted
by pm. The position vector of the most appropriate block needed by the partner is
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Figure 6.6: MAX’s helping action in interaction space.
denoted by pblock (see Figure 6.6). Based on the following equation, the new position of
the block is calculated:
pblockNew = pb + (degEmp · phelp), with phelp = pm − pblock (6.1)
degEmp denotes the calculated degree of empathy for MAX and determines the dis-
tance by which the most appropriate block is moved toward the partner. A maximally
distant position, where a most appropriate block can be relocated, is defined as the inter-
section of leanArcpartner and the line segment spanned by pm and pblock. Hence, degEmp
modulates only the part of phelp within interaction space. This prevents helping actions
by which the new block position is located outside interaction space where the block is
still not reachable by the partner.
Furthermore, the effort quality of MAX’s helping action is also modulated by his
degree of empathy (cf. [26], see Section 3.2.1). In this regard, MAX’s degree of empathy
modulates the velocity of MAX’s replacement movement by modulating its velocity-
factor. The velocity-factor of the replacement-movement takes values between 0 and 1,
and modulates the overall duration of the movement. Each replacement-movement has
a maximum and a minimum time of execution. The value of 0 denotes the slowest pre-
defined replacement-movement. With increasing value, the duration of the movement
decreases linearly. This means that the duration time becomes shorter and the move-
ment is executed faster until it reaches the value of 1, denoting the fastest predefined
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replacement-movement. The standard predefined value of the maximum overall duration
is set to 11 seconds and the minimum is set to 3 seconds. If, for example, the degree of
empathy is of value 0.5, the velocity-factor of the replacement-movement is also set to
0.5. This results in an overall duration of 7 seconds for MAX’s entire movement. Thus,
MAX’s degree of empathy also impacts his behavior expressivity during his helping
action.
MAX’s modulated empathic emotion decays over time (cf. Section 5.3.2). Accordingly,
the higher MAX’s degree of empathy with his partner, the slower his modulated empathic
emotion decays, and vice versa. Once the PA values of the modulated empathic emotion
equal the value 0, MAX returns to his own emotional state.
Further, the virtual human MAX waits until the partner has performed his game
moves. Once the partner grasps a block, MAX infers the block’s position in the partner’s
peripersonal space (lines 13 and 14, Algorithm 2) and triggers a corresponding value of
emotional valence for the partner according to the cost function depicted by Figure 6.5
(lines 15 and 16). When the partner puts the block on top of the tower, MAX interprets
this action as goal success and triggers an emotional impulse equal to 40 for the partner
(lines 17 to 19 and line 22). In case no appropriate block is reachable by the partner
and MAX’s helping action is not triggered, MAX interprets this game situation as goal
failure and triggers an emotional impulse for the partner equal to −40 (lines 9 to 12 and
line 23). These emotional impulses further drive the simulated dynamics of the partner’s
perceived emotional state over time.
In the following, an example interaction between MAX and the human partner in
this scenario is described. Figure 6.7 illustrates an example sequence of MAX’s game
moves. As shown by Algorithm 1, MAX first searches for the most appropriate block,
eight in our example situation (see Figure 6.7, top, left). Since the most appropriate block
is in MAX’s forward lean space, MAX looks at his partner and waits for his partner’s
help (see Figure 6.7, top, right). By this behavior MAX signalizes to his partner that
he would like to be helped. In case the partner does not help, MAX grasps the block,
receives a negative emotional impulse of −70, and places it on top of the tower (see
Figure 6.7, bottom, left). After positioning the block on top of the tower, MAX receives
a positive emotional impulse of 40 as a reward for his goal success (Figure 6.7, bottom,
right). However, MAX is expressing a negative emotional state because of the previously
triggered negative emotional impulse of −70. The value of deservingness is first equal
to 0.5 because both MAX and the human partner have the same number of appropriate
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Figure 6.7: Example sequence of MAX’s game moves.
blocks. This value decreases after MAX places the block number eight on top of the
tower thus decreasing the number of his most appropriate blocks. The value of liking is
equal to 0 because the partner has not helped MAX.
Figure 6.8 illustrates an example situation where the partner helps MAX. In this
situation, MAX needs block number six which is the most appropriate block. However,
the block is in MAX’s extrapersonal space. Thus, a negative emotional impulse of −100
is triggered for MAX (see Figure 6.8, top, left). As mentioned earlier, MAX waits for the
help of his partner (see Figure 6.8, top, right). In fact, the partner helps MAX by placing
the needed block in MAX’s reach space (see Figure 6.8, bottom, left). Accordingly,
MAX’s value of liking increases based on the partner’s investment in helping him (see
Figure 6.8, bottom, right). MAX then places the block on top of the tower resulting
first in a negative emotional impulse of −30 since the needed block was placed in his
forward-lean space, and then a positive emotional impulse of 40 as a reward for his goal
success (see Figure 6.8, bottom, right). Note that during the partner’s achievement of
the helping action, MAX’s negative emotional state triggered at the beginning by the
emotional impulse of −100, decays to neutral. As compared to the previously described
example situation (see Figure 6.7), MAX is expressing a positive emotional state after
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Figure 6.8: Example situation where the human partner helps MAX.
placing the block on top of the tower. This is in line with Davis’s definition of helping
as an action that at some cost to the self, reduces the negative states or increases the
positive states for the other [34] (cf. Section 2.1.2).
Figure 6.9 illustrates an example situation where MAX helps his partner. In this
situation, MAX searches for the most appropriate block needed by his partner, namely,
block number five (Figure 6.9, left). Accordingly, an emotional impulse of −100 is trig-
gered for the partner since the most appropriate block is not reachable by the partner.
Subsequently, MAX’s empathic emotion is elicited and a degree of empathy is calculated
according to the values of liking, of deservingness, and of MAX’s mood. Furthermore,
MAX’s helping action is triggered and is modulated by the value of his degree of em-
pathy (see Figure 6.9, left). Note that this example situation is not a sequel to the one
illustrated by Figure 6.8.
In this scenario, we illustrated how MAX’s degree of empathy with his partner
triggers and modulates his helping action. Furthermore, MAX’s value of liking is based
on the partner’s investment in helping him. Thus, the more the partner helps MAX,
the more MAX likes his partner and the more he empathizes and helps him. In the
following section, we introduce the empirical evaluation of our model in the context of
the conversational agent scenario presented in Section 6.1.1.
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Figure 6.9: Example situation where MAX helps his partner.
6.2 Empirical evaluation
After the successful application of the proposed computational model of empathy within
two different interaction scenarios (see Section 6.1), an empirical evaluation of the model
was carried out, and is presented in the next sections. This evaluation was performed in
cooperation with Prof. Pia Knoeferle and Dr. Maria Nella Carminati as members of
the psycholinguistics section of project A1 ’Modelling Partners’ (see Chapter 1).
6.2.1 Hypotheses
The purpose of the empirical evaluation is to investigate how a virtual human’s behavior
produced by the empathy model is perceived and interpreted by human participants.
Accordingly, the empirical evaluation of the empathy model is performed in the context
of the conversational agent scenario introduced in Section 6.1.1 to test the following
hypotheses:
• H1: the virtual human EMMA’s expression of empathy is perceivable by the par-
ticipants.
• H2: the virtual human EMMA’s expressed degree of empathy is perceivable by
the participants.
• H3: the human participants acknowledge different values of relationship between
EMMA and MAX according to EMMA’s expressed degree of empathy.
• H4: the virtual human EMMA is perceived as more likable the higher the value of
her expressed degree of empathy.
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6.2.2 Design and procedure
For the purpose of this empirical evaluation, we designed 24 dialog interactions to
be used in a repeated measures design. The interactions were between EMMA, MAX,
and a human partner who we called Lisa. At the beginning of each of the 24 dialog
interactions, the virtual humans are in a neutral emotional state. In each of the 24
dialog interactions, Lisa begins by greeting EMMA and then praising her. Consequently,
a positive emotional impulse of +100 is input to EMMA’s emotion simulation module,
activating her primary emotion category happy. Simultaneously, EMMA greets Lisa and
thanks her for being kind. Then Lisa greets MAX although she then insults him. Thus,
a negative emotional impulse of −100 is input to MAX’s emotion simulation module,
activating his primary emotion category angry. Simultaneously, MAX answers with a
negative verbal utterance such as Lisa, you are horrible. Meanwhile, EMMA empathizes
with MAX to different degrees depending on her mood and her defined relationship to
MAX. Note that MAX’s facial expression for angry is perceived by EMMA as showing
the emotional state annoyed (cf. Table 5.1, p. 111).
Regarding EMMA’s degree of empathy with MAX, three different conditions are
considered for each of the 24 dialog interactions. In the three conditions, EMMA is in
the same positive mood after being praised by Lisa. Thus, the modulation factor mood
is constant across all conditions. Accordingly, the three conditions consist of varying
the value of EMMA’s relationship to MAX, thus impacting her degree of empathy with
MAX. Since the focus is not on the interaction of several relationship modulation factors,
only the factor dispositional liking is manipulated. The three conditions are as follows:
1. EMMA’s value of liking toward MAX is equal to 0. Accordingly, EMMA’s modu-
lated empathic emotion is inhibited and EMMA’s value of degree of empathy is also
equal to 0. In this case, EMMA continues expressing her own positive emotional
state of happiness triggered by Lisa’s praising expression. We call this condition
the neutral liking condition (see Figure 6.10, left).
2. EMMA’s value of liking toward MAX is equal to 0.5. Accordingly, EMMA’s mod-
ulated empathic emotion is facilitated and has as its related primary emotion
category concentrated. In this case, EMMA expresses the modulated empathic
emotion. EMMA’s value of degree of empathy is equal to 0.25. Hence, EMMA’s
values of liking and degree of empathy are higher than in the first condition. We
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call this condition the medium liking condition (see Figure 6.10, middle).
3. EMMA’s value of liking toward MAX is equal to 1. Accordingly, EMMA’s modu-
lated empathic emotion equals the non-modulated empathic emotion which has as
its related primary emotion category annoyed. In this case, EMMA expresses the
non-modulated empathic emotion. EMMA’s value of degree of empathy is equal to
1. Hence, EMMA’s values of liking and degree of empathy are higher than in the
first and second condition. We call this condition themaximum liking condition
(see Figure 6.10, right).
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Figure 6.10: EMMA’s modulated empathic emotion, empEmot,mod, in PAD space of
positive dominance. ownEmot refers to EMMA’s own emotional state, empEmot refers
to the non-modulated empathic emotion, and the box represents the empathy facilitation
region defined for the emotion category annoyed (cf. Section 5.3). From left to right,
respectively, EMMA’s modulated empathic emotion, empEmot,mod, in the neutral liking
condition, the medium liking condition, and the maximum liking condition.
In all three conditions, EMMA’s degree of empathy is expressed by her facial ex-
pression and speech prosody while the verbal utterance is the same across the three
conditions. Thus, after MAX’s response to Lisa, EMMA also responded with a negative
verbal utterance such as You are nasty to MAX. EMMA’s and MAX’s secondary be-
haviors and conversational gestures are deactivated in all three conditions. Figure 6.11
depicts the utterances of EMMA, MAX, and Lisa in two example dialog interactions.
In order to obtain a controlled environmental setting for the evaluation of EMMA’s
empathic behavior, a total of 72 videos of the 24 Dialog interactions in the three
conditions were recorded. Figure 6.12 depicts the setting for the video recordings.
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Example Dialog 1 
 
 
Example Dialog 2 
 
HP: Hallo EMMA, ich finde dich hübsch 
(Hello EMMA, you look pretty) 
 
 
HP: Hallo EMMA, ich finde dich klug 
(Hello EMMA, you are clever) 
 
E: Hallo Lisa, das ist lieb von dir 
(Hello Lisa, you are nice) 
 
 
E: Hallo Lisa, das ist großartig von dir  
(Hello Lisa, you are great) 
 
HP: Hei MAX, du bist mir zu hässlich  
(Hey MAX, you look ugly) 
 
 
HP: Hei MAX, du scheinst mir blöd zu sein 
(Hey MAX, you seem to be stupid) 
 
M: Nun Lisa, du bist fies 
(So Lisa, you are nasty) 
 
 
M: Nun Lisa, du bist unhöflich 
(So Lisa, you are rude) 
 
E: Du bist aber unmöglich zu MAX 
(You are obnoxious to MAX) 
 
 
E: Du bist aber fies zu MAX 
(You are nasty to MAX)  
Figure 6.11: Two example dialog interactions of EMMA, MAX, and Lisa. HP refers to
human partner, E refers to EMMA, and M refers to MAX.
Figure 6.12: Setting for the video recordings.
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In order to present a more natural interaction to the participants, the human partner
in the videos does not use a keyboard to input his responses. Instead, another person
in the background typed them while the human partner spoke. Figure 6.13 presents a
snapshot of the last frame of a video showing a dialog interaction and EMMA’s facial
expression of empathy in the three conditions.
Figure 6.13: Snapshot of the last frame of a video showing a dialog interaction. From
left to right: EMMA’s facial expression of empathy in the three conditions.
For the purpose of assigning the video recordings to participants, we constructed three
experimental lists following the Latin Square design. Each list comprises 24 videos
from each condition (giving a total of 72 videos) such that each video appeared in each
list in only one condition, as shown by Table 6.1. Altogether, 30 participants (15 female
and 15 male) took part in the experiment, with each list assigned to 10 participants,
and with an equal number of male and female participants assigned to each list. The
24 videos contained in a list were presented in a random order to each corresponding
participant.
To test the hypotheses formulated in Section 6.2.1, each participant was asked to
complete a questionnaire after each shown video. The questionnaire comprises five
questionnaire items that were rated using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from −3 to +3.
The items are listed in Table 6.2. The first two items were used to test hypothesis H1.
The third, fourth, and fifth items were respectively used to test hypotheses H2, H3,
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Dialog Number 
 
 
List 1 
 
List 2 
 
List 3 
D1 video(cond1) video(cond2) video(cond3) 
D2 video(cond2) video(cond3) video(cond1) 
D3 video(cond3) video(cond1) video(cond2) 
D4 video(cond1) video(cond2) video(cond3) 
D5 video(cond2) video(cond3) video(cond1) 
… … … … 
D24 video(cond3) video(cond1) video(cond2)  
Table 6.1: The recorded videos as arranged in three lists according to the Latin Square
design. ’cond1’ refers to the neutral liking condition, ’cond2’ refers to the medium liking
condition, and ’cond3’ refers to the maximum liking condition.
and H4.  
 
Measure 
 
 
Questionnaire item 
 
Scale 
 
Expression of empathy 
(H1) 
 
“In the last frame of the video, 
EMMA’s face shows:  ” 
 
 
“In the last frame of the video, 
EMMA’s speech prosody is: ” 
 
 
-3 = very negative mood 
+3 = very positive mood 
 
 
-3 = very negative 
+3 = very positive 
 
Degree of empathy 
(H2) 
 
“In this video, EMMA is: ” 
 
-3 = very cold to MAX 
+3 = feeling with MAX 
 
 
Values of relationship 
(H3) 
 
“In this video, EMMA has: ” 
 
-3 = very negative relationship 
to MAX 
+3 = very strong relationship to 
MAX 
 
 
Likability 
(H4) 
 
“In this video, EMMA is overall: ” 
 
-3 = very unlikable 
+3 = very likable 
  
Table 6.2: A schematic overview of the questionnaire presented after each shown video
to test hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4.
After having watched all 24 videos, the participants were further asked to complete
two post-experimental questionnaires. The first questionnaire comprises 21 ques-
tionnaire items. The first item was to evaluate the participants’ understanding of the
content of the presented videos. As such, the participants were asked to describe the
general story presented in the videos, and if they can discern any perceived differences
153
6 Application and evaluation
in their content. The remaining questionnaire items are grouped into four categories
and were rated using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from −3 to +3. Accordingly, nine
questionnaire items were used to evaluate EMMA’s general behavior in the videos (see
Table 6.3). Three questionnaire items were used to evaluate the naturalness of EMMA’s
behavior in the videos (see Table 6.4). Four questionnaire items were used to evaluate
EMMA’s social behavior over all presented videos (see Table 6.5). Finally, four ques-
tionnaire items were used to evaluate the general likability of EMMA (see Table 6.6).
 
 
Measure 
 
 
Questionnaire item 
 
Scale 
 
Facial behavior 
 
“EMMA’s face was expressive: ” 
 
 
“EMMA’s facial expressions were 
exaggerated: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
 
Speech behavior 
 
 
“EMMA’s pronunciation was clear: ” 
 
 
“EMMA’s speech was difficult to 
understand: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
 
Attention behavior 
 
 
“EMMA had eye contact with Lisa: ” 
 
 
“EMMA never had eye contact with 
MAX: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
 
Empathic response 
trigger 
 
 
“In the last frame of all presented 
videos, EMMA’s response toward 
Lisa is triggered by MAX’s facial 
expression: ” 
 
“In the last frame of all presented 
videos, EMMA’s response toward 
Lisa is triggered by Lisa’s utterance 
toward MAX: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
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Behavior in general 
 
 
“The behavior of EMMA over all 
presented videos was exaggerated: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
  
Table 6.3: Questionnaire items to measure EMMA’s general behavior in the videos.
The second post-experimental questionnaire comprises 14 questionnaire items to mea-
sure the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) [33] of the participants thus measuring
their empathy. This measure was collected so as to allow us to test any correlation
that might exist between the participants’ IRI and the ratings of the five questionnaire
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Measure 
 
 
Questionnaire item 
 
Scale 
 
Facial behavior 
 
“EMMA’s facial expressions 
appeared: ” 
 
 
-3 = artificial 
+3 = natural 
 
Speech behavior 
 
 
“EMMA’s pronunciation appeared: ” 
 
 
-3 = artificial 
+3 = natural 
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Attention behavior 
 
 
“EMMA’s attention behavior 
appeared: ” 
 
 
-3 = artificial 
+3 = natural  
Table 6.4: Questionnaire items to measure the naturalness of EMMA’s behavior in the
videos.
 
Measure 
 
 
Questionnaire item 
 
Scale 
Cooperative 
 
“EMMA is a cooperative agent: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
Caring 
 
“EMMA is an uncaring agent: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
Protective 
 
“EMMA is a protective agent: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
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Social “EMMA is an asocial agent: ” 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
  
Table 6.5: Questionnaire items to measure EMMA’s social behavior over all presented
videos.
items after each shown video. The hypothesis here is: The higher the value of IRI, the
more participants can differentiate between the three conditions of EMMA’s empathy with
MAX in their ratings for the five questionnaire items. This hypothesis is not central to
the present thesis, and is thus not listed with the four hypotheses formulated in Section
6.2.1. The results regarding this hypothesis can be considered as a by-product of the
present work. A German version of the questionnaire was used [92]. The questionnaire
items were rated using a 5-point Likert scale. Note that the participants were advised
about the scale change before they began the questionnaire.
At the end of the experiment, an interview was conducted with each participant to
ask about the criteria on the basis of which they rated EMMA’s likability (cf. Table 6.2)
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Measure 
 
 
Questionnaire item 
 
Scale 
 
Trust 
 
“You would trust EMMA if she were 
your friend: ” 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
 
Friendship 
 
“You could not imagine EMMA to be 
your friend: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
 
Interaction 
 
“You would like to interact with 
EMMA: ” 
 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
G
en
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Interest 
 
“You are not interested in EMMA: ” 
 
-3 = strongly disagree 
+3 = strongly agree 
  
Table 6.6: Questionnaire items to measure the general likability of EMMA.
after each presented video.
The questionnaire to test the hypotheses and the first post-experimental questionnaire
were designed in the context of the present study according to the general criteria for a
questionnaire design. Thus, the questions are written in everyday language using short
and simple sentences. In order to avoid the acquiescence bias, half of the questions in the
post-experimental questionnaire are worded in reverse. With regard to the questionnaire
after each video, the questions were presented with an inverted scale for half of the
participants. All questions were randomized for each participant to prevent order effects.
The videos and the questionnaires were presented to participants on a computer screen.
A headset was used during the presentation of the videos (see Figure 6.14).
Figure 6.14: Setting for running the experiment.
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Further, to ensure that the experimental design is clear and appropriate for the human
participants, a pretest was performed with three participants who were unfamiliar with
the research subject. The three participants, respectively, evaluated the videos contained
in the three lists provided by the Latin Square design (cf. Table 6.1). The clarity of
the experiment was confirmed by these participants such that no further changes were
required.
As mentioned earlier, the study was conducted with a total of 30 participants (15
female, 15 male). The participants were unfamiliar with the subject and purpose of
the experiment. The participants’ age ranged between 21 and 38 years. Before the
beginning of the experiment, the participants were asked to read and sign a consent
form. Further, the participants received written instructions as to how to proceed during
the experiment. They also watched an example video and got some example questions
to become familiar with the experiment. The example video was not taken from the 72
recorded videos. Before the participants started with the experiment, they were asked
if they had any clarifying questions. The experiment duration was between 30 and 45
minutes. At the end of the experiment, each participant received five euros and a button
depicting EMMA’s facial expression of happy as a thank-you gift for their willingness to
participate.
6.2.3 Results
After successful collection of the participants’ ratings, a statistical analysis of the col-
lected data was conducted. In the following, the results of the statistical analysis of the
data are reported for the questionnaire presented after each shown video and for the
post experimental questionnaires.
Questionnaire after each video
We began the analysis of the rating data by calculating themean rating by condition for
each of the five questionnaire items (see Table 6.2) for participants and items (i.e. videos)
separately. Next, we performed an omnibus mixed design two-way ANOVA using
participants and items as random effects. Condition (3 levels: neutral liking, medium
liking, maximum liking) was a within-participant factor, while gender (2 levels: male,
female) was a within-participants in the ANOVA by participants and a within-items in
the ANOVA by items. The results of the omnibus ANOVA show a significant effect of
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condition for all five questionnaire items. However, no significant effect of gender was
found nor did the gender factor interact with condition in any of the questionnaire items.
Accordingly, we did not carry out any further tests involving the gender factor.
To assess how the conditions differ from each other, we next performed a series of
planned pairwise comparisons by participants and items. As the participant and
item comparisons yielded similar results, in the following sections for simplicity’s sake,
we present the results for the participants’ analyses. To address the concern that some
of our data may not be normally distributed, we also performed non-parametric tests
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Mann-Whitney test). These gave the same results as
the parametric pairwise comparisons which are reported in the following sections. In the
following, the names of the three conditions are abbreviated to neutLike for the neutral
liking condition, to medLike for the medium liking condition, and to maxLike for the
maximum liking condition.
Expression of empathy Participants’ perception of EMMA’s expression of empathy
(facial expression and speech prosody) was measured using the first two questionnaire
items listed in Table 6.2. The mean values of the ratings and their standard errors for
each condition are listed in Table 6.7 and are visualized in Figure 6.15 respectively for the
first and the second questionnaire item. Further, the results of the pairwise comparisons
of the ratings in the three conditions are listed in Table 6.8. 
Condition  
 
Measure 
 
 
neutLike 
 
 
medLike 
 
maxLike 
 
Facial 
expression 
 
 
M = 0.883 
(SE = 0.157) 
 
M = -0.483 
(SE = 0.103) 
 
M = -1.554 
(SE = 0.135) 
 
 
 
Expression of 
empathy 
 
 
Speech 
prosody 
 
 
M = 0.521 
(SE = 0.173) 
 
M = -0.550 
(SE = 0.110) 
 
M = -1.592 
(SE = 0.123)  
Table 6.7: Mean values (M ) and their standard errors (SE ) showing participants’ per-
ception of EMMA’s expression of empathy.
Regarding the ratings of EMMA’s facial expression in the last frames of the pre-
sented videos, the mean values show that EMMA’s facial expression was rated as showing
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neutLike  
medLike 
maxLike 
‐2 
‐1,5 
‐1 
‐0,5 
0 
0,5 
1 
1,5 
Mean values for facial expression      
neutLike 
medLike 
maxLike 
‐2 
‐1,5 
‐1 
‐0,5 
0 
0,5 
1 
Mean values for speech prosody 
Figure 6.15: Visualization of the mean values and their standard errors showing partic-
ipants’ perception of EMMA’s expression of empathy. 
Pairwise Comparisons  
 
Measure 
 
 
neutLike  
vs. 
medLike 
 
 
medLike  
vs. 
maxLike 
 
maxLike  
vs. 
neutLike 
 
Facial 
expression 
 
 
MD = 1.367*** 
(SE = 0.156) 
(CI = [1.047:1.687]) 
 
 
MD = 1.071*** 
(SE = 0.131) 
(CI = [0.802:1.339]) 
 
 
MD = 2.438*** 
(SE = 0.195) 
(CI = [2.038:2.837]) 
 
 
 
 
Expression of 
empathy 
  
Speech 
prosody 
 
 
MD = 1.071*** 
(SE = 0.173) 
(CI = [0.717:1.425]) 
 
 
MD = 1.042*** 
(SE = 0.150) 
(CI = [0.735:1.348]) 
 
 
MD = 2.113*** 
(SE = 0.241) 
(CI = [1.619:2.606]) 
  
Table 6.8: Pairwise comparisons of the ratings in the three conditions regarding partici-
pants’ perception of EMMA’s expression of empathy. MD refers to mean difference, SE
refers to standard error of the difference, CI refers to the 95% confidence interval for
the difference; ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < .001.
a positive mood in the neutral liking condition (M = 0.883), as showing a slightly nega-
tive mood in the medium liking condition (M = −0.438), and as showing a more negative
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mood in the maximum liking condition (M = −1.554). The results of the pairwise com-
parisons show that the three conditions were rated as significantly different from each
other (p < .001).
Regarding the ratings of EMMA’s speech prosody in the last frames of the presented
videos, the mean values show that EMMA’s speech prosody was rated as slightly positive
in the neutral liking condition (M = 0.521), as slightly negative in the medium liking
condition (M = −0.550), and as more negative in the maximum liking condition (M =
−1.592). As for the ratings of EMMA’s facial expression, the results of the pairwise
comparisons show that the three conditions were rated as significantly different from
each other (p < .001).
Degree of empathy Participants’ perception of EMMA’s expressed degree of empathy
was measured using the third questionnaire item listed in Table 6.2. The mean ratings
for this item and their standard errors for each condition are listed in Table 6.9 and are
visualized in Figure 6.16. Further, the results of the pairwise comparisons of the ratings
in the three conditions are reported in Table 6.10.     
Condition  
 
Measure 
 
 
neutLike 
 
 
medLike 
 
maxLike 
Degree of empathy 
 
M = 0.458 
(SE = 0.189) 
 
 
M = 0.992 
(SE = 0.132) 
 
M = 1.608 
(SE = 0.144)  
Table 6.9: Mean values (M ) and their standard errors (SE ) showing participants’ per-
ception of EMMA’s expressed degree of empathy.
The mean values show that EMMA was rated as slightly feeling with MAX in the
neutral liking condition (M = 0.458) and as progressively more feeling with MAX in
the medium liking condition (M = 0.992) and the maximum liking condition (M =
1.608) respectively. As for EMMA’s expression of empathy, the results of the pairwise
comparisons show that the three conditions were rated as significantly different from
each other (p < .001).
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neutLike 
medLike 
maxLike 
0 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 
1 
1,2 
1,4 
1,6 
1,8 
2 
Mean values for degree of empathy 
Figure 6.16: Visualization of the mean values and their standard errors showing partic-
ipants’ perception of EMMA’s expressed degree of empathy.
Pairwise Comparisons  
 
 
Measure 
 
 
neutLike 
vs. 
medLike 
 
 
medLike 
vs. 
maxLike 
 
maxLike 
vs. 
neutLike 
Degree of empathy 
 
MD = 0.533*** 
(SE = 0.135) 
(CI = [0.256:0.810]) 
 
 
MD = 0.617*** 
(SE = 0.124) 
(CI = [0.363:0.871]) 
 
MD = 1.150*** 
(SE = 0.219) 
(CI = [0.702:1.598])  
Table 6.10: Pairwise comparisons of the ratings in the three conditions regarding partici-
pants’ perception of EMMA’s expressed degree of empathy.MD refers to mean difference,
SE refers to standard error of the difference, CI refers to the 95% confidence interval
for the difference; ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < .001.
Values of relationship Participants’ acknowledgment of different values of relationship
between EMMA and MAX was measured using the fourth questionnaire item listed in
Table 6.2. The values of the mean ratings and their standard errors for each condition
are reported in Table 6.11 and are visualized in Figure 6.17. The results of the pairwise
comparisons of the ratings in the three conditions are reported in Table 6.12.
The mean values show that EMMA’s value of relationship to MAX was rated as
slightly positive in the neutral liking condition (M = 0.325), and as progressively more
positive in the medium liking condition (M = 0.888) and the maximum liking condition
(M = 1.442) respectively. As for EMMA’s expression of empathy and her expressed
degree of empathy, the results of the pairwise comparisons show that the three conditions
were rated as significantly different from each other (p < .001).
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Condition  
 
Measure 
 
 
neutLike 
 
 
medLike 
 
maxLike 
Values of relationship 
 
M = 0.325 
(SE = 0.177) 
 
 
M = 0.888 
(SE = 0.127) 
 
M = 1.442 
(SE = 0.120)  
Table 6.11: Mean values (M ) and their standard errors (SE ) showing participants’
acknowledgment of different values of relationship between EMMA and MAX.
neutLike 
medLike 
maxLike 
0 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 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Figure 6.17: Visualization of the mean values and their standard errors showing partic-
ipants’ acknowledgment of different values of relationship between EMMA and MAX.
Pairwise Comparisons  
 
 
Measure 
 
 
neutLike 
vs. 
medLike 
 
 
medLike 
vs. 
maxLike 
 
maxLike 
vs. 
neutLike 
Values of relationship 
 
MD = 0.563*** 
(SE = 0.132) 
(CI = [0.292:0.833]) 
 
 
MD = 0.554*** 
(SE = 0.105) 
(CI = [0.338:0.770]) 
 
MD = 1.117*** 
(SE = 0.196) 
(CI = [0.716:1.518])  
Table 6.12: Pairwise comparisons of the ratings in the three conditions regarding par-
ticipants’ acknowledgment of different values of relationship between EMMA and MAX.
MD refers to mean difference, SE refers to standard error of the difference, CI refers to
the 95% confidence interval for the difference; ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < .001.
Likability Participants’ likability of EMMA was measured using the fifth questionnaire
item listed in Table 6.2. The values of the mean ratings and their standard errors for
each condition are reported in Table 6.13 and are visualized in Figure 6.18. The results
of the pairwise comparisons of the ratings in the three conditions are reported in Table
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6.14.
Condition  
 
Measure 
 
 
neutLike 
 
 
medLike 
 
maxLike 
Likability 
 
M = 0.250 
(SE = 0.125) 
 
 
M = 0.500 
(SE = 0.118) 
 
M = 0.746 
(SE = 0.161)  
Table 6.13: Mean values (M ) and their standard errors (SE ) showing participants’
likability of EMMA.
neutLike 
medLike 
maxLike 
0 
0,1 
0,2 
0,3 
0,4 
0,5 
0,6 
0,7 
0,8 
0,9 
1 
Mean values for likability 
Figure 6.18: Visualization of the mean values and their standard errors showing partic-
ipants’ likability of EMMA.
Pairwise Comparisons  
 
 
Measure 
 
neutLike  
vs. 
medLike 
 
 
medLike  
vs. 
maxLike 
 
maxLike  
vs. 
neutLike 
Likability 
 
MD = 0.250ns 
(SE = 0.134) 
(CI = [-0.025:0.525]) 
 
 
MD = 0.246ns 
(SE = 0.136) 
(CI = [-0.033:0.525]) 
 
MD = 0.496** 
(SE = 0.195) 
(CI = [0.096:0.896])  
Table 6.14: Pairwise comparisons of the ratings in the three conditions regarding par-
ticipants’ likability of EMMA MD refers to mean difference, SE refers to standard
error of the difference, CI refers to the 95% confidence interval for the difference;
∗∗ = p < .05, ns = p > .07.
The mean values show that EMMA was rated as slightly likable in the neutral liking
condition (M = 0.250) and as progressively more likable in the medium liking condition
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(M = 0.500) and the maximum liking condition (M = 0.746) respectively. The results of
the pairwise comparisons show a significant difference only between the first and third
conditions (p < .05).
First post-experimental questionnaire
In the following, the results of the evaluation of participants’ ratings for the questionnaire
items in the first post-experimental questionnaire (see Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6) are
reported. After adjusting for reverse scoring, the mean values of the ratings were
calculated for each questionnaire item except for the first where participants were asked
to report their understanding of the content presented in the videos.
Understanding of the content presented in the videos Participants’ understanding
of the content presented in the videos was evaluated by asking them to describe the
general story shown in the videos, and if they could discern any perceived differences in
their content.
In their answers, most of the participants reported that Lisa first praised EMMA and
then insulted MAX; that MAX defended himself through his answer to Lisa and that
EMMA reacted to Lisa’s insult toward MAX differently. Some of the participants de-
scribed EMMA’s reaction as defending MAX to different degrees. Others described the
story as showing different values of relationship between EMMA and MAX. Five par-
ticipants reported having seen that EMMA’s facial expression changed during MAX’s
response to Lisa, and not immediately after Lisa’s utterance toward MAX. One of the
participants described this behavior of EMMA as unnatural and irritating since EMMA
did not immediately react to Lisa’s utterance toward MAX. Another participant de-
scribed it as natural and likable. A further participant pointed out that EMMA’s reaction
coincided with MAX’s facial expression.
The reported differences perceived in the content of the videos were mainly regarding
EMMA’s facial expression and speech prosody. Seven of the participants reported having
perceived differences only in the facial expressions. Two participants reported having
perceived differences only in the speech prosody. One participant reported differences
in the utterances while three reported no perceived differences at all. With regard to
the perceived differences in EMMA’s facial expressions, some participants described the
differences as showing a neutral, positive, or negative mood while others just described
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the position of the lip corners (upward, downward) and the eye brows (constricted or
not). With regard to EMMA’s speech prosody, the differences were described in terms
of speed, volume, and pitch.
EMMA’s general behavior in the videos EMMA’s general behavior in the videos
was measured using the questionnaire items listed in Table 6.3. The mean values of the
ratings and their standard errors are listed in Table 6.15.
 
Measure 
 
 
Questionnaire item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Facial behavior 
 
“EMMA’s face was expressive: ” 
 
 
“EMMA’s facial expressions were 
exaggerated: ” 
(reverse scored) 
 
 
-0.500 
 
 
1.500 
 
 
0.238 
 
 
0.213 
 
 
Speech behavior 
 
 
“EMMA’s pronunciation was clear: ” 
 
 
“EMMA’s speech was difficult to 
understand: ” 
(reverse scored) 
 
 
-0.666 
 
 
-0.200 
 
 
0.260 
 
 
0.289 
 
 
 
Attention behavior 
 
 
“EMMA had eye contact with Lisa: ” 
 
 
“EMMA never had eye contact with 
MAX: ” 
(reverse scored) 
 
 
1.666 
 
 
1.933 
 
 
0.210 
 
 
0.266 
 
 
Empathic response 
trigger 
 
 
“In the last frame of all presented 
videos, EMMA’s response toward 
Lisa is triggered by MAX’s facial 
expression: ” 
 
“In the last frame of all presented 
videos, EMMA’s response toward 
Lisa is triggered by Lisa’s utterance 
toward MAX: ” 
 
 
-0.366 
 
 
 
 
1.566 
 
 
0.242 
 
 
 
 
0.320 
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Behavior in general 
 
 
“The behavior of EMMA over all 
presented videos was exaggerated: ” 
(reverse scored) 
 
 
1.400 
 
 
0.256 
 
 
Table 6.15: Mean ratings of EMMA’s general behavior in the videos. Note that for
the questionnaire items that are reverse scored, the mean values correspond to these
questionnaire items worded in the reverse.
The mean values of the ratings of the first and second questionnaire items show that
EMMA’ facial expressions were rated as rather inexpressive and as not exaggerated. The
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mean values concerning the ratings of the third and fourth questionnaire items show that
EMMA’s speech was rated as rather difficult to understand and as unclear. The mean
values of the ratings of the next two questionnaire items show that the participants
agreed that EMMA’s attention was toward Lisa and also toward MAX in the presented
videos. Regarding the last two questionnaire items, the mean values show that partici-
pants rather disagreed that MAX’s facial expression triggered EMMA’s response toward
Lisa and agreed that Lisa’s utterance triggered EMMA’s response.
Naturalness of EMMA’s behavior in the videos The naturalness of EMMA’s be-
havior in the videos was measured using the questionnaire items listed in Table 6.4. The
mean values of the ratings and their standard errors are listed in Table 6.16.
 
Measure 
 
 
Questionnaire item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Facial behavior 
 
“EMMA’s facial expressions 
appeared: ” 
 
-1.266 
 
0.248 
 
 
Speech behavior 
 
 
“EMMA’s pronunciation appeared: ” 
 
-2.100 
 
0.173 
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Attention behavior 
 
 
“EMMA’s attention behavior 
appeared: ” 
 
-0.466 
 
0.316 
  
Table 6.16: Mean ratings of the naturalness of EMMA’s behavior in the videos.
The mean values corresponding to the ratings of the first and second questionnaire
items show that EMMA’s facial expressions and pronunciation were rated as artificial.
The mean values corresponding to the ratings of the third questionnaire item show that
EMMA’s attention behavior was rated as rather artificial. The mean value of the ratings
of all questionnaire items shows that EMMA’s overall expressive behavior was rated as
artificial.
EMMA’s social behavior over all presented videos EMMA’s social behavior over
all presented videos was measured using the questionnaire items listed in Table 6.5.
The mean values of the ratings and their standard errors are listed in Table 6.17. The
mean values of the ratings of all questionnaire items show that EMMA was rated as a
cooperative, a caring, a protective, and a social agent.
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Measure 
 
 
Questionnaire item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Error 
Cooperative 
 
“EMMA is a cooperative agent: ” 
 
1.033 0.188 
Caring 
 
“EMMA is an uncaring agent: ” 
(reverse scored) 
 
1.200 0.285 
Protective 
 
“EMMA is a protective agent: ” 
 
1.200 0.241 
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Social 
 
“EMMA is an asocial agent: ” 
(reverse scored) 
 
1.333 0.300 
 
Table 6.17: Mean ratings of EMMA’s social behavior over all presented videos. Note
that for the questionnaire items that are reverse scored, the mean values correspond to
these questionnaire items worded in the reverse.
General likability of EMMA The general likability of EMMA was measured using
the questionnaire items listed in Table 6.6. The mean values of the ratings and their
standard errors are listed in Table 6.18.
 
Measure 
 
 
Questionnaire item 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Trust 
 
“You would trust EMMA if she were 
your friend: ” 
 
0.100 
 
0.312 
 
 
 
Friendship 
 
“You could not imagine EMMA to be 
your friend: ” 
(reverse scored) 
 
-0.133 
 
0.361 
 
 
Interaction 
 
“You would like to interact with 
EMMA: ” 
 
-0.200 
 
0.360 
 
G
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y 
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 E
M
M
A
 
 
Interest 
 
“You are not interested in EMMA: ” 
(reverse scored) 
 
0.166 0.314 
 
Table 6.18: Mean ratings of the general likability of EMMA. Note that for the question-
naire items that are reverse scored, the mean values correspond to these questionnaire
items worded in the reverse.
The mean values of the ratings of all questionnaire items show that participants would
neither trust nor distrust EMMA as a potential friend, neither imagine nor not imagine
EMMA as a potential friend, neither like nor not like to individually interact with
EMMA, and that participants were neither interested nor not interested in EMMA.
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Second post-experimental questionnaire
A second post-experimental questionnaire measured participants’ Interpersonal Reac-
tivity Index (IRI) [33] as a means to assess empathy. This measure was collected to
test for any correlation that might exist between the participants’ IRI and their ratings
of the five questionnaire items after each shown video. A German version [92] of the
questionnaire proposed in [33] was used. The questionnaire proposed in [33] comprises
four subscales with corresponding questionnaire items to measure different aspects of
participants’ empathy. With the German version of the IRI questionnaire, two aspects
of empathy can be measured using the perspective taking scale and the empathic con-
cern scale. Accordingly, the mean values for each empathy scale were calculated for each
participant. Further, for each of the five questionnaire items listed in Table 6.2, the mean
values of the differences between the ratings of the neutral liking condition and the max-
imum liking condition were calculated for each participant. A Pearson Correlation
between the mean values of the perspective taking and empathic concern scales and the
mean values indicating participants’ differentiation between the neutral and maximum
liking conditions was conducted. No significant correlations were found between partici-
pants’ IRI and their differentiation between the neutral and maximum liking conditions.
Accordingly, our hypothesis that the higher the value of IRI, the more participants can
differentiate between the three conditions of EMMA’s empathy with MAX in their rat-
ings for the five questionnaire items (cf. Section 6.2.2) was not confirmed. Finally, we
report the results of the analysis of participants’ answers during the post-experimental
interview.
Interview: Criteria for rating EMMA’s likability after each presented video
In order to determine the criteria by which participants rated the likability of EMMA
in the three conditions, we conducted a post-experimental interview. The analysis of
the participants’ answers shows that 20 participants rated the likability of EMMA on
the basis of her different reactions toward MAX. That is, the more EMMA was feeling
with MAX, the more she was rated as likable. Two participants reported rating EMMA’s
likability on the basis of her reaction toward Lisa. That is, the more EMMA was friendly
to Lisa, the more she was rated as likable. One of these participants also emphasized
that one’s rude behavior cannot be justified through others’ rude behavior and thus that
EMMA should not be rude because Lisa is behaving that way. Three participants rated
168
6.2 Empirical evaluation
EMMA’s likability on the basis of her feeling with MAX and also of her positive reaction
toward Lisa at the beginning of the video. Two participants reported that EMMA was
rated as neither likable nor unlikable because they were not involved in the observed
interaction. Two other participants also rated EMMA as neither likable nor unlikable
because her observed behavior in the videos was deemed unconvincing and was unnat-
ural. One participant was not able to describe any criteria by means of which he rated
EMMA’s likability after each presented video. In the following, the results of the present
study are discussed and interpreted.
6.2.4 Discussion and conclusion
The results of evaluating participants’ perception of EMMA’s expression of empathy
show that EMMA’s facial expression of happy in the neutral liking condition was
rated as showing a positive mood, that EMMA’s facial expression of concentrated, as
the neutral emotional state, in the medium liking condition was rated as showing a
slightly negative mood, and that EMMA’s facial expression of annoyed in the maxi-
mum liking condition was rated as showing a negative mood. The results also show that
EMMA’s speech prosody for happy in the neutral liking condition was rated as slightly
positive, that EMMA’s speech prosody for concentrated in the medium liking condition
was rated as slightly negative, and that EMMA’s speech prosody for annoyed in the
maximum liking condition was rated as negative. The perceived differences in EMMA’s
expression of empathy are also significant in all three conditions. In sum, the results
show the appropriate recognition of EMMA’s expression of empathy as positive in the
first condition, and as progressively more negative in the second and third conditions
respectively. Hence, the results confirm our first hypothesis, H1, that EMMA’s ex-
pression of empathy is perceivable by the participants, and also suggest the appropriate
modeling of EMMA’s facial expressions and speech prosody.
The results of evaluating participants’ perception of EMMA’s expressed degree of
empathy show that EMMA was rated as slightly feeling with MAX in the neutral lik-
ing condition and as progressively more feeling with MAX in the medium liking and
the maximum liking conditions respectively. The perceived differences in EMMA’s ex-
pressed degree of empathy are also significant in all three conditions. Thus, EMMA’s
degree of empathy with MAX was rated as significantly higher in the maximum liking
condition than in the other two conditions, and as significantly higher in the medium
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liking condition than in the neutral liking condition. Hence, the results confirm our sec-
ond hypothesis, H2, that EMMA’s expressed degree of empathy is perceivable by the
participants. Descriptively, Figures 6.15 and 6.16 show that the more similar partici-
pants’ ratings of EMMA’s expression of empathy to MAX’s expressed emotional state,
the higher the rated value of EMMA’s degree of empathy with MAX. This is in line
with our definition of the degree of empathy as the degree of similarity between one’s
empathic emotion and the other’s perceived emotion (cf. Section 5.3). That is, the more
similar one’s empathic emotion to the other’s perceived emotion, the higher the degree
of empathy. Accordingly, these findings further substantiate the theoretical assumption
underlying our model that empathy occurs to different degrees (cf. Section 2.1). Further-
more, the results show that EMMA’s facial expression and speech prosody are reliable
indicators of her different degrees of empathy, thus providing further support for the
appropriate modeling of EMMA’s facial expressions and speech prosody.
The results of evaluating participants’ acknowledgment of different values of rela-
tionship between EMMA and MAX show that EMMA’s value of relationship to MAX
was rated as slightly positive in the neutral liking condition, and as progressively more
positive in the medium liking and maximum liking conditions respectively. The acknowl-
edged differences in EMMA’s value of relationship to MAX are also significant in all three
conditions. Thus, EMMA’s acknowledged value of relationship was rated as significantly
higher in the maximum liking condition than in the other two conditions, and as signifi-
cantly higher in the medium liking condition than in the neutral liking condition. Hence,
the results confirm our third hypothesis, H3, that human participants acknowledge
different values of relationship between EMMA and MAX according to EMMA’s ex-
pressed degree of empathy. Descriptively, Figures 6.16 and 6.17 show that the higher
the rated value of EMMA’s expressed degree of empathy, the higher the rated value of
her relationship to MAX. This is in line with our definition of the impact of relation-
ship modulation factors such as liking or familiarity in our model. That is, the higher
the values of such modulation factors, the higher the similarity between the empathic
emotion and the other’s perceived emotion, the higher the degree of empathy (cf. Sec-
tion 5.3). These findings further substantiate the theoretical assumption underlying our
proposed model that empathy is modulated by several modulation factors such as the
relationship between the empathizer and the observed other (cf. Section 2.1). Moreover,
the results also show that EMMA’s facial expression and speech prosody are reliable
indicators of her different values of relationship to MAX thus providing further support
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for the appropriate modeling of EMMA’s facial expressions and speech prosody.
The results of evaluating participants’ likability of EMMA show that EMMA was
rated as slightly likable in the neutral liking condition, and as progressively more likable
in the medium liking and maximum liking conditions respectively. However, a signifi-
cant difference was found only between the first and third conditions. These results only
partially support our fourth hypothesis, H4, that EMMA is perceived as more likable
the higher the value of her expressed degree of empathy. In this regard, the analysis of
the reported criteria for rating EMMA’s likability in the three conditions shows that
while most of the participants reported having rated EMMA’s likability on the basis of
her degree of empathy with MAX, others rated EMMA’s likability on the basis of, e.g.,
her positive emotions in the presented video. That is, the more EMMA was friendly
toward Lisa the more she was rated as likable. Accordingly, these participants may have
interpreted EMMA’s expression of a positive emotion, together with a verbal expression
of empathy as a more convenient way to communicate the inappropriateness of Lisa’s
behavior toward MAX. Thus, a more conservative empathic behavior in such conflict
situations seems to be more appreciated by these participants. This issue could be ad-
dressed by taking social norms and rules into account in the computational modeling
of empathy, since they may allow for masking the ’true feeling’ of strong empathy in
such situations.
Evaluation of participants’ understanding of the content presented in the videos shows
that the participants clearly understood the scenario shown in the videos. Most of the
participants reported differences with regard to EMMA’s facial expression and speech
prosody, while in turn, most of these participants reported differences only in terms of
EMMA’s facial expression. Some of the participants reported the perceived differences
in terms of expressive features such as lip corners (upward, downward), eye brows (con-
stricted or not) and speech volume, speed, and pitch which characterize EMMA’s facial
expressions and speech prosody. These findings provide further support for the appro-
priate modeling of EMMA’s facial expressions and speech prosody and further confirm
our first hypothesis H1. However, the results of evaluating EMMA’s general behavior
in the videos show that EMMA’s facial expressions were rated as rather inexpressive
and artificial and that her speech was rated as rather unclear and also artificial. In
this regard, further evaluations of EMMA’s facial expressions and speech prosody are
needed to improve their expressiveness and naturalness and to thus further improve their
appropriate modeling.
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Further, most of the participants agreed that Lisa’s response to MAX triggered
EMMA’s response to Lisa, and disagreed that MAX’s facial expression triggered EMMA’s
response to Lisa. However, some of the participants reported having seen that EMMA’s
facial expressions changed during MAX’s utterance and not immediately after Lisa’s
utterance, and only one participant recognized that EMMA’s reaction coincided with
MAX’s facial expression. Thus, it was difficult to recognize that EMMA’s reaction to-
ward Lisa was in response to her perception of MAX’s facial expressions during facial
mimicry (cf. Sections 6.1.1 and 5.2.1). While we expected to obtain this result, we were
interested to know if some of the participants recognized this behavior in EMMA, and
in fact it was interesting to see that one of the participants did.
In general, EMMA was rated as neither likable nor unlikable. This could be explained
by the fact that the participants were not directly involved in the interaction with
EMMA. This aspect was reported in the criteria of rating EMMA’s likability as neutral
in the three conditions. However, overall EMMA was rated as a cooperative, a caring, a
protective, and a social agent.
According to the results of the study reported in Section 4.3, EMMA’s neutral facial
expression was rated by participants as displeased, as aroused, and as submissive (see
Table 4.1, p. 83). As compared to this, in the present study, EMMA’s facial expression in
the medium liking condition, which is very similar to EMMA’s neutral facial expression,
was rated as showing a slightly negative mood, and thus as more neutral than EMMA’s
facial expression in the previous study. A crucial difference between the studies is that in
the above mentioned study, EMMA’s facial expression was presented in a static context,
while in the present study EMMA’s facial expression was presented in a dynamic con-
text alongside other facial expressions of emotion. This further supports Russell’s [100]
emphasis that the meaning of facial expressions is not absolute but relative, and that
facial expressions do not come with single values. However, EMMA’s appearance in the
above mentioned study was a little different from her current appearance, which may
have influenced participants’ ratings. Thus, more evaluations should be done in order to
further investigate this issue.
Altogether, the results of the present study show that EMMA’s expression of empathy,
as generated by our computational model of empathy was appropriately recognized by
the participants and is a reliable indicator of EMMA’s degree of empathy, and her value
of relationship to MAX. Accordingly, the results further corroborate the theories and
findings underlying our model. A highlight is that the present study is one of the
172
6.3 Summary and conclusion
first studies in this field to consider three conditions showing three different degrees of
empathy thus allowing for a more refined and fine grained evaluation of the output of
the model and of its underlying parameters.
6.3 Summary and conclusion
This chapter introduced the application and evaluation of our computational model of
empathy. In Section 6.1, we presented the application of our model in a conversational
agent scenario and in a spatial interaction task scenario. In the conversational agent
scenario, the virtual humans MAX [62] and EMMA (see Chapter 4) and a human inter-
action partner were involved. In this scenario, EMMA empathizes with MAX to different
degrees depending on hermood and defined values of relationship (liking and familiarity)
to MAX. In this scenario, we applied the empathy mechanism facial mimicry (see Sec-
tion 5.2.1) and showed how by means of a very simple form of the empathy mechanism
situational role-taking (see Section 5.2.2), EMMA infers an explicit value of dominance
for MAX. This can be considered a first step toward combining the hypotheses about
the other’s emotional state as generated by both mechanisms to get a more adequate
hypothesis. EMMA’s different degrees of empathy are expressed by her facial expres-
sion, speech prosody, and breathing and eye blinking behaviors. EMMA also expresses
a verbal utterance advising the human partner to continue being kind to MAX or to
stop being unfriendly to MAX. In this scenario, we illustrated the different processing
steps underlying our empathy model. In light of the requirement Adequacy (cf. Section
1.2), different values of the modulation factors, liking, familiarity, and EMMA’s mood
were tried and combined to check the adequacy of the empathic behavior provided by
our model. Accordingly, EMMA’s empathic behavior reflected the empathic behavior
generated by our model, and was as expected in line with the underlying theories.
Further in Section 6.1, we presented the application of our model in a spatial in-
teraction task scenario. As compared to the conversational agent scenario where
agent-agent interaction was considered, this scenario involved the virtual human MAX
and a human interaction partner. In this scenario, MAX empathizes with his human
interaction partner to different degrees depending on the values of the modulation fac-
tors liking, deservingness, and MAX’s mood. In this scenario, we applied the empathy
mechanism situational role-taking. A highlight in this scenario is that MAX’s de-
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gree of empathy triggers and modulates his spatial helping action. That is, the quality
and distance of the helping movement are modulated by MAX’s calculated value of de-
gree of empathy. Accordingly, the more MAX empathizes with his partner, the more
he helps the partner by rapidly putting needed objects in front of him. This is in line
with Hoffman’s and Davis’s emphasis that empathy is a motivational basis for prosocial
cooperative behavior such as helping and caring [55] [34]. On the other hand, MAX’s
value of liking is based on the partner’s investment in helping actions. That is, the more
the partner helps MAX, the more MAX likes his partner, empathizes, and in turn, helps
him. This is in line with Davis’s emphasis that the ability for empathy impacts one’s
social behavior and thus one’s relationship with others [34]. In light of the requirement
Adequacy, MAX’s empathic behavior according to different values of the modulation
factors reflects the empathic behavior generated by our model, and was as expected in
line with the underlying theories.
In light of the requirement Universality, our approach to empathy modulation was
easily carried over to both considered scenarios. In this regard, extensions were made
only for defining liking and familiarity as modulation factors in the first application
scenario, and liking and deservingness in the second.
In order to further investigate the adequacy of the empathic behavior generated by our
model, an empirical evaluation was conducted with the purpose of evaluating human
participants’ perception and interpretation of the generated behavior. This was subject
to Section 6.2. The empirical evaluation was conducted in the conversational agent sce-
nario to evaluate EMMA’s empathic behavior toward MAX. In this regard, we defined
three conditions where different degrees of empathy were considered, a neutral liking con-
dition, a medium liking condition, and a maximum liking condition. The results show
that EMMA’s different degrees of empathy were perceived by human participants, and
that the human participants also acknowledged different values of relationship between
EMMA and MAX according to EMMA’s degree of empathy. Thus, EMMA’s expres-
sion of empathy, as a reflection of the empathic behavior generated by our model was
a reliable indicator of her different degrees of empathy and of her different values of
relationship to MAX. Thus, in light of the requirement Adequacy, our findings further
substantiate the adequacy of the empathic behavior generated by our model.
In conclusion, the application and evaluation of our model shows that it provides ade-
quate empathic behavior, and that the virtual human EMMA is perceived as capable of
exhibiting different degrees of empathy and values of relationship with MAX. Further-
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more, the findings of our empirical evaluation provided further support for the theories
and assumptions underlying the model. Thus, our model enhances a virtual human’s
social behavior and provides an experimental tool for underlying theories.
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As motivated in the introduction (see Chapter 1), the goal of the present thesis is
to provide a computational model of empathy to enhance an artificial agent’s social
behavior, and to provide an experimental tool for the psychological theories shaping
the model. In light of the requirements to achieve these objectives (cf. Chapter 1), the
results and contribution of this thesis are summarized and discussed in Section 7.1 of
this chapter. Subsequently, in Section 7.2, future desirable extensions to further improve
the presented work are described.
7.1 Results and contribution
In our attempt to achieve our thesis objectives, a careful consideration of the theoretical
background on empathy and of previous works on empathic artificial agents, as pre-
sented respectively in Chapters 2 and 3, was carried out. Accordingly, we defined the
requirements to achieve our objectives (see Sections 1.2 and 3.3.3). In this regard, we de-
fined three requirements for building a computational model of empathy that addresses
three central processes to empathy, Empathy Mechanism, Empathy Modulation,
and Expression of Empathy. As such, the present thesis provided a computational
model of empathy (see Chapter 5) based on three processing steps: first, the empathy
mechanism as the process by which an empathic emotion is produced; second, the em-
pathy modulation as the process by which the empathic emotion produced in the first
step is modulated; and third, the expression of empathy as the process by which the
empathic emotion modulated in the second step is expressed. Our empathy model is
realized for the virtual humans MAX [62] and EMMA (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, we
defined two requirements that a computational model of empathy should fulfill, Ade-
quacy and Universality. In light of the above mentioned requirements, the results and
contribution of the present thesis are summarized and discussed in the following.
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Empathy mechanism
Following the theoretical background on empathy presented in Section 2.1, we realized
two empathy mechanisms for our model, facial mimicry (see Section 5.2.1) and situa-
tional role-taking (see Section 5.2.2).
Facial mimicry as defined in our model has found little attention in previous works
on empathic artificial agents (cf. Section 3.3), except in the work by Breazeal et al. [21]
where only the imitation step was considered. Accordingly, by means of our realization
of facial mimicry, the new virtual human EMMA internally imitates a perceived facial
expression by first mapping perceived facial features to Action Units (AUs) (internal
imitation), and by subsequently determining its related emotional state (emotional feed-
back). Our realization of facial mimicry is based on EMMA’s facial expression repertoire
as a shared representational system where AUs are linked to Pleasure-Arousal-
Dominance (PAD) values. That is, by combining the meanings of AUs within PAD
space, a PAD value is determined from a perceived emotional facial expression. A first
evaluation of our realization of facial mimicry shows promising results in that it de-
termines quite accurate PAD values from the virtual human MAX’s facial expressions
of emotion, and in that the determined PA values mimic the course of intensities of his
facial muscles. Thus, our approach allows for the recognition of a wide range of emo-
tional states and is not limited to the recognition of a predefined number of emotion
categories. This is in line with the emphasis that dimensional emotion models allow for
the recognition of a wide range of emotional states, and that they are more convenient for
characterizing the continuity and subtlety of emotion expression. However, in previous
works on automatic emotion recognition, little attention was devoted to emotion recog-
nition using a dimensional rather than a categorical approach, in particular, regarding
emotion recognition from facial expressions (cf. Section 3.2.2).
As compared to the computational model of empathy provided by Rodrigues et al. [98],
both facial mimicry and situational role-taking are considered separately in our model.
However, a first step toward combining these mechanisms is that we used the value of
dominance inferred by situational role-taking, as context related information to
improve emotion recognition from facial expressions in our realization of facial mimicry
(see Section 6.1.1).
The perceived emotional state produced by facial mimicry or situational role-taking
is simulated within the virtual human’s emotion simulation module [8] and is thus rep-
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resented in his PAD space (see Section 5.2.3). Accordingly, by means of our defined con-
dition of elicitation of an empathic emotion, empathy is not only elicited in response to
the saliency of a perceived emotional state but also in response to the dynamic change
in the perceived emotional state. Thus, empathy can be elicited, e.g., in response to a
neutral emotional state as resulting from a rapid and salient change in emotions. This
further substantiates the convenience of dimensional emotion models in characterizing
the continuity and dynamics of emotional states. Furthermore, the simulation of an em-
pathic emotion within the virtual human’s emotion simulation module allowed for the
simulation of the time course of an empathic emotion, and of its interaction with the
virtual human’s emotional state. As in the theoretical models of empathy, this issue was
not explicitly and clearly addressed in most of the previous works.
Empathy modulation
By means of our realization of empathy modulation (see Section 5.3), a virtual human
is allowed to empathize to different degrees depending on several modulation factors,
e.g., his mood and his relationship to the other. Accordingly, our approach allows for the
modulation of an empathic emotion through the factor empathizer’s mood and through
further arbitrary predefined factors that can have values ranging in [0, 1], e.g., liking,
familiarity, and deservingness. Furthermore, it also allows for the assignment of differ-
ent weight values for these factors to define which have a more significant impact on
modulating the empathic emotion than others. Further, regions of immediate neighbor-
hood for each emotion category located in PAD space were defined where a modulated
empathic emotion from different type (emotion category) but compatible with the non-
modulated one is facilitated. Accordingly, a degree of empathy is calculated as the
degree of similarity between a modulated empathic emotion and a non-modulated one
within the defined regions of immediate neighborhood. In this regard, we rely on the
thesis of the dimensional emotion theories that emotions are related to one another in
a systematic manner and that their relationships can be represented in a dimensional
model (cf. Section 2.2). Hence, we exploited the assumed relationships between emotions
in PAD space.
In previous works on empathic artificial agents, little attention was devoted to the con-
sideration of different degrees of empathy which is a crucial aspect in further enhancing
an artificial agent’s social behavior (cf. Section 3.3). Furthermore, in previous works,
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where this issue is addressed, only the intensity of an empathic emotion is modulated.
In contrast, our realization of empathy modulation also allows for the modulation of the
type (emotion category) of the empathic emotion. This is in agreement with Hoffman’s
underscoring that an empathic response need not to be a close match to the affect ex-
perienced by the other, but can be any emotional reaction compatible with the other’s
situation [55] (cf. Section 2.1.2).
Expression of Empathy
In our computational model of empathy, a virtual human is allowed to have a multi-
modal expression of empathy (see Section 5.4). That is, the virtual human is allowed
to express empathy based on his repertoire of multiple modalities such as facial expres-
sions, speech prosody, eye blinking and breathing behaviors, verbal utterances, and spa-
tial helping actions. A highlight is the virtual human EMMA’s elaborate model of facial
expressions (cf. Section 4.3) which also underlies our realization of facial mimicry, and
hence EMMA’s ability for facial mimicry. In this regard, we investigated the meaning
of single AUs within PAD space and how it contributes to the meaning of a whole facial
expression of emotion. As a result, we provided three-dimensional intensity functions for
each AU within PAD space, which we combined to reconstruct a facial expression reper-
toire. The provided repertoire comprises quite accurate facial expressions of EMMA
that reflect the trajectories of the time course of her emotions within PAD space. Thus,
EMMA is allowed to express a wide range of emotional states rather than a limited
set of emotion categories. This is in line with the emphasis that dimensional emotion
models allow for the expression of a wide range of emotional states, and that they are
more inclined for characterizing the continuity and subtlety of emotion expression (cf.
Section 3.2.1).
Adequacy
The adequacy of the empathic behavior provided by our empathy model was verified in
the context of its application and evaluation in a context scenario (see Chapter 6). Thus,
we applied our model in two different interaction scenarios, a conversational agent
scenario and a spatial interaction task scenario. Furthermore, an empirical evaluation of
our model in the context of the conversational agent scenario was performed.
The application of our model in the conversational agent scenario (see Section
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6.1.1) shows that the virtual human EMMA is able of empathizing with the virtual
human MAX to different degrees, depending on her mood and her defined values of
relationship to MAX. In this regard, different values and weights of the modulation fac-
tors liking and familiarity as well as different values of EMMA’s mood were considered
to check the adequacy of EMMA’s empathic behavior in consequence to the changing
values of these factors. EMMA’s empathic behavior in this scenario reflected the em-
pathic behavior generated by our model, and was as expected in line with the theories
underlying the model.
The application of our model in the spatial interaction task scenario (see Section
6.1.2) shows that the virtual human MAX is able of empathizing with a human interac-
tion partner to different degrees depending on his mood and on the values of liking and
deservingness as further modulation factors. As compared to the conversational agent
scenario where the values of the modulation factors liking and familiarity are prede-
fined, in the spatial interaction task scenario, the values of liking and deservingness are
inferred according to the interaction context. A highlight is that MAX’s spatial helping
action is triggered and modulated by his degree of empathy with his interaction partner.
In this regard, the quality of MAX’s spatial helping movement, as well as its distance,
are modulated by the degree of empathy. That is, the more MAX empathizes with his
partner, the closer and faster he places needed objects in front of the partner and thus
the more he invested in helping him. This is in line with Hoffman’s and Davis’ empha-
sis that empathy is a motivational basis of prosocial and cooperative behaviors such as
helping and caring [55] [34] (cf. Section 2.1.2). Furthermore, MAX’s value of liking is
inferred based on his partner’s investment in helping actions and thus on his partner’s
hypothesized degree of empathy. This is in line with Davis’ emphasis [34] that one’s
ability for empathy impacts one’s social behavior which is perceived by others, and
which thus influences one’s social relationships with others (cf. Section 2.1.2). MAX’s
empathic behavior during interaction to cooperatively build a tower of virtual toy blocks
reflected the empathic behavior generated by our model, and concurred with the theories
underlying the model. This further substantiates the adequacy of the empathic behavior
generated by our model.
In order to investigate how the empathic behavior generated by our model is perceived
and interpreted by human participants and thus to further verify its adequacy, we con-
ducted an empirical evaluation of the model (see Section 6.2). The evaluation was
performed in the context of the conversational agent scenario where three different
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conditions regarding EMMA’s degree of empathy were considered. The results show
that EMMA’s expression of empathy (facial expression and speech prosody) was appro-
priately recognized in all three conditions and that it was a reliable indicator of EMMA’s
degree of empathy and her value of relationship to MAX. These findings further support
our claim that the empathic behavior generated by our model concurs with underlying
theories, and further substantiates them. A highlight is that this study is one of the first
studies in this field to consider three conditions showing different degrees of empathy,
thus allowing for a more fine-grained evaluation of the output of the model as well as of
its underlying parameters. Taken together, the application and evaluation of our model
in a context scenario suggest that our model provides adequate empathic behavior
which is in line with underlying theories and hypotheses.
Universality
Regarding the empathy mechanism, our realization of facial mimicry can be easily
carried over in different interaction scenarios of the virtual human EMMA. In contrast,
our realization of situational role-taking requires a context scenario and is thus domain
dependent. Regarding our realization of empathy modulation, once the modulation
factors are defined, the modulation of the empathic emotion and the calculation of
different degrees of empathy can be easily carried over to different context scenarios, e.g.,
the conversational agent scenario and the spatial interaction task scenario considered in
the present work. In this regard, adaptations were only carried out for the definition
of the modulation factors such as liking and familiarity in the first scenario, and liking
and deservingness in the second. Regarding the expression of empathy, we defined
context independent expressions such as facial expressions, speech prosody, and eye
blinking and breathing behaviors. All in all, our model is not entirely universal but is so
in several of its components making it easier to apply and adapt to different scenarios
as demonstrated in the present thesis.
Conclusion
In light of the objectives of this thesis, a computational model of empathy is provided
that allows a virtual human to empathize with his interaction partner to different degrees,
and to express his degree of empathy by means of different modalities. The adequacy of
the empathic behavior provided by our model was verified and confirmed in the context
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of its application in two interaction scenarios, and of its empirical evaluation. In this
regard, the findings show that the virtual human was perceived by human participants
as capable of exhibiting different degrees of empathy, and of having different values of
relationship with his interaction partner. Thus, our model satisfies our objective that it
enhances a virtual human’s social behavior.
Furthermore, different parameters are defined in our model that allow for the con-
cretization and investigation of several theoretical aspects of empathy that are not ex-
plicitly and clearly defined in the theoretical models of empathy. Hence, our model
satisfies our objective to provide an experimental tool for underlying theories and
assumptions. This issue was further supported by the findings of the empirical evalua-
tion of the model where a fine-grained evaluation of the values of our model parameters
was successfully performed, thus substantiating the model’s underlying theories and
hypotheses.
7.2 Future work
While much effort was invested in our attempt to achieve the thesis objectives, more
effort is needed to further improve our work on empathy. Accordingly, our approach
to determine PAD values from AUs displaying emotions should be further investigated
on the basis of human data provided by an automatic AU recognition system, or
by a database of emotional facial expressions annotated with AUs and their intensity
values. Thus, the aim is to allow for the application of facial mimicry, as defined in
our model, in the context of human-agent interaction. As presented in Section 3.2.2,
there are several works on automatic AU recognition. However, it was not possible to
get such a system in the context of the present thesis since this field is still in its
beginning stages. Further, while expressive cues such as facial expressions may present
a valid source of information about others’ emotional states, contextual cues remain
another possible source of information. Thus, the integration of information about the
other’s emotional state as provided by expressive and by contextual cues may allow for
a more adequate recognition of the other’s emotional state. This issue was addressed
in previous works on empathic artificial agents (e.g., [98] and [69], see Section 3.3)
and should be taken into account in our model. In this regard, a future work is to
combine the hypotheses about the other’s emotional state provided by facial mimicry
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and situational role-taking to show how they can complement each other to obtain an
explicit and a more adequate hypothesis. A first step was carried out by using the value of
dominance inferred by situational role-taking as context related information to improve
emotion recognition from facial expressions in our realization of facial mimicry. Another
interesting aspect is the distinction between primary and secondary emotions as defined
in the virtual human’s emotion simulation module [8]. In this regard, our model generates
only primary emotions as empathic emotions. Accordingly, by means of facial mimicry, a
facial expression showing the secondary emotion relief is likely to be falsely interpreted
as showing the primary emotion happy. Thus, the aim is to enhance our realization of
situational role-taking to the generation of secondary emotions as empathic emotions
such as relief. Furthermore, also individual role-taking could be addressed to allow
for the consideration of the other’s beliefs, desires, and goals, and to thus allow for
non-egocentric empathy. In the context of the project part A1 ’Modelling Partners’ (see
Chapter 1), a joint-attention framework was developed by Pfeiffer-Lessmann et al. [93]
that allows for cognitive partner modeling, e.g., the partner’s beliefs, desires, and goals.
Thus, this information could be used for the realization of individual role-taking.
Regarding our realization of empathy modulation, the proposed approach can be ex-
tended to retrieving the values of modulation factors such as liking and familiarity from
a person memory as proposed by Mattar & Wachsmuth [74]. Further, personality factors
are defined in the virtual human’s emotion simulation module [8], for example, factors
impacting how emotional (e.g., temperamental vs. lethargic) the virtual human is. Ac-
cordingly, the impact of these personality factors on modulating the virtual human’s
empathic emotion could be investigated in our future work. We also aim to consider
further modulation factors (cf. Table 5.2) as, for example, similarity. An interesting
aspect might be to extend our approach to the consideration of negative empathic
emotions such as gloating or resentment by extending the values of modulation factors
such as liking or deservingness to negative ones (cf. [88], see Section 2.1). This issue
would, for example, allow for the modeling of a virtual human’s competitive behavior
such as placing needed objects out of reach from his interaction partner in the spatial
interaction task scenario presented in Section 6.1.2.
In his theoretical model of empathy, Davis [34] distinguishes between affective and
cognitive intrapersonal outcomes of empathic processes (cf. Section 2.1.2). While in our
empathy model only affective outcomes are considered, cognitive outcomes could be
subject to future work. For example, consider the situation where one is feeling sadness
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in response to the other’s emotional state of sadness and one knows the other prefers
that one shows a more positive emotional state to alter the other’s negative feeling. In
such situations, the affective outcome of sadness could be masked by showing a positive
emotional state according to the cognitive outcome of estimating the other’s preferences,
thus resulting in a more convenient behavior toward the other. Further, our evaluation
of EMMA’s empathic behavior in the conversational agent scenario shows that some
participants preferred the situations where EMMA was showing a more conservative
empathic behavior. Also in such situations, the affective outcome could be masked by
showing a behavior dictated by the cognitive outcome, resulting from social norms
and rules for a more appropriate social behavior. Such a behavior could be displayed
by so called ’complex facial expressions’ as expressions that are modified with respect to
some socio-cultural rules following the approach proposed by Niewiadomski et al. [84].
In our empirical evaluation of the empathic behavior provided by our model, we consid-
ered three different conditions where the virtual human respectively expresses a positive
emotional state in the neutral liking condition, a neutral emotional state in the medium
liking condition, and a negative emotional state in the maximum liking condition. Ac-
cording to our realization of empathy modulation, the virtual human would express the
emotional state of surprised in the medium liking condition when the empathic emotional
state has anger as its related emotion category (cf. Section 6.2). Accordingly, a future
work could involve evaluating human participants’ perception of the virtual human’s ex-
pressed emotional state surprised in the medium liking condition and its impact on the
perception of his degree of empathy. Furthermore, the evaluation of human participant’s
perception of the modulation factor empathizer’s mood and how it impacts the degree
of empathy could also be considered in future work. Empirical evaluation of the model
in other context scenarios, such as the spatial interaction task scenario presented in
Section 6.1.2, could be performed to further investigate the adequacy of the proposed
model. In the spatial interaction task scenario, the more the partner helps MAX the
more MAX likes his partner, empathizes, and helps him. Thus, by his modulated help-
ing actions, MAX signalizes his human partner’s investment in cooperating with him.
Accordingly, in future work, we aim at empirically evaluating how MAX’s modulated
helping action impacts the partner’s engagement in achieving a successful cooperation.
While significant advances have been made in allowing artificial agents to empathize,
much work remains before they can be considered holders of the human ’helping genes’ !
[55].
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A EMMA’s facial expression repertoire
A.1 The Facial Action Coding System (FACS)
In this section, two tables showing the list of Action Units (AUs) as defined in FACS
and the rules to link AUs to the six basic emotion categories [40] are presented.
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AU  
Number 
AU 
Name 
AU 
Number  AU Name 
Upper Face AUs  Lower Face AUs 1  Inner Brow Raise  9  Nose Wrinkle 2  Outer Brow Raise  10  Upper Lip Raise 4  Brow Lowerer  11  Nasolabial Furrow Deepener 5  Upper Lid Raise  12  Lip Corner Puller 6  Cheek Raise  13  Sharp Lip Puller 7  Lids Tight  14  Dimpler 43  Eyes Close  15  Lip Corner Depressor 45  Blink  16  Lower Lip Depressor 46  Wink  17  Chin Raiser 70  Brows Not Visible  18  Lip Pucker 71  Eyes Not Visible  20  Lip Stretch 
Head Positions  22  Lip Funneler 51  Turn Left  23  Lip Tightener 52  Turn Right  24  Lip Presser 53  Head Up  28  Lip Suck 54  Head Down  72  Lower Face Not Visible 55  Tilt Left  Miscellaneous AUs 56  Tilt Right  8  Lips Toward Each Other 57  Forward  19  Tongue Show 58  Back  21  Neck Tightener 
Eye Positions  29  Jaw Thrust 61  Eyes Left  30  Jaw Sideways 62  Eye Right  31  Jaw Clencher 63  Eyes Up  32  Bite 64  Eyes Down  33  Blow 65  Walleye  34  Puff 66  Crosseye  35  Cheek Suck 
Lip Parting and Jaw Opening  36  Tongue Bulge 25  Lips Part  37  Lip Wipe 26  Jaw Drop  38  Nostril Dilate 27  Mouth Stretch  39  Nostril Compress  
Table A.1: The list of AUs from FACS [40].
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Emotion 
 
Prototypes Major Variants 
Surprise 1+2+5B+26 
1+2+5B+27 
1+2+5B 
1+2+26 
1+2+27 
5B+26 
5B+27 
 
Fear 1+2+4+5+20+25, 26, or 27 
1+2+4+5+25, 26, or 27 
1+2+4+5+L or R20+25, 26, or 27 
1+2+4+5 
1+2+5Z, with or without 25, 26, 27 
5+20, with or without 25, 26, 27 
 
Happy 6+12 
12C/D 
 
 
Sadness 1+4+11+15B, with or without 54+64 
1+4+15, with or without 54+64 
6+15, with or without 54+64 
 
1+4+11, with or without 54+64 
1+4+15B, with or without 54+64 
1+4+15B+17, with or without 54+64 
11+15B, with or without 54+64 
11+17 
 
 25 or 26 may occur with all prototypes or major variants  
 
 
Disgust 9 
9+16+15, 26 
9+17 
10 
10+16+25, 26 
10+17 
 
 
 
Anger 4+5+7+10+22+23+25, 26 
4+5+7+10+23+25, 26 
4+5+7+23+25, 26 
4+5+7+17+23 
4+5+7+17+24 
4+5+7+23 
4+5+7+24 
Any of the prototypes without any one of 
the following AUs: 4, 5, 7, or 10 
 
Table A.2: Rules to link AUs to the six basic emotion categories [40].
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A.2 EMMA’s Action Units
In this section, a list of figures showing EMMA’s AUs is provided. EMMA’s AUs are
modeled with the help of experienced FACS coders in cooperation with the department
of anthropology at the University of Vienna [56].
Neutral Face
Action Unit 1:
Inner Brow Raiser
Action Unit 2:
Outer Brow Raiser
Action Unit 4:
Brow Lowerer
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Action Unit 5:
Uppder Lid Raiser
Action Unit 6:
Cheek Raiser
Action Unit 7:
Lower Lid Raiser
Action Unit 9:
Nose Wrinkler
Action Unit 10:
Upper Lid Raiser
Action Unit 11:
Nasolabial Furrow
Deepener
Action Unit 12:
Lip Corner Puller
Action Unit 13:
Sharp Lip Puller
Action Unit 14:
Dimpler
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Action Unit 15:
Lip Corner Depressor
Action Unit 16:
Lower Lip Depressor
Action Unit 17:
Chin Raiser
Action Unit 18:
Lip Pucker
Action Unit 20:
Lip Strechter
Action Unit 22:
Lip Funnel
Action Unit 23:
Lip Tightener
Action Unit 24:
Lip Presser
Action Unit 25:
Lips Part
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Action Unit 26:
Jaw Drop
Action Unit 27:
Mouth Stretch
Action Unit 28:
Lip Suck
Action Unit 29:
Jaw Thrust
Action Unit 30:
Jaw Sideways
Action Unit 31:
Jaw Clencher
Action Unit 32:
Bite Lip
Action Unit 33:
Blow
Action Unit 34:
Puff
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Action Unit 35:
Suck Cheeks
Action Unit 38:
Nostril Dilatator
Action Unit 39:
Nostril Compressor
Action Unit 43:
Eyes Close
Action Unit 51:
Head Turn Left
Action Unit 52:
Head Turn Right
Action Unit 53:
Head Turn Up
Action Unit 54:
Head Turn Down
Action Unit 55:
Head Tilt Left
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Action Unit 56:
Head Tilt Right
Action Unit 61:
Eyes Left
Action Unit 62:
Eyes Right
Action Unit 63:
Eyes Up
Action Unit 64:
Eyes Down
Action Unit 90:
Body Turn Left
Action Unit 91:
Body Turn Right
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A.3 EMMA’s Visemes
In this section, a list of figures showing EMMA’s visemes is provided. EMMA’s visemes
are modeled following the work of Aschenberner & Weiss [2] (see Table A.3).
Phoneme (BOSS) Viseme Example 
p, b P Pause, Bitte 
t, d, k, g T Tonne, Dach, König, Gier 
n, @n, l, @l N Nadel, raten, Liebe, Igel 
m M Mutter 
f, v F Finder, Vase 
s, z S Fass, Sein 
S, Z, tS, dZ Z Schein, Garage, Tscheche, Dschungel 
h, r, x, N R Hase, Reden, Dach, Wange 
j, C C Junge, Wicht 
i:, I, e:, E:, E E Bier, Tisch, Weg, Räte, Menge 
a:, a A Wange, Watte 
o:, O O Wolle, Wogen 
u:, U U Buch, Runde 
@, 6 Q Bitte, Weiher 
y:, Y, 2:, 9 Y Tür, Mütter, Goethe, Götter 
 
Table A.3: Phoneme-viseme mapping as defined by Aschenberner & Weiss [2].
Viseme P
AU17(0.6)+AU24(0.2)+
AU34(0.2)
Viseme T
AU20(0.1)+AU25(0.4)+
AU26(0.4)+AU27(0.3)
Viseme N
AU16(0.5)+AU25(0.1)+
AU26(0.2)
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Viseme M
AU17(0.3)+AU23(0.3)+
AU24(0.4)+AU26(0.1)
Viseme F
AU10(0.2)+AU11(0.4)+
AU17(0.1)+AU18(0.4)+
AU22(0.2)+AU26(0.2)+
AU27(0.3)+AU33(0.4)
Viseme S
AU10(0.2)+AU12(0.3)+
AU14(0.3)+AU18(0.1)+
AU22(0.3)+AU24(0.1)+
AU26(0.2)+AU27(0.5)+
AU33(0.4)
Viseme Z
AU18(0.2)+AU22(0.7)+
AU26(0.1)+AU27(0.4)+
AU33(0.4)
Viseme R
AU10(0.1)+AU11(0.3)+
AU16(0.2)+AU25(0.6)+
AU26(0.5)+AU27(0.2)
Viseme C
AU16(0.2)+AU25(0.3)+
AU26(0.3)+AU27(0.2)+
AU33(0.2)
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Viseme E
AU12(0.4)+AU16(0.3)+
AU20(0.2)+AU25(0.7)+
AU26(0.7)
Viseme A
AU25(0.7)+AU26(0.8)+
AU27(0.3)
Viseme O
AU18(0.8)+AU22(0.3)+
AU25(0.1)+AU26(0.5)+
AU27(0.3)
Viseme U
AU18(0.8)+AU22(0.4)+
AU26(0.1)+AU27(0.1)
Viseme Q
AU25(0.5)+AU26(0.5)
Viseme Y
AU18(0.8)+AU22(0.4)+
AU26(0.2)+AU27(0.1)
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A.7 Linear Regression Planes - PA Space of Negative
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